<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20075286</id><updated>2011-04-21T19:10:21.194-07:00</updated><title type='text'>AACAR Bulletin</title><subtitle type='html'>Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research
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B. PAKSOY Vol. V, No. 1, Spring 1992&lt;br /&gt;IN THIS ISSUE&lt;br /&gt;H. B. Paksoy NOTE FROM THE EDITOR.Kevin Krisciunas THE LEGACY OF ULUGH BEG (1394-1449).Yusuf Ak ura (1876-1935) THREE POLICIES. (Tr.) David S. Thomas.Hisao Komatsu THE TURKIC FEDERALIST PARTY IN TURKISTAN.Rene Pruneau DEMOCRATIZATION IN UZBEKISTAN.News of the ProfessionBibliographyBook Reviews&lt;br /&gt;NOTE FROM THE EDITOR&lt;br /&gt;With this issue, the AACAR BULLETIN has entered its fifth year. Accordingly, under the provisions of the AACAR By-Laws, the term of this Editor is completed. Meanwhile the circulation of the&lt;br /&gt;4 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;AACAR BULLETIN reached two thousand, partially via the electronic medium of SOVSET, administered by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR BULLETIN went through its paces. The original mailing list was composed entirely of the Founding Editor's personal correspondence files accumulated over some fifteen years. Later, the contents of the list grew through the inquiries and interest of individuals and institutions.&lt;br /&gt;Compared to the difficulties experienced by pioneers such as Hasan Bey Melikov Zerdabi (1842-1907) and Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1854-1914), who founded and edited, respectively, the celebrated newspapers Ekinci (1875-1877) and Terc man/Perevodchik (1883- 1918), our early efforts were nothing to complain about. While the above named individuals fought tsarist censors as well as a sceptical public and paucity of finances, AACAR BULLETIN had to confront corporeality first. But the demand for AACAR BULLETIN has been humblingly overwhelming, with each issue printing more than the one earlier, and no back issues remaining in stock. As libraries wrote us requesting a complete collection, we had to satisfy the demand by photocopying. Today, several dozen research libraries around the world possess complete runs of the AACAR BULLETIN.&lt;br /&gt;There remains the pleasant task of offering my sincere thanks to the Members of AACAR, Executive Council Members, and the Members of its several Committees; SOVSET administrators, including Dawn Mann, Alice Young and Sarah Helmstadter; American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Middle East Studies Association, their Executive Directors, Drs. Dorothy Atkinson and Anne Betteridge, respectively, and the Boards of Directors of both organizations, for unanimously extending AACAR Affiliate status and privileges; to AACAR BULLETIN contributors, book reviewers, publishing houses, book sellers and those who sent materials we included in the issues of past and present, whose names are preserved in our pages.&lt;br /&gt;5 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;The issues most of our readers enjoyed would not have been possible without the subventions provided: at first by the Department of History, CENTRAL CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY, and later by the Department of History, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS- AMHERST toward the publication of these five volumes. We greatly appreciate the help and understanding of Department Chairs, in chronological order, Professors John Rommel and his successor Donald Sanford (and the then Academic Vice-President Richard Pattenaude) of CCSU; Roland Sarti and his successor Robert E. Jones, of UMASS-Amherst.&lt;br /&gt;I trust the AACAR BULLETIN readership will extend its welcome to the new editor, who will take over with the next issue.&lt;br /&gt;THE LEGACY OF ULUGH BEG&lt;br /&gt;Kevin Krisciunas, PhD [1]Joint Astronomy Centre-Hawaii&lt;br /&gt;Muhammed Taragai Ulugh Beg (1394-1449) was a Turk who ruled the province of Transoxiana (Maverannahr), a region situated between the River Oxus (Amu Darya) and the River Jaxartes (Syr Darya), the principal city of which was Samarkand. Ulugh Beg's grandfather was the famous conqueror Timur (1336-1405). Ulugh Beg became the ruler of Transoxiana in 1447 upon the death of his father. But his rule was of short duration. Two years later he was killed by an assassin hired by his son 'Abd al Latif. Were it only for his role as prince, viceroy, and martyr, few scholars would know of Ulugh Beg. But his memory lives on because he was an observatory builder, patron of astronomy, and&lt;br /&gt;6 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;astronomer in his own right. He was certainly the most important observational astronomer of the 15th century. He was one of the first to advocate and build permanently mounted astronomical instruments. His catalogue of 1018 stars (some sources count 1022) was the only such undertaking carried out between the times of Claudius Ptolemy (ca. 170 A.D.) and Tycho Brahe (ca. 1600). And, as we shall briefly discuss here, his attitude towards scientific endeavors was surprisingly modern.&lt;br /&gt;The administration of Transoxiana was the responsibility of Ulugh Beg's father for most of Ulugh Beg's life. The prince had the opportunity (and the inclination) to pursue scholarly matters. His interest in astronomy dates from an early age, when he visited the remains of the Maragha Observatory, made famous by the astronomer Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1201-74). The principal accomplishment at Maragha was the Zij-i ilkhani, or Ilkhanic Tables.[2]&lt;br /&gt;A principal source of our information about the astronomical activity at Samarkand is a letter of one Ghiyath al-Din Jamshid al-Kashi (d. 1429), which is available in Turkish and English (see Sayili 1960). This letter, originally in Persian, was written in 1421 or 1422. From it we deduce that serious astronomical activity began in Samarkand in 1408-10, and that the construction of Ulugh Beg's observatory was begun in 1420. Among the astronomers known to have been active at Samarkand, we know only a few by name, but according to al-Kashi there were sixty or seventy scholars at the madrasa who were well enough versed in mathematics to participate in some capacity in the astronomical observations and/or seminars.&lt;br /&gt;The observations were carried out systematically from 1420 to 1437. While observatories today are expected to carry on indefinitely, this was not the case in olden times. Rather, observations were carried out, for example, to update tables of planetary motions in order to predict their future positions. al-Kashi tells us (see Sayili 1960, p.106):&lt;br /&gt;7 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;As to the inquiry of those who ask why observations are not completed in one year but require ten or fifteen years, the situation is such that there are certain conditions suited to the determination of matters pertaining to the planets, and it is necessary to observe them when these conditions obtain. It is necessary, e.g., to have two eclipses in both of which the eclipsed parts are equal and to the same side, and both these eclipses have to take place near the same node. Likewise, another pair of eclipses conforming to other specifications is needed, and still other cases of a similar nature are required. It is necessary to observe Mercury at a time when it is at its maximum morning elongation and once at its maximum evening elongation, with the addition of certain other conditions, and a similar situation exists for the other planets.&lt;br /&gt;Now, all these circumstances do not obtain within a single year, so that observations cannot be made in one year. It is necessary to wait until the required circumstances obtain and then if there is cloud at the awaited time, the opportunity will be lost and gone for another year or two until the like of it occurs once more. In this manner there is need for ten or fifteen years.&lt;br /&gt;One might add that because it takes Saturn 29 years to return to the same position amongst the stars (that being its period of revolution about the Sun), a period of 29 years might have been the projected length of the Samarkand program of observations.&lt;br /&gt;A number of instruments were used for the observations of the planets and for determining the relative positions of the stars.[3] The largest instrument in Samarkand was the so- called&lt;br /&gt;8 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Fakhri sextant. It was a 60-degree stone arc mounted on the north-south meridian line. Such an instrument was used to determine the transit altitudes of stars (i.e. their maximum angular distances above the horizon). From the most southern and northern positions of the Sun, observed over the course of a year, one can easily determine the obliquity of the ecliptic (i.e. the tilt of the Earth's axis of rotation with respect to the plane of its orbit.) The mean of these extrema, or the meridian altitude of the Sun at the moment of the vernal or autumnal equinox allows one (by definition) to determine one's latitude.[4] According to Ulugh Beg the obliquity of the ecliptic was 23 degrees 30' 17" (differing by only 32" from the true value for his time). His value for the latitude of Samarkand was 39 degrees 37' 33".&lt;br /&gt;Now, to the reader unaccustomed to astronomical topics, these might seem like just numbers, the accuracy of which may mean nothing. The most interesting thing about the Fakhri sextant in Samarkand was that its radius was 40 meters! (This is very nearly equal to the height of the dome of the 200-inch reflector at Palomar Mountain, California.) The Fakhri sextant was by far the largest meridian instrument ever built. It could achieve a resolution of a several seconds of arc -- on the order of a six-hundredth of a degree, or the diameter of an American penny at a distance of more than half a kilometer.&lt;br /&gt;Because the Fakhri sextant was an arc fixed on the meridian, it could only be used for determining the declinations of celestial bodies. (This being before the invention of accurate clocks, it could not be used for the determinations of relative right ascensions.) Because it was a 60-degree arc, it could not be used to observe stars along the full north-south meridian. Thus, it could not be used, say, to determine the angular separations of pairs of stars, or for observing stars near the northern or southern horizons. Consequently, other observational instruments were used at Samarkand, among them parallactical&lt;br /&gt;9 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;lineals and equinoctial and solstitial armillary spheres. These were made of metal and wood and were on the order of 1 meter in size. Hand held astrolabes are not to be included in this list because they were "star finders" and were used for rough time determination, rather than for the accurate determination of stellar or planetary positions.&lt;br /&gt;Typically, two people were required to make individual observations at any given time. At Samarkand it was the practice for a larger number of people to discuss the results. In modern terms, this is like peer review, the purpose of which is to eliminate sources of error and to ensure the health of the observational program. Ulugh Beg himself has allowed that in scientific questions there should be no agreeing until the matter is thoroughly understood and that people should not pretend to understand in order to be pleasing. Occasionally, when someone assented to His Majesty's view out of submission to his authority, His Majesty reprimanded him by saying 'you are imputing ignorance to me.' He also poses a false question, so that if anyone accepts it out of politeness he will reintroduce the matter and put the man to shame.[5]&lt;br /&gt;The foreword to Ulugh Beg's Zij contains four parts: 1) the chronology, describing various systems of time reckoning; 2) practical astronomy (how observations are made and used); 3) the apparent motions of the Sun, Moon, and planets, based on a geocentric system of the universe; and 4) astrology. Besides the tables of motions of the Sun, Moon, and planets, Ulugh Beg's Zij was significant for its catalogue of about 1000 stars, giving their names and ecliptic coordinates. In an appendix to this paper I give a list of published works that contain all or part of Ulugh Beg's Zij.[6] In Flamsteed's Historia Coelestis Britannica (1725) and Baily's 1843 treatise we&lt;br /&gt;10 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;can directly compare Ulugh Beg's positions with those of Ptolemy, Tycho Brahe, and others. With modern stellar positions, proper motions, and an accurate treatment of precession, it would be interesting to make a statistical analysis of, say, the 100 brightest stars, to see how these catalogues compare as to average accuracy.[7]&lt;br /&gt;In The Observatory in Islam Sayili concludes (pp. 391, 393) by stating:&lt;br /&gt;The observatory as an organized and specialized institution was born in Islam; it went through very important stages of evolution within Islam itself; it passed on in a rather highly developed state to Europe, and this was followed, shortly afterwards, by the creation of modern observatories of Europe, in an unbroken process of evolution superposing upon the traditions borrowed from Eastern Islam...The question is of significance...in the case of the Samarqand Observatory because it appears as probably the most important Islamic observatory from the standpoint of influences exerted upon Europe.&lt;br /&gt;I can accept the first half of Sayili's perspective. The astronomical programs carried out at Baghdad (9th century), Cordova (10th century), Cairo (10th to 12th centuries), Toledo (11th century), Castile (under the Christian king Alfonso X; 13th century), Maragha (13th century), and at Samarkand (15th century) were far more extensive than anything carried out by the ancient Greeks, with the possible exception of Hipparchus. The Arabs honored learning and kept alive the study of astronomy by preserving Ptolemy's Almagest and adding to its mathematical formulation. The Ma'munic, Hakemite, Toledan, Ilkhanic and Alphonsine Tables, along with the tables contained in Ulugh Beg's Zij have come down to us because scholars knew they were&lt;br /&gt;11 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;important. But the influence of the Samarkand Observatory on European astronomy was more indirect than direct. While copies of Ulugh Beg's Zij existed in various libraries such as Oxford and Paris not long after its composition (see Razvi 1985), it only became known in Europe in the mid-17th century, nearly five decades after the publication of Tycho Brahe's much more accurate data (see appendix to this paper).&lt;br /&gt;If the activities in Samarkand influenced European ones, why does Ulugh Beg only get cursory mention (on pp. 328 and 347, but not in the index) of Dreyer's classic 1890 biography of Tycho Brahe? In Thoren's even more authoritative 1990 biography of Tycho there is no mention of Ulugh Beg at all. It was work such as Tycho's, not Ulugh Beg's, that led in turn to the efforts at Greenwich (founded 1675), Pulkovo (founded 1839), and the United States Naval Observatory (founded 1844), among other institutions, and these modern, national, facilities did not need or use Ulugh Beg's work as a fundamental component of the construction of accurate star catalogues. Yet, to be fair, astronomers and historians have found many uses for ancient and medieval observations, such as studies of the spin down rate of the Earth, studies of the motion of the Moon and planets, and the dating of historical events. Ulugh Beg's observations being the best of their century allow them to stand as a permanent observational archive for our benefit. For example, Shcheglov (1977) has recently used information from the modern excavation of Ulugh Beg's large meridian instrument for a study of continental drift.&lt;br /&gt;The most direct influence of the Samarkand Observatory was on the construction of the five observatories, or Jantar Mantars, built by Maharajah Jai Singh (1686-1743) in India. Jai Singh was a Hindu prince in the court of a Muslim Mogul emperor. These observatories were built at New Delhi, Ujjain, Mathura, Varanasi, and Jaipur. The largest instrument was 27 meters high. For more&lt;br /&gt;12 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;information see Kaye (1918), Mayer (1979), Sharma (1987), and Bedding (1991).&lt;br /&gt;While recognition of Ulugh Beg's contributions to astronomy was delayed, an extensive body of information now exists on the activity of his observatory in Samarkand.[8] We now know that at the time Ulugh Beg's observatory flourished it was carrying out the most advanced observations and analysis being done anywhere. In the 1420's and 1430's Samarkand was the astronomical capital of the world. As such it is deserving of further study.&lt;br /&gt;NOTES:&lt;br /&gt;[1] Member, International Astronomical Union, Commission 41 (History of Astronomy). [2] A zij is an astronomical treatise that usually contains tables for calculating the positions of the Sun, Moon, and planets. It might also contain a star catalogue.&lt;br /&gt;[3] For a discussion of the astronomical instrumentation of the Arabs, see Sedillot (1841), Repsold (1908), and Krisciunas (1988, chapter 2). Note that the telescope was only first used for astronomical purposes in 1609.&lt;br /&gt;[4] Strictly speaking, one must also account for atmospheric refraction. For a review of astronomical coordinate systems see Krisciunas (1988, chapter 1).&lt;br /&gt;[5] Sayili (1960, pp. 109-110).&lt;br /&gt;[6] The appendix is largely based on information found in Shcheglov (1968; 1979) and in the National Union Catalog Pre-1956 Imprints. I thank Paul Luther for additional information.&lt;br /&gt;13 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;[7] Vogt (1925) found 22' for the average error of 122 Ptolemaic celestial latitudes. The best of Tycho's stellar positional measures are good to 1'. See Dreyer (1890, pp.387-8), Wesley (1978), and Thoren (1990, pp. 287-299, and references therein).&lt;br /&gt;[8] See Kary-Niiazov (1967) and Sirazhdinov (1979).&lt;br /&gt;REFERENCES AND FURTHER READINGS&lt;br /&gt;Barthold, W. W., Ulugh Beg und seine Zeit. Abhandlungen fur die Kunde des Morganlandes 21, No. 1, 1935.&lt;br /&gt;Bedding, James, "Playground for the stars: The Jantar Mantars, Astronomical Observatories in India," New Scientist, 31 August 1991, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;Dreyer, J. L. E., Tycho Brahe: A Picture of Scientific Life and Work in the Sixteenth Century (Gloucester, Mass.:Peter Smith), 1977 reprint. (Original edition published by Adam &amp; Charles Black, Edinburgh, 1890.)&lt;br /&gt;Kar[y]-N[i]iazov, T. N., "Ulugh Beg", in Dictionary of Scientific Biography 13, pp. 535-537.&lt;br /&gt;Kary-Niiazov, T. N., Astronomicheskaia shkola Ulugbeka, (Tashkent), 1967.&lt;br /&gt;Kaye, G. R., The Astronomical Observatories of Jai Singh, (Janpath, New Delhi: Archaeological Survey of India), reprint of 1918 edition. Krisciunas, Kevin, Astronomical Centers of the World (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 1988.&lt;br /&gt;14 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Mayer, Ben, "Touring the Jai Singh Observatories," Sky and Telescope 58, No. 1, July 1979, pp. 6-10.&lt;br /&gt;Razvi, Abbas, "The Observatory at Samarqand (Marsad-e-Ulugh Beg, 15th C)," Central Asia, No. 17, 1985, pp. 97-150.&lt;br /&gt;Repsold, Johann A., Zur Geschichte der Astronomischen Mess-werkzeuge von Purbach bis Reichenbach (1450 bis 1830) (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann), 1908. I have a rough (unpublished) English translation, which I would be happy to provide anyone, of the first six sections of this work, covering the astronomical instrumentation of the ancient Greeks, the Arabs, Purbach, Regiomontanus, Copernicus, Apian, Wilhelm IV of Hesse-Cassel, and Tycho Brahe.&lt;br /&gt;Sarton, George, Introduction to the History of Science (Baltimore: Williams &amp;amp; Wilkins), 1948, vol. 3, pp. 1120, 1467-1474.&lt;br /&gt;Sayili, Aydin, Ulug Bey Ve Semerkanddeki Ilim Faaliyeti Hakkinda Giyasuddin-i Kasi'nin Mektubu (Ghiyath al Din al Kashi's Letter on Ulugh Bey and the Scientific Activity in Samarqand) (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi), 1960. In note 1, pp. 32-33 of this work it is stated that another English translation was published by E. S. Kennedy (Orientalia 29, 1960, pp. 191-213), which differs in many particulars, and that the Persian text of the letter was published twice before that.&lt;br /&gt;Sayili, Aydin, The Observatory in Islam and its Place in the General History of the Observatory (New York: Arno Press), 1981 reprint. (Original edition published by T rk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara, 1960.)&lt;br /&gt;15 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Sedillot, L. [P. E. A.], Memoire sur les instruments astron. des Arabes, Paris, 1841.&lt;br /&gt;Sharma, V. N., "The Astronomical Efforts of Sawai Jai Singh," in G. Swarup [et al.], eds., History of Oriental Astronomy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 1987, pp. 233-240.&lt;br /&gt;Sh[ch]eglov, V. P., Jan Hevelius: The Star Atlas (Tashkent: "Fan" Press), 1968. Shcheglov, V. P., "Astronomical azimuths of terrestrial objects as indicators of the rotational motions of the continental blocks," Soviet Astronomy 21, No. 4, July-August 1977, pp. 499-502.&lt;br /&gt;Shcheglov, V. P., "Rasprostranenie &lt;&gt; v evropeiskoi pechati," in Sirazhdinov (1979, see below), pp. 143-151.&lt;br /&gt;Sirazhdinov, S. KH., ed., Iz istorii nauki epokhi Ulugbeka, (Tashkent: Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR), 1979.&lt;br /&gt;Thoren, Victor E., The Lord of Uraniborg: A Biography of Tycho Brahe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),1990.&lt;br /&gt;Vogt, H., "Versuch einer Wiederherstellung von Hipparchs Fixsternverzeichnis," Astronomische Nachrichten, No. 5354-55 (1925):23.&lt;br /&gt;Wesley, Walter, "The accuracy of Tycho Brahe's instruments," Journal for the History of Astronomy 9 (1978), pp.42-53.&lt;br /&gt;16 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;EDITIONS CONTAINING ALL OR PART OF ULUGH BEG'S ZIJ&lt;br /&gt;1648. John Greaves (1602-1652). Quibus accesserunt, Insigniorum aliquot Stellarum Longitudines, et Latitudines, Ex Astronomicis Observationibus Ulug Beigi, Tamerlani Magni Nepotis. Oxoniae. Contains latitudes and longitudes of [98] stars.&lt;br /&gt;1648. John Greaves (1602-1652). Binae Tabulae Geographicae, una Nassir Eddini Persae, altera Vlug Beigi Tatari: Opera et Studio J. Gravii. Lugduni, Batavorum. Geographical tables of the Zij.&lt;br /&gt;1648. John Bainbridge (1582-1643). Canicularia. Una cum demonstratione ortus Sirii heliaci, pro parallelo inferioris Aegypti. Auctore Iohanne Gravio. Quibus accesserunt, insigniorum aliquot stellarum longitudines, et latitudines, ex astronomicis observationibus Vlug Beigi. Oxoniae, H. Hall. The citation in the U. S. Naval Observatory copy states that Greaves added the catalogue of 98 Ulugh Beg stars to the Bainbridge treatise.&lt;br /&gt;1650. John Greaves (1602-1652). Epochae Celebriores, Astronomis, Historicis, Chronologis, Chataiorum, Syro-Graecorum Arabum, Persarum, Chorasmiorum usitatae (Arabice et Latine): Ex traditione Ulugi Beigi; eas primus publicavit, recensuit, et Commentarius illustravit Johannes Gravius. Londini, J. Flesher. Latin and Persian on opposite pages. That part of the Zij dealing with chronology.&lt;br /&gt;1652. John Greaves (1602-1652). Binae Tabulae Geographicae, una Nassir Eddini Persae, altera Vlug Beigi Tatari: Opera et Studio J. Gravii nunc primum publicatae. Londini, Typis Jacobi Flesher: prostant apud Cornelium Bee. 2nd edition of geographical tables.&lt;br /&gt;17 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;1665. Thomas Hyde (1636-1703). Tabulae long. ac lat. stellarum fixarum, ex observatione Ulugh Beighi, Tamerlanis Magni Nepotis, Regionum ultra citraque Gjihun (i. Oxum) Principis potentissimi. Ex tribus invicem collatis MSS. Persicis jam primum Luce ac Latio donavit, &amp; commentariis illustravit, Thomas Hyde. In calce libri accesserunt Mohammedis Tizini tabulae declinationum &amp;amp; rectarium ascensionum. Additur demum Elenchus Nominum Stellarum. Oxonii: Typis Henrici Hall, sumptibus authoris. Tables in Latin and Persian for 1018 stars of which about 700 were based exclusively on Ulugh Beg and the balance were reduced from Ptolemy in one or both coordinates. Hyde appears to have worked totally independent of Greaves.&lt;br /&gt;1690. Johannes Hevelius (1611-1687). Prodromus Astronomiae. Danzig. Contains a comparison of data in Ulugh Beg's tables with other star catalogues known at that time -- those of Ptolemy, Tycho Brahe, Giambattista Riccioli, Wilhelm IV (Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel), and Hevelius.&lt;br /&gt;1698-1712. Geographiae veteris scriptores graeci minores. Cum interpretatione latina, dissertationibus, ac annotationibus... Oxoniae, e Theatro Sheldoniano. A work containing Ulugh Beg's geographical tables.&lt;br /&gt;1725. John Flamsteed (1646-1719). Historia Coelestis Britannica. London, 3 vols. Includes Ulugh Beg's catalogue, along with those of Ptolemy, Tycho Brahe, Wilhelm IV, and Hevelius.&lt;br /&gt;1767. Gregory Sharpe. Syntagma dissertationum quas olim auctor doctissimus Thomas Hyde, S. T. P. separatim edidit. Accesserunt nonnulla ejusdem opuscula hactenus inedita, &amp;c. &amp;amp;c. Omnia diligenter recognita a Gregorio Sharpe, LL.D. Reg. Maj. a sacris. Templi Magistro S.S.R. et A.S. Oxonii. Reprint, with corrections,&lt;br /&gt;18 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;of Hyde's 1665 work on the Zij, in a 2 vol. collection of Hyde's work.&lt;br /&gt;1807. Duo pinakez geographikoi, d men Nassir 'Eddinou Persou, d de Ouloug Mpei Tatarou. 'Epimeleia kai opoudh Dhmhtriou 'Alexandridou ... Kata thn en 'Oxonia ekdosin tou sophou Grauiou. 'En Biennh thz Austriaz, ek thz tupographiaz 'A. Sxmidiou. Ulugh Beg's geographical tables published in Vienna in a Greek-language edition.&lt;br /&gt;1843. Francis Baily (1774-1844). "The Catalogues of Ptolemy, Ulugh Beigh, Tycho Brahe, Halley and Hevelius, Deduced From the Best Authorities, With Various Notes and Corrections," Memoires of the Royal Astronomical Society 13, pp. 19-28, 79-125, London. Reprinted from Thomas Hyde's translation, as edited by Gregory Sharpe in 1767.&lt;br /&gt;1839. L. P. E. A. Sedillot (1808-1875). Tables astronomiques d'Oloug Beg, commentees et publiees avec le texte en regard, Tome I, 1 fascicule, Paris. A very rare work, but referenced in the Bibliographie generale de l'astronomie jusqu'en 1880, by J. C. Houzeau and A. Lancaster (Brussels, 3 vols. 1887-9; reprinted London, 1964).&lt;br /&gt;1847. L. P. E. A. Sedillot (1808-1875). Prolegomenes des Tables astronomiques d'Oloug Beg, publiees avec Notes et Variantes, et precedes d'une Introduction. Paris: F. Didot.&lt;br /&gt;1853. L. P. E. A. Sedillot (1808-1875). Prolegomenes des Tables astronomiques d'Oloug Beg, traduction et commentaire. Paris.&lt;br /&gt;1917. Edward Ball Knobel (1841-1930). Ulugh Beg's Catalogue of Stars, Revised from all Persian Manuscripts Existing in Great&lt;br /&gt;19 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Britain, with a Vocabulary of Persian and Arabic Words. Washington, D. C.: The Carnegie Institute of Washington.&lt;br /&gt;* * *&lt;br /&gt;TARZ-I SIYASET(THREE POLICIES)&lt;br /&gt;Yusuf Ak ura (1876-1935)&lt;br /&gt;Ak ura's Tarz-i Siyaset (Three Policies) appeared during 1904 in the newspaper T RK (Nos. 24-34) in Cairo, then under British rule. The work was re-printed in 1912 in Istanbul, as a pamphlet. In 1976, Tarz-i Siyaset was re-issued with the late E. Z. Karal's introduction, also containing two of the original responses to the work: by Ali Kemal and Ahmet Ferit (Tek).[1] Due to the prevailing censorship in Istanbul, a number of periodicals opposing the rule of Abd lhamid II were being printed in Cairo.[2] One such paper of the era was AL-NAHDAH[3] published by Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1854-1914)[4], who was related to Ak ura by marriage.&lt;br /&gt;The issues discussed in Three Policies have occupied the thoughts of a large number of individuals belonging to almost all persuasions, and the administrative strata of the majority of political entities of its time. The perspectives from which Ak ura viewed those issues are also very wide, and the conclusions he reached essentially foretold what was to become. The concerns Ak ura articulated are still valid for most of the region.&lt;br /&gt;20 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;A brief biography of Ak ura is provided by David Thomas, immediately following the translation proper.[5]&lt;br /&gt;NOTES TO INTRODUCTION:&lt;br /&gt;[1] Yusuf Ak ura, Tarz-i Siyaset (Ankara: T rk Tarih Kurumu, 1976). The dedication page states: "In commemmoration of Ak ura's 100th birth anniversary, one of the first Presidents of the T rk Tarih Kurumu [Turkish Historical Society, founded by the order of Mustafa Kemal Atat rk in 1925 and maintained by his legacy provided in his last will and testament]." The volume contains a biography of Ak ura by Karal, and a bibliography of Ak ura's writings.&lt;br /&gt;[2] To place the events of the era into perspective, see for example, Y. H. Bayur, T rk Inkilabi Tarihi (Ankara, 1940-1967) Three Vols.; A. B. Kuran, Inkilap Tarihimiz ve J n T rkler (Istanbul, 1945); T. Z. Tunaya T rkiyede Siyasi Partiler, 1859- 1952 (Istanbul, 1952), of which there is now a new and expanded edition; Serif Mardin, J n T rklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908 (Ankara, 1964); A. Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, La presse et le mouvement national ches les musulmans de russie avant 1920 (Paris, 1964); E. E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks (Beirut, 1965); Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (Oxford, 1969); Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi (Ankara, 1970); S. S. Aydemir, Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Pasa, Vol. II. (Istanbul, 1976) 2nd Ed. (Especially Pp. 443-494); Stanford J &amp; E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II (Cambridge University Press, 1977); M. S kr Hanioglu, Bir Siyasal rg t Olarak 'Osmanli Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti' ve 'J n T rkl k' 1889-1902 (Vol I) (Istanbul, 1985); Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the&lt;br /&gt;21 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Young Turk era (Leiden, 1991). Most contain extensive bibliographies.&lt;br /&gt;[3] Thomas Kuttner "Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World: Ismail Gasprinskii in Cairo, 1908" Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique. 16. (1975).&lt;br /&gt;[4] Edward Lazzerini, "Gaspirali Ismail Bey's Terc man" Central Asian Monuments, H. B. Paksoy, Ed. (at press); idem, "Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View From Within" Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique. 16 (1975); idem "From Bakhchisaray to Bukhara in 1893: Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's Journey to Central Asia" Central Asian Survey Vol. 3, No. 4 (1984); idem, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878-1914" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1973); Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, Russkoe musul'manstvo: mysli, zametki I nablyudeniya (Simferopol, 1881) Society for Central Asian Studies (Oxford, 1985) Reprint No. 6; Cafer Seydahmet, Gaspirali Ismail Bey (Istanbul, 1934).&lt;br /&gt;[5] For further details, see David Thomas, "Yusuf Ak ura and the Intellectual Origins of Tarz-i Siyaset" Journal of Turkish Studies/T rkl k Bilgisi Arastirmalari Vol. 2 (1978); idem, "The Life and Thought of Yusuf Ak ura 1876-1935" (Doctoral Dissertation, McGill University, 1976).&lt;br /&gt;THREE POLICIES&lt;br /&gt;Translated by David S. Thomas, PhD.Rhode Island College&lt;br /&gt;It seems to me that since the rise of the desires for progress and rehabilitation spread from the West, three principal&lt;br /&gt;22 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;political doctrines have been conceived and followed in the Ottoman dominions. The first is the one which seeks to create an Ottoman Nation through assimilating and unifying the various nations subject to Ottoman rule. The second seeks to unify politically all Muslims living under the governance of the Ottoman State because of the fact that the prerogative of the Caliphate has been a part of the power of the Ottoman State (this is what the Europeans call Pan-Islamism). The third seeks to organize a policy of Turkish nationalism (T rk Milliyet-i siyasiyesi) based on ethnicity.&lt;br /&gt;The first of these principles had an important influence on the general political policy of the Ottoman Empire, whereas the last appeared only recently in the writings of certain authors.&lt;br /&gt;I&lt;br /&gt;The desire to bring into being an Ottoman nation did not aim at a lofty objective nor high hopes. Rather the real purpose was to grant and impose the same rights and political duties on the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman dominions, and thus to realize perfect equality between them and to grant complete freedom of thought and worship. The aim was thus to create an Ottoman Nation (Osmanli Milleti) a new nationality united in a common country similar to the American nation in the United States of America by blending and assimilating to each other the above mentioned peoples in spite of the religious and racial differences [existing] among them. The ultimate result of all these difficult processes was to be the preservation of the "High Ottoman State" in her original external form, that is within her old boundaries. Although the continuance and strengthening of the power of a state whose majority was Muslim and Turkish in its major part was beneficial to all Muslims and Turks, this political principle would not directly serve them. For this reason the Muslims and Turks living outside the Ottoman lands&lt;br /&gt;23 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;could not be so interested in this policy. The point is that it would only be a local and internal matter.&lt;br /&gt;The policy of creation of an Ottoman nation arose seriously during the reign of Mahmut the Second.(1) It is well known that this ruler said: "I wish to see the religious differences among my subjects only when they enter their mosques, synagogues, and churches..." Around the beginning and the middle of the nineteenth century it was natural that this policy was thought preferable and practicable for the Ottoman dominions. At that time in Europe the idea of nationalism, through the influence of the French Revolution, accepted as the basis of nationality the French model based on the principle of conscience rather than that of descent and ethnicity. Sultan Mahmud and his successors, self-deceived by this principle which they could not thoroughly comprehend, believed in the possibility of blending, and molding the subjects of the state who were of different ethnicities and faiths into a united nation, by means of freedom, equality, security and fraternity. Some examples which could be observed in the history of the integration of nationalities in Europe also strengthened their conviction. In fact did not the French nationality originate from a compound of German, Celtic, Latin, Greek, and other elements? Were there not many Slavic elements digested in the German nationality? Is not Switzerland a nation despite differences of ethnicity and religion? It is not improbable that these Ottoman statesmen, through an inadequate understanding of the nature of the policies pursued by the Germans and the Italians, who were striving for their political unity at that time, presented these movements as evidence to support the correctness of their policy.&lt;br /&gt;The idea of an Ottoman national unity was observed especially during the time of Ali and Fuat Pasha. Napoleon the Third, the apostle of creating nations according to the French principle of the plebiscite, was the most powerful supporter of these Westernized pashas. The French inspired reforms during the&lt;br /&gt;24 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;time of Sultan Abd laziz and the lyc e at Galatasaray which this reform symbolized were all results of the time when this system was fashionable.&lt;br /&gt;But when Napoleon and the French Empire fell in 1870-1871 which symbolized the victory of the German interpretation of nationality, that of assuming ethnicity as the basis of nationality, which, I believe, is closer to reality, the policy of Ottoman unity lost its only powerful supporter. It is true that Mithat Pasha was to a degree a follower of the two famous ministers mentioned above but his political program which was more complex in relation to theirs disappeared very quickly. As for the program of present-day Young Ottomans, who pretend to follow the work of Mithat, is very vague. I believe therefore it would not be a mistake if one assumes that the illusion of organizing an Ottoman nation passed away with the French Empire and, like it, can never be revived again. When the policy of creating an Ottoman nation failed, the policy of Islamism appeared.(2)&lt;br /&gt;This idea which the Europeans term Pan-Islamism was recently developed out of Young Ottomanism, namely by a group who partially adopted a policy of forming an Ottoman nation. The point to which many Young Ottoman poets and politicians ultimately arrived, having begun first of all with the slogans "Homeland" and "Ottomanizm" --that is Ottomanizm composed of all the peoples living in the homelands-- was "Islamism." The most influential cause of this metamorphosis was their experience of Europe and their closer observation of Western ideas. When they were in the East they stuffed their heads with the ideas of eighteenth century political philosophy --one of them was a translator of Rousseau-- but they were unable completely to comprehend the importance of ethnicity and religion and especially they were unable to understand completely that the time had passed for creating a new nationality; that the interests, if not desires, of the various elements under the rule&lt;br /&gt;25 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;of the Ottoman state were not in accordance with such a unity and blending and hence that the application of the French conception of nationality was impossible in the East. When they were in foreign countries, however, they saw their own country with greater clarity from afar, and they were successful in understanding the gradually increasing political importance of religion and ethnicity for the East. As a result they realized that the desire to create an Ottoman nation was an illusion. Thereupon they became convinced of the necessity to unify completely all Muslim peoples using all possible means, starting first with those living in the Ottoman dominions and then with those living in the remainder of the world, without regard to differences of ethnicity, but taking advantage of their common faith. In accordance with the rule that "religion and nation are one" which every Muslim learns from his earliest years, they believed that it was possible to put all Muslims in the form of a unified nation in the sense given to a nation in recent times. In one respect this would lead to dissolution and separation among the peoples of the Ottoman dominions. Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman subjects would now be divided. On the other hand, however, this would be the means of uniting all Muslims in an even greater unification and assimilation. This policy, in comparison to the previous policy, was more extensive, or in current terminology, it was world-wide (mondiale). This idea which in the beginning was purely theoretical, appearing only in the press, gradually began as well to have practical application. During the last years of Sultan Abd laziz's reign the word Pan- Islamism was frequently heard in diplomatic conversations. The establishment of diplomatic relations with certain Muslim rulers of Asia were undertaken. After the fall of Mithat Pasha, that is after the complete renunciation of the idea officially of creating an Ottoman nation, Sultan Abd lhamid the Second strove to follow this policy. This ruler, in spite of the fact that he was the irreconcilable adversary of the Young Ottomans, was, to a&lt;br /&gt;26 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;degree, their political disciple. The Young Ottomans, once realizing that the non-Muslim subjects did not want to stay within the Ottoman Commonwealth, even if they were granted complete equality in rights and freedom, had begun to express their enmity toward these non-Muslim subjects and towards their Christian protectors. The present-day policy of the Padisah exhibits a striking resemblance to Young Ottoman ideas after this change in their outlook. (3)&lt;br /&gt;The present-day ruler tried to substitute the religious title of Caliph for the terms Sultan and Padisah. In his general policies, religion, i.e. the religion of Islam, held an important place. In the curricula of the secular schools the time allotted to religious instruction was increased; the basis of education was religious. Religiosity and pietism --even if it were external and hypocritical-- became the most important means for attracting the protection of the Caliphal favor. The imperial residence of Yildiz was filled with hojas, imams, seyyids, sheikhs, and sherifs. It became a custom to appoint men with turbans to certain civil posts. Preachers were sent among the people to inspire firmness in religion, strong loyalty to the office of the Caliphate --to the person who occupied that office rather than the office itself-- and hatred against the non- Muslim peoples. Everywhere tekkes, zaviyehs, and jamis were built and repaired. Hajis won great importance. During the pilgrimage season, pilgrims passing through the city of the Caliphate were honored by the blessing and favor of the Ruler of the Muslims. Their religious allegiance and loyalty of heart to the office of the Caliphate was sought. In recent years envoys have been sent to the countries of Africa and China thickly populated by Muslims. One of the best means of carrying out this policy has been the building of the Hamidiye-Hijaz Railway. Yet with this political policy the Ottoman Empire resumed the form of a theocratic state that it had tried to abandon in the period of the Tanzimat. It now became necessary [for the&lt;br /&gt;27 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;state] to renounce all freedom, the freedom of conscience, thought and political freedom, as well as religious, ethnic, political and cultural equality. Consequently, it was necessary to say farewell to an European-type constitutional government; to accept an increase of the already existing enmities and antipathies arising out of the diversity of ethnicities, religions and social positions, which ultimately led to an increase of revolts and rebellions, as well as to an upsurge in Europe of enmity against the Turk. In fact that is just what occurred.(4)&lt;br /&gt;The idea to bring about a policy of Turkish nationalism based on ethnicity is very recent. I do not think this idea existed in either the Ottoman Empire up to now nor in other former Turkish states. Although L on Cahun, the partisan historian of Chinggis and Mongols, has written that this great Turkish Khan conquered Asia from end-to-end with the ultimate intention to unite all the Turks. I am unable to say anything concerning the historical authenticity of this assertion. Furthermore, I have not encountered any trace concerning the existence of an idea to unite the Turks during the Tanzimat and in the Young Ottoman movements. Probably the late Vefik Pasha, when he showed interest in a pure Turkish language by writing his Dictionary, was fascinated for a while with this utopian idea. It is true, nevertheless, that recently in Istanbul a circle, scientific rather than political, has been founded to pursue the idea of Turkish nationalism. It seems to me that an increase in the relations between the Ottomans and the Germans, and the growing acquaintance among Turkish youth of the German language and especially the historical and philological studies done by the Germans, have been very influential in the formation of this circle. In this new group, rather than the light, frivolous, and political style characterized by the French tradition, there exists a soundly-based science which has been obtained quietly, patiently, and in a detailed fashion. The most prominent members&lt;br /&gt;28 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;of this group are Semseddin Sami, Mehmet Emin, Necip Asim, Velet elebi, and Hasan Tahsin; while Ikdam, up to a point, seems to be their organ. The movement is developing rather slowly because the present-day government apparently does not look with favor on this mode of thinking.(5)&lt;br /&gt;I do not know whether followers of this idea exist in places other than Istanbul in the Ottoman Empire. Yet Turkism, just like Islamism, is a general policy. It is not limited to the borders of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently it is necessary to look at the other parts of the world inhabited by the Turks. In Russia, where most of the Turks live, I know of the existence in a very vague form of the idea of the unity of the Turks. The nascent Idil literature is more Turkish than Muslim in character. If external pressure had not existed, the regions of Turkistan, Yayik and Idil, wherein the great majority of the Turks are found, could have provided a more favorable environment than the Ottoman dominions for the flourishing of this idea. This idea may also exist among the Caucasian Turks. Although the Caucasian Turks have had an intellectual influence on the Azerbaijan Turks, I do not know to what degree the Turks of Northern Iran have embraced the idea of Turkish unity. In any case the formulation of a policy of nationalism based on ethnicity is still in its infancy and not widespread.&lt;br /&gt;II&lt;br /&gt;Now let us investigate which one of these three policies is useful and practicable.&lt;br /&gt;We said useful, but useful to whom and to what purpose? To this question only our natural instincts, in other words our sentiments which reason is still unable to analyze and justify, can give an answer. "I am an Ottoman, a Muslim, and a Turk. Therefore I wish to serve the interests of the Ottoman state, Islam, and all Turks." But are the interests of these three&lt;br /&gt;29 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;societies, which are political, religious, and ethnic, common? That is to say does the strengthening of one imply the strengthening of the others? The interests of the Ottoman state are not contrary to the interests of Muslims and Turks in general, inasmuch as both Muslim and Turkish subjects would become powerful by its gaining power, and at the same time other Muslims and Turks [outside] will also have support.&lt;br /&gt;But the interests of Islam do not completely coincide with Ottoman and Turkish interests, because the strengthening of Islam would lead in the end to the separation of some non-Muslim peoples from the state. The rise of the conflicts between the Muslims and the non-Muslims would lead to a partition of the present-day Ottoman commonwealth and its weakening.(6) As for the interests of the Turks, they also do not completely coincide with the interests of the Ottoman state or with Islam, since the division of Islamic society into Turkish and non-Turkish parts, will weaken it, with the result that this would release discord among the Ottoman Muslim subjects and lead to a weakening of the Ottoman Empire.&lt;br /&gt;Therefore a person belonging to each of the three societies must work for the interests of the Ottoman state. Yet in which one of these three policies, which we are discussing, lies the interest of the Ottoman state itself? And which one of these is practicable in the Ottoman Commonwealth?&lt;br /&gt;III&lt;br /&gt;The creation of an Ottoman Nation is the sole means for preserving the Ottoman Empire within its present-day borders. Yet, does the real strength of the Ottoman state lie in its preservation within its present-day geographical form?&lt;br /&gt;30 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;In the case of an Ottoman nation, it is believed that a composite nation will come into existence from among the various religions and ethnic groups based upon liberty and legal equality. They [the people] will be united only by the ideas of homeland (The Ottoman Dominions) and nation (The Ottoman Nation). The conflicts and animosities arising from religious and ethnic differences will cease, and in this fashion the Greeks and Armenians, like the Arabs will be fused into a unity. The Ottoman Turks who are the basic foundation of the Ottoman state will be content with the spiritual benefits of attributing the name of Osman Bey, their first leader, to their homeland and nation and especially by seeing the empire which came into existence through the efforts of their ancestors not partitioned any further. Perhaps they may even be forced to drop this name altogether because in this free state, in which the former conquered peoples constitute a majority, the name "Ottoman," which to them is a symbol of their former subjugation, may be abolished by their will!&lt;br /&gt;The Ottoman Turks may continue their actual predominance for a limited duration of time thanks to their sovereignty exercised through past centuries, yet it must be remembered that the duration of the force of inertia in the social realm is no more than the one observed in the realm of nature. As for the generality of Muslims who live in the Ottoman nation, since they will constitute the majority, the complete power of rulership in the administration of the state will pass into their hands. Consequently, if it is recognized that spiritually and materially the Islamic element will derive the greatest benefit from this composite society, then we also must admit that in this Ottoman nation religious conflicts remain, a real equality does not exist and the various elements have not truly been merged into one.&lt;br /&gt;To say that in the creation of the Ottoman Nation the Turkish and Muslim population and their power will not be&lt;br /&gt;31 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;increased is not to say that the power of the Ottoman state will be decreased. Nevertheless our basic question is the power of the state. Power will certainly be increased. The people of a state organized in a rational, closely-knit fashion, in short, as a block, rather than being in the state of continuous disputes and conflict (anarchy), will certainly be more powerful.&lt;br /&gt;But the basic problem is whether or not the elements belonging to different ethnicities and religions which up to now have never ceased being in conflict and contention with one another can now be united and assimilated? We have seen above that experiments of this nature in the past have ended in failures: in order to understand henceforth whether or not success is possible, let us survey the causes of this failure.&lt;br /&gt;1. Muslims, and especially Ottoman Turks, did not themselves wish this combination and assimilation. Such a policy would have put an end legally to their six hundred year-old sovereignty, and they would descend to the level of equality with reayas whom they had become accustomed over many years to regard as subjugated peoples. As the most immediate and material result of it they would be forced to let the reayas enter the government and army positions that they had customarily monopolized up to that time. In other words, by leaving an occupation looked on as honorable by the aristocratic peoples, they themselves would be forced to enter into trade and industry which they looked down upon and with which they were little acquainted.&lt;br /&gt;2. Likewise, the Muslims did not wish this inasmuch as this powerful religion which looked after the real interests of its followers from a very material and human point of view, did not accept complete legal equality of Muslim and non-Muslim: the Zimmis were to remain always on a secondary level. As for liberty, although it is true from every aspect that Islam, among all the religions, has been the most liberal, nevertheless as a religion, having its origin in the supernatural, it regards every&lt;br /&gt;32 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;custom not entirely of its own principles and customs, derived [as they are] from absolute truths, as contrary to the true path. It would not accept, therefore, merely for the goal of human happiness, complete freedom of thought and conscience.&lt;br /&gt;3. The non-Muslims, too, did not want it, because all of them had their own past, their own independence and their own governments in that past which was now being glorified because of the revival of national consciousness. Muslims and especially the Turks had ended their independence and had destroyed their governments. And, under the Ottoman rule, they believed, they had experienced injustice and not justice, contempt and not equality, misery and not happiness. The Nineteenth century had taught them their past, their rights and their nationality on the one hand, and had weakened the Ottomans, their masters on the other. And some of the fellow subjugated peoples had already won their independence. Now their weakened masters are extending their hand of brotherhood unwillingly and hesitantly. They wanted them to share sovereignty; they wanted to equalize the privileges. These invigorated subjects, whose wisdom was now brighter than their masters' and who understood that some of the hands extending towards them were really sincere, did not fail to recognize the role played on the formation of this new policy by the pressure of Western powers, who, for their own interests, sought the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The interests of some of them were probably with the idea of the Ottoman nation, yet they were also prone to exalted emotions rather than cool calculations. Thus, literally none of them wanted to form a new national unity by letting themselves merge with those whom they looked upon as their enemies.&lt;br /&gt;4. The greatest enemy of the Ottomans, Russia, as well as its satellites, the Balkan states, also did not want it. Russia wanted to get possession of the Straits [Bosphorus and Dardanelles], Anatolia, and Iraq, Istanbul and the whole of Balkans, the Holy Lands, and thus to realize its political,&lt;br /&gt;33 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;economic, national and religious aims. By occupying the Straights, Russia would obtain a large and protected port for its naval fleet, freely roam the important trade routes of the Mediterranean. From that position, Russia could, at any time, ambush the British Naval and commercial fleets, the caravans of our time, thereby at will could sever the British lines of communication with her wealthiest colony. In short, Russia could flank India, which it has coveted for a long time, again, this time from the West. By occupying Anatolia, Russia would be in a position totally to control the most fertile and productive continent on earth. By expanding into Iraq, Russia would complete its conquest of Asia, thus tilting the age old competition with Britain for the control of the Islamic holy-lands and populations in its own favor. As a result, by gaining the Straits and a substantial portion of Ottoman Asia, Russia would reap important political and economic benefits.&lt;br /&gt;By annexing the Balkans to its already wide lands, [Russians would] unify the South Slavs, and by planting the Cross on St. Sophia, gain control of the lands from which the Russian Orthodox religion originated. This would allow the extremely devout Russians, to claim with all their hearts, their highest religious and emotional objectives.&lt;br /&gt;The realization of these aims depended upon a weak, troubled and divided Ottoman state. Therefore, Russia could never tolerate the rise of an Ottoman nationality.&lt;br /&gt;Then, those Serbian and Greek states, which had recently gained political life, would want to increase [sic] their populations "that have been left under the yoke of the Turks." This could only be attained by segregating the Ottoman communities. They would have strived towards that [objective].&lt;br /&gt;5. The idea was not well received in some sections of European public opinion. Some of those who manipulated European public opinion were still under the influence of the age-old religious quarrel between Christianity and Islam. They were still&lt;br /&gt;34 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;following the tradition of the Crusades. They wanted to rescue the Christians from the Muslim yoke, to clear the infidels out of Europe and the lands of the Christians. Some of them, giving a more humane and scientific color to their claims, wanted not only to rescue the "European nations capable of progress" from the yoke of the half-barbarian Turanians who knew nothing but waging warfare, but also to push these Asiatics back to the deserts of the continent from which they originated. Frequently these two theses became mixed and confused with each other so that it was not clear which one was derived from the other. We see, therefore, that in spite of the desires of all peoples living in the Ottoman lands and in spite of all external obstacles, only a few persons who were at the top of the Ottoman government wanted to create an Ottoman nationality simply by relying upon the support of certain European governments (especially of the France of Napoleon III)! It was an impossible task. Even if these men at the top were great geniuses, it would not in the least have been possible to overcome so many obstacles. In fact, their efforts ended in failure.&lt;br /&gt;Those obstacles have not decreased since then. On the contrary they have become more numerous. Abd lhamid's policy increased the enmity and the gulf between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. Additional numbers of non-Muslim peoples were getting their independence and this doubled the enthusiasm of the others. Russia increased its power and became more aggressive. European public opinion turned more bitterly against the Turks. France, the most powerful supporter of the idea of Ottoman nationality, lost its greatness and became a follower of Russia. In short, both inside and outside, the conditions became more and more unfavorable to the scheme. It seems, therefore, that from now on to follow the policy of Ottomanism is nothing more than a waste of time.&lt;br /&gt;Now let us see if the policy of PAn-Islam is beneficial and practicable for the Ottoman state.&lt;br /&gt;35 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;As has ben alluded above, the application of this policy would increase the already existing rivalries and animosities among the peoples of the Empire and thus would mean the weakening of the state. Moreover, the Turks would find themselves separated into Muslims and non-Muslims and thus the common affinity based on ethnicity would be destroyed by religious conflicts.&lt;br /&gt;Against such disadvantages, however, this policy had the advantage of unifying all Muslims, and consequently the Turks, would create an Islamic Commonwealth more solid and compact than the unity of the Ottoman nation. More important than this, it would prepare the ground for the rise of a larger unity, based on religion, which would be able to survive alongside the great powers arising out of Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Slavic, Latin and perhaps Sino blocs.&lt;br /&gt;The realization of this ultimate aim would undoubtedly take a long time. In the beginning it would suffice to strengthen the already existing spiritual relations and to set down the outlines of future organization. But gradually the outlines will begin to take a more clear and definite form, and then it would be possible to create a stable spiritual unity extending over the greater part of Asia and half of Africa which would serve to challenge the above mentioned great and formidable blocks. But is it possible to pursue this policy in the Ottoman lands successfully?&lt;br /&gt;Islam is one of the religions which puts much importance on political and social affairs. One of its tenets may be formulated by the saying that "religion and nation are the same." Islam abolishes ethnic and national loyalties of those who embrace it. It also tends to do away with their language, their past and their traditions. Islam is a powerful melting pot in which peoples of various ethnicities and beliefs, produces Muslims who believe they are a body with the same equal rights. At the rise of Islam there was within it a strong orderly political&lt;br /&gt;36 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;organization. Its constitution was the Koran. Its official language was Arabic. It had an elected head and a holy seat. However, the changes observable in other religions can be seen in Islam, too. As the result of the influences of ethnicity and various events the political unity achieved by religion became partly disrupted. A century had not even passed since the hijra before the national conflicts between the Arabs and the Persians (taking the form of the struggles between the Umayyads and Hashemites dynasties) had opened an unbridgeable rift in the unity of Islam. It created the great schism between the Sunni and Shii Muslims. Later on various other elements like the Turks and Berbers appeared in addition to the Arabs and the Persians. In spite of the great levelling, assimilating and unifying power of Islam, the unity of the official and religious language, too, disappeared. Persians claimed equality with Arabic. A time came when the power of Islam began to sink to its lowest ebb. Part of the Muslim lands and then gradually a great part of them (more than three fourths) passed under the domination of the Christian states. The unity of Islam became more disrupted. And, in recent times, under the impact of Western ideas ethnic and national feelings which previously had been subsumed by Islam began to show their force.&lt;br /&gt;In spite of all these forces which have weakened the power of Islam, religious beliefs are still very influential. We can safely say that among the Muslims skepticism toward their faith and the doctrine of atheism are not yet wide spread. All followers of Islam still seem to be faithful, enthusiastic, obedient believers, who can face every sacrifice for the sake of their religion.&lt;br /&gt;Although the new legislations of some Muslim states have diverged from the sheria of Islam, these states still pretend to maintain the Islamic law as the basis of legislation. Arabic is still the only religious language of science and literature among the Muslims of certain lands. Many Muslim madrasa, with a few&lt;br /&gt;37 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;exceptions, still teach in Arabic and follow the same scholastic programs. Still many Muslims are saying "Thank God, I am a Muslim," before saying "I am a Turk or an Iranian." Still the majority of the Muslims of the world recognize the Emperor of the Ottoman Turks as their Caliph. Still all Muslims turn their faces to Mecca five times a day and rush from all corners of the world, enthusiastically facing all kinds of difficulties, to the kabah of Allah to kiss the Black Stone. Without hesitating, we can repeat, therefore, that Islam still is very powerful. Thus, it seems that the internal obstacles against the policy of Pan-Islam may more or less easily be overcome.&lt;br /&gt;The external obstacles, on the other hand, are very powerful. On the one hand, all of the Islamic states, with one or two exceptions, are under the influence of the Christian states. On the other hand, all of the Christian states, with one or two exceptions, have among their subjects, Muslims.&lt;br /&gt;These states believe that the allegiance of their Muslim subjects, even if this allegiance is only in a spiritual sense, to a foreign political power is contrary to their interests and is something which might prove dangerous in the future. Therefore, these states would naturally use every means within their power to prevent the realization of a Pan-Islamic unity. And, through their influence and might over the Muslim states, they are in a position to prevent it. Therefore, they can follow and eventually succeed in the materialization of a policy contrary to the Pan-Islamic program of the Ottoman government which is the strongest Islamic power today.&lt;br /&gt;Now, let us survey the benefits of the policy of Pan- Turkism (tevhid-i Etrak). By such a policy all Turks living in the Ottoman Empire would be perfectly united by both ethnic and religious bonds and the other non-Turkish Muslim groups who have been already Turkified to a certain extent would be further assimilated. Those who have never been assimilated but at the&lt;br /&gt;38 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;same time have no national feelings would be entirely assimilated under such a program.&lt;br /&gt;But the main service of such a policy would be to unify all the Turks who, being spread over a great portion of Asia and over the Eastern parts of Europe, belong to the same language groups, the same ethnicity and mostly the same religion. Thus there would be created a greater national political unity among the other great nations. In this greater national unity the Ottoman state as the most powerful, the most progressive and civilized of all Turkish societies, would naturally play an important role. There would be a Turkish world in between the world of the Caucasian and the East Asian ethnicities. Recent events suggest that such a division of the world into two great blocs is imminent. In between these two blocks the Ottoman state could play a role similar to that which is played by Japan among the East Asian ethnicities.&lt;br /&gt;But, over these advantages, there are certain disadvantages which may lead to the partition of the non-Turkish Muslims from the Ottoman Empire. These peoples cannot be assimilated with the Turks and therefore this policy would lead to the division of the Muslims into Turks and non-Turks and thereby to the relinquishment of any serious relations between the Ottoman state and the non-Turkish Muslims.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, the internal obstacles against this policy are greater in number than those which were unfavorable to the policy of Pan-Islam. For one thing, the Turkish nationalistic ideas which appeared under the influence of Western ideas is still very recent. Turkish nationalism --the idea of the unification of the Turks-- is still a new born child. That strong organization, that living and zealous feeling, in short, those primary elements which create a solid unity among Muslims do not exist in Turkishness (T rkl k). The majority of the Turks today have forgotten their past!&lt;br /&gt;39 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;We must remember, however, that a great majority of the present-day Turks who seem to be amenable to unification, are of Muslim religion. For that reason, Islam may be an important factor in the realization of a Turkish unity. Religion is admitted as an important element in various definitions of nationality. Islam, however, to play such a role in the realization of the Turkish nationality has to face a change so that it can admit the existence of the nationalities within itself --a recognition achieved recently in Christianity. And such a transformation is almost inevitable. The dominant current in our contemporary history is that of the nations. Religions as such are increasingly losing their political importance and force. Religion is increasingly becoming less and less social and more and more personal. Freedom of conscience is replacing unity of faith. Religions are renouncing their claims to being the sole director of the affairs of the communities and they are becoming spiritual forces leading hearts towards salvation. Religion is nothing more than a moral bond between the Creator and the created. Religions, therefore, if they are to maintain any of their social and political importance can do so by becoming a helper and even a hand-maiden to the national unities.(7) External obstacles against the realization of the Turkish unification, on the other hand, are less strong in comparison with those working against Pan-Islamism. Among the Christian states only power to work against this policy will be Russia. As to the other Christian governments, they may even encourage this policy because they will find it against the interests of Russia. The following conclusions seem to emerge from our discussion. The policy of Ottoman nationality, though implying many advantages for the Ottoman state, seems to be impracticable. Other policies aiming at the unification of the Muslims or of the Turks, on the other hand, seem to imply advantages and disadvantages of almost equal weight. As to the practicability of&lt;br /&gt;40 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;these two policies, we see likewise that the favorable and the unfavorable conditions are equal.&lt;br /&gt;Which one, then, should be followed? When I saw the name of your paper T rk, an uncommon name to be used [by the Ottomans], I hoped to find in your columns an answer to this question which used to occupy me continuously and I hoped that this answer would be in favor of the policy of Turkism. But, I see that the "Turk" whose rights you are defending, the "Turk" whom you are trying to enlighten and move is not anyone of that great ethnicity who live in the lands of Asia, Africa, and Europe, extending from Central Asia to Montenegro, from Timor Peninsula to the Karalar Ili[?], but he is just one of the Western Turks who is a subject of the Ottoman state. Your paper T rk knows and sees this "Turk" only as a Turk living from the Fourteenth century and whose history is known only through the eyes of the French historians. You are trying to defend the rights of only the "Turk" against the pressures of the foreign nations and the non-Muslim and Muslim peoples who are subjects of the same [Ottoman] state but who belong to a different [non-Turkish] ethnicity. For your paper T rk, the military, political and civil history of the Turks is nothing but the history of Murat the First, Mehmet the Conqueror, Selim the First, Ibn Kemal, Nef'i, Baki, Evliya elebi and Namik Kemal. It does not and cannot be extended to the names of Oghuz, Chinggis, Timur, Ulugh Bey, Farabi, Ibn Sina, Taftazani and Navai. Sometimes your opinions seems somewhat close to the policy of Pan-Islam and the Caliphate leaving the impression that you are supporting the policies of Pan-Islamism and Turkism at the same time. You implicitly seem to believe that both groups being Muslims have common interests on vital questions. But you do not even insist upon this view.(8)&lt;br /&gt;In short, the question which is in my thoughts and inviting an answer is still unanswered. The question is: of the three policies of Islamism and Turkism (T rkl k) which one is the more beneficial and practicable for the Ottoman state?&lt;br /&gt;Yusuf Ak uraVillage of Zoya, Russia 15 (28) March 1904&lt;br /&gt;41 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Ak ura's Notes:&lt;br /&gt;(1) Although it can be claimed that this policy had been followed in a natural fashion by certain Ottoman rulers up to the time of Selim I, it was not because of imitating Europe. Rather, it originated from the needs of the time and from the fact that Islam was not yet well established. Consequently it is not relevant to our discussion.&lt;br /&gt;(2) This policy had been followed several centuries before by the Ottomans. Bayazit the Lightening, Mehmet the Conqueror, and Mehmet Sokollu pursued this idea. The desire to unify the world of Islam is obvious in almost every action of Selim I. These periods, however, do not fall within the scope of this article.&lt;br /&gt;(3) It must not be forgotten that this article was written over seven years ago. [Editor's Note to the 1912 re-print].&lt;br /&gt;(4) My intention must not be misunderstood. There are several reasons for the hostility which exists among the diverse peoples and the conflicts between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The cause I have mentioned above forms only one of several varied causes.&lt;br /&gt;(5) If I am not mistaken the government did not permit publication of the second volume of the Turkish History [which this group prepared].&lt;br /&gt;42 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;(6) Because the non-Muslim Turks are very few [in number], this last danger is not important.&lt;br /&gt;(7) Examples are: the Orthodox church in Russia, Protestanizm in Germany, Anglicanism in England and Catholicism in various countries.&lt;br /&gt;(8) "Makam-i Celil-i Hilafet" T rk, 18 Kanunevvel 1319 (1903). About the Life of Yusuf Ak ura&lt;br /&gt;Ak ura was born in 1876 in Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk) on the right bank of the middle Volga. His father died when he was two; five years later he and his mother emigrated to Istanbul where henceforth he was to live. He received his early education in the schools of the Ottoman Empire and in 1895 he entered the Harbiye Mektebi (War College) in Istanbul. Upon graduation he was assigned to the Erkan-i Harbiye (General Staff Course), one of the most prestigious posts for young and ambitious cadets and one of the essential steps up the ladder of the Ottoman military hierarchy. Before he completed his training, however, he was accused of belonging to a secret society opposed to Abd lhamid and was sent into exile at Fezan in the interior of Libya, from where, in 1899, he and Ahmet Ferit [Tek], his close friend since their days together in the War College, escaped and made their way to Paris.&lt;br /&gt;Ak ura remained in Paris four years. It was a period which exerted a decisive influence on his thinking and which was to turn him completely away from a military career and reorient him for the remainder of his life toward intellectual and academic pursuits. He was given the opportunity to gain first-hand experience of European, specifically French culture, and to perfect his knowledge of French. At this time he became&lt;br /&gt;43 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;politically conscious and began to understand the motive forces and power of nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;In 1903 Ak ura left Paris and returned to his ancestral home in the Russian domains where he composed what was to become his best known work, THREE TYPES OF POLICIES. In this essay which appeared in 1904 in the paper T rk published in Cairo, Ak ura advanced a number of arguments which, when taken together, were in fact a proposal to the Turks of the Ottoman Empire, urging them to recognize their national aspirations, to forget about being Ottomans and to adopt a policy of Turkish nationalism as the focus of their collective loyalty and identity. For their time these ideas were revolutionary. Among the Ottoman Turks they were either universally ignored or rejected and it was only during the period of the Second Mesrutiyet (Constitutional Monarchy) (1908-1918) that these notions were taken seriously and elaborated by Ak ura and others into an ideology of Turkish nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;In pursuit of this, Ak ura founded the journal T RK YURDU which, from 1911 to 1917, became the foremost publication in the Turkish cultural world advancing the cause of nationalism "for all the Turks of the world." In it, Ak ura elaborated his own comprehensive doctrine of Turkism which was radically different from that advanced by G kalp. His ideology of Turkish nationalism was distinguished by its definition of the Turkish nation in terms of ethnicity, its recognition that the Turks must develop a national economy to sustain national consciousness and its insistence on reform of all institutions of Turkish society in accordance with a program of total Westernization.&lt;br /&gt;In the Turkish Republic, Ak ura assumed a position of intellectual leadership. He continued to influence the ideological evolution of the new Turkish political entity, the Turkish Republic, through his position as an influential university professor and popular teacher, and through his ideas&lt;br /&gt;44 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;on the writing of history as well as his historical studies. He died in Istanbul in 1935.&lt;br /&gt;THE TURKIC FEDERALIST PARTY IN TURKISTAN: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS&lt;br /&gt;Hisao Komatsu, PhD.Tokai University&lt;br /&gt;Perestroika opened the way for the discovery and new interpretation of the modern history of Soviet Central Asia. In recent Central Asian publications we can find a lot of new facts and source materials relating to issues and individuals that were absolutely neglected or treated as a taboo subject. In this paper, I would like to discuss an interesting document presented last year by Uzbek scholars and suggest its interpretation from a historical perspective.&lt;br /&gt;This document is the program (maramnamasi) and regulations (nizamnamasi) of the Turkic Federalist Party (T rk Adam-i Markaziyat Firkasi) adopted on August 23, 1917. It was published as a lithographed pamphlet in Tashkent in the same year and reprinted in the Cyrillic alphabet in the journal Fan ve Turmush No. 7 (1990) through the efforts of Ahmadjan Madaminov and Said Murad. I regret that I have not yet obtained the original of the pamphlet. However, as far as I know, copies of that document remained unknown to the rest of the world up to now. To begin with, it is appropriate to provide a glimpse of the political circumstances in Turkistan between the February and October Revolutions. The February Revolution evoked the nationalist movement among the Turkistan population against the&lt;br /&gt;45 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;colonial Russian rule. The Turkistani political awakening was observed in every major city, where a number of newspapers and journals were published. In addition to the periodicals, the first political organization, the Turkistan Muslim Central Council (Turkistan M sl man Merkez-i Shurasi) was established mainly by the reformist (jadids) intellectuals in Tashkent in April of the same year. However, the leadership was in fact divided into two political groups. The first was the Islamic Council (Shura-i Islam), that was established by the liberal reformists in March 1917. The second was the Ulama Society (Ulama Jamiyati), that was formed by the conservative Muslim intellectuals in June. In the first phase, there existed between them hostility and sharp conflicts as to their doctrines and tactics. While the first designed an autonomous republic for future Turkistan, the latter stressed autonomy only in the realm of Islamic law. The all-Russian Muslim Congress held in Moscow in May, indicated the clear contrast among the Turkistan delegates with different orientations. However, before long, the political situation in Turkistan among other things the Russian negative attitude toward the Turkistani population, brought about the compromise and union of the two political groups, which was completed on the occasion of the Fourth Turkistan Muslim Congress convened in Khoqand in November, just after the October Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;Now I would like to examine the above mentioned document. First of all, its content. The program consists of a Preamble, or Special Remark (Ikhtar-i Mahsus), and of Nine Chapters which are entitled as follows: "State and Autonomous Organization;" "Nationality Issues;" Religious Issues;" "Human Rights in Autonomous Segments;" Economic and Financial Matters;" "Land Issues;" "Workers Issues;" "Justice;" and "Educational Affairs." The aim of the Party is shown in the Introduction. It states "In order to bring about an autonomous and federative administration in Turkistan, there are no other means than to&lt;br /&gt;46 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;create an effective Federalist Party in Turkistan." Accordingly, new Russian state should be based on a federal system. Such major national segments as Turkistan, Kirghizistan (Kazakistan), Caucasus, Bashkurdistan and others enjoy national and territorial autonomy, while other scattered or small nations, for example Volga and Crimean Tatars, enjoy national and cultural autonomy within Russia. In general, the program plans to establish a democratic, secular and, with respect to domestic affairs, an independent Republic of Turkistan. For instance, its secular aspects appears in the article that states "no religions and sects are preferred by the government." However, at the same time it should be noted that the aspiration for the Turkic and Islamic unity in Russia is obviously expressed. The all-Russian Turkic league for national and cultural affairs and the all-Russian Muslim Spiritual Board presided by a selected Shayk al-Islam are to be created for the control of religious affairs. The program also states that a common Turkic written language should be learned and used in higher education. Still, this does not mean that the program denied linguistic pluralism in multi-ethnic Turkistan. A local language or dialect was to be used along with the official language in administrative affairs of every province and district. And in any elementary and secondary school, a local language or dialect spoken by the majority of the population should be used in the classrooms.&lt;br /&gt;The next question pertains to the identity of the author. At the end of the document, we find a list of fourteen co-authors. I introduce some of them. Mullah Kamaluddin Qazi Damulla Rahmanberdiogli of Khoqand, who was one of the delegates of Turkistan Ulama at the all-Russian Muslim Congress in Moscow. Their conservative attitude was severely criticized by other reformist --and socialist-- minded Turkistan delegates. He and some mullahs named on the list are supposed to be members of the Ulama Jamiyeti. Mullah Abidjan Mahmudyar, a merchant of Khoqand and Mir Adil Mirza Ahmadogli, a merchant of Skobelev (Margilan),&lt;br /&gt;47 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;were reformist intellectuals and later entered the cabinet of the short-lived Turkistan Autonomous Republic. Munavvar Qari Abdurrashidhan Ogli and Mullah Mahmudhoja Bahbudiy were rather famous Jadid leaders. However, as to Behbudiy's thought, it may be noticed that his early project of autonomous Turkistan presented in 1909 is enlarged and incorporated in this Party Program. Sadriddinhan Mahdum is one of the most remarkable Turkistan nationalists. After the collapse of the Turkistan autonomy [under Red Army occupation], he went to Istanbul with the purpose of establishing a Turkistan Representative Committee in Switzerland. Although he left for Switzerland with K pr l zade Mehmet Fuat, having been assisted by Talat Pasha, the revolutionary conditions in Eastern Europe prevented him from accomplishing his purpose. Later returning to Turkistan, he joined the Basmachi Movement. In short, we can find on the list the leaders of the two opposite political groups the most eminent nationalist leaders in Turkistan. And one more person not to be forgotten is Muhammad Amin Afandizada, a Caucasus ulama. The list indicates that the program was drafted by Turkistani nationalists themselves. However, it seems not without help. Zeki Velidi Togan, who himself participated in the Turkistan National Movement, writes as follows:&lt;br /&gt;In the summer of 1917, the Turkistan reformist intellectuals were engaged in establishing their own political party in preparation for the coming election of the all-Russian Constituent Assembly. Formerly there was among the Uzbeks the Turan Society for Spreading Education. At first they tried to reorganize it on the Social Democratic principles, but later, under the influence of an Azerbaijani Mehmet Emin Efendizade, they transformed it into the Turkic Federalist Party and published a definitive program. Theirs presented a socialist version of the Azerbaijan Musavat Party's&lt;br /&gt;48 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;program. They also published newspapers entitled Turan (April-September), and later T rk Ili (September). [T rkistan, P. 362]&lt;br /&gt;Togan's statement is very instructive for our interpretation. When we compare the program with that of the Azerbaijan Musavat Party, it turns out that the former is essentially the same as the latter except for a few alterations. In both programs not only the framework, but also most of the articles are identical. This program is considered the result of the cooperative work of the Turkistan and Azerbaijan reformists. The work was carried out under the effective guidance of Muhammad Amin Efendizade who was supposed to be sent by the Musavat Party at the Turkistani's request. Objectively speaking, it was inevitable for the Turkistani intellectuals who had lacked political experience to imitate the Musavat Program. On the other hand, some differences are found between the two programs. In general, the Turkistan program appears more moderate than the Musavat's. It is supposed that the Turkistan reformists had to modify it in some respects to persuade their conservative colleagues to form a united national front against the Russians. They seem to have compromised with the Ulama Jamiyati with respect to such problems as expropriation and distribution of large tracts of private land, women's rights, and so on. As to those issues we know that the delegates of the Turkistan ulama made a strong protest during the Moscow Congress. Therefore, we cannot agree with Togan, who pointed out that the Turkistan program presented the socialist version of the Azerbaijan Musavat Party. On the contrary, some radical articles in the Musavat Program, for example workers' and women's rights, disappeared in the Turkistan version. The reformists' concession to the ulama, who were conservative yet influential among the population, appear also in the party organ T rk Ili's motto: "Holding on to Islam, we work hard to defend autonomous rights."&lt;br /&gt;49 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;The biggest difference between the two programs may be found in the articles relating to land issues. As to this subject, the Turkistan Party had its own claims. First, the Turkistan program omitted the Musavat principle of expropriation and distribution of large tracts of private land. Second, the Turkistan Program claimed the recovery of land and villages confiscated by the Russians. We know, for instance, the Andijan uprising and the Kazakh revolts in Semirechiye in 1916. Third, the Turkistan Program states that the whole waqf lands confiscated unlawfully should be returned to the rightful owners according to the waqfnamas concerned. In short, as to the land issue, the Turkistan Party was radically against the previous colonial rule, but moderate as to the traditional Muslim land ownership. Unfortunately, we have not sufficient knowledge about the Party's real aspects. The Party's organ T rk Ili was at the same time the organ of the Turkistan Muslim Central Council, and it is supposed that the Party included almost all the members of the Islamic council. The very short life of the T rk Ili suggests that the Party could not enjoy great success. On the other hand, Nurshirvan Yashev did not hide his disappointment, after observing the activities of the Second Turkistan Muslim Congress held in September, just after the birth of the Party. However, it is undeniable that the Turkic Federalist Party attempted to draw the first and systematic political program independent of the Russian political parties in Turkistan, and promoted the autonomous Turkistan idea among the population even if the sphere was limited. And around it, such talented young intellectuals as Fitrat began to search for Turkistan national history and traditions. When the Musavatists in Azerbaijan decided to adopt the Ilkhanid's blue banner as their symbol, Fitrat remembered the golden age of the Timurids.&lt;br /&gt;50 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;[INSERT: three pages containing the regulations of the Turkic Federalist Party, in the original, photomechanically reproduced].&lt;br /&gt;51 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;DEMOCRATIZATION IN UZBEKISTAN&lt;br /&gt;Rene Pruneau[1]&lt;br /&gt;[Presented at the AACAR Sponsored Panel during AAASS annual meeting in November 1991].&lt;br /&gt;Prior to the August coup in Moscow, Uzbek President Islam Karimov was a firm supporter of a renewed union with increased sovereignty for the republics. Even in the days following the coup, Karimov criticized President Gorbachev's decision to resign from the Communist Party and in speeches and statements called for its primacy. Since the aborted coup and Karimov's realization of what a turning point it was for the Soviet Union, the Uzbek President has been working overtime to appeal to nationalists and democrats in Uzbekistan. He now calls for an economic and security union but complete political independence of the republic.&lt;br /&gt;Political unrest in the republic has been growing since the aborted coup and the decline of center authority. In response to the political discontent, Karimov has allowed two opposition parties to be registered and has set Presidential elections and a referendum on Uzbekistan's independence for 29 December. So far, Karimov is the only candidate for President though other parties are trying to get their nominees on the ballot.&lt;br /&gt;This paper will show that in fact Islam Karimov is working to fill the vacuum that the demise of central authority has left in the republics. After first discussing laws and decrees issued by Karimov, this paper will then look at his opposition,&lt;br /&gt;52 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;obstacles to democratization in Uzbekistan, and finally, discuss Karimov's prospects for holding on to power.&lt;br /&gt;Islam Karimov is 53-years-old and a veteran of Uzbek politics. He is from Samarkand and has held his current post since March 1990. Until this fall he had also been First Secretary of the Communist Party since 1989.[2] Karimov has proven to be a deft politician. With increased openness throughout the Soviet Union causing most republic leaders to relinquish some of their hold over their populace, Karimov remains in control.&lt;br /&gt;Karimov and his government issued an independence declaration just days after the coupe five months after 94 percent of the Uzbek population voted for President Gorbachev's referendum on the inviolability of the Union[3]--and changed the republic name from Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic to the Republic of Uzbekistan. Karimov is actively departyizing cultural societies, education, and security forces.[4] He has put security forces under direct republic control.&lt;br /&gt;The Communist Party has broken with the CPSU and renamed itself the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan--which is headed by Karimov. The new party calls for peaceable revival of spiritual and cultural traditions although it condemns calls for a state religion or creation of political religious organizations.[5] It also calls for development of a sovereign and independent Uzbekistan as a democratic state where human rights will be scrupulously observed. The party was officially registered on 18 November.[6] With the exception of these largely cosmetic changes, however, little has changed in the republic. Karimov has orchestrated what appears to be a slight opening up of Uzbek culture with the passing of a language law underscoring Uzbek preeminence as the republic's language, the publication of novels which extol the virtues of Uzbek culture, and restoring to Uzbek history books some heroes that the Soviet&lt;br /&gt;53 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;period had forgotten. On the other hand, however, he continues to clamp down on the personal freedoms of the populace. Karimov strictly controls the republic press and no unofficial papers or journals are allowed to publish. The republic press law which was published in June 1991 claims to guarantee the freedom of speech and right of Uzbek citizens to express their opinion and that censorship of the mass media is not permitted. It goes on to state, however, that appealing for a change of the state or public system is an abuse of the guaranteed right of freedom of speech. It also says that the use of mass media for interference in the personal lives of citizens without their consent, or for the infringement of their honor and dignity, is banned and prosecuted in conformity with the law. A clear warning against criticizing the President or any other public official.&lt;br /&gt;One Uzbek opposition paper, Munosabat, attempted to publish by registering and publishing in Moscow rather than Tashkent. Its distributors in Uzbekistan, however, were arrested and the paper eventually closed.[7]&lt;br /&gt;Karimov is denying the populace the freedom to assemble. In February 1990, the Supreme Soviet banned mass meetings and demonstrations outside of private premises and the Tashkent City Soviet Executive Committee has tightened the edict by prohibiting groups from meeting in private premises also.[8] This ban continues. In fact, according to leaders of the opposition group Birlik, their headquarters in Tashkent has been closed by the government and militia forces stand guard outside its entrance to keep away would be members.[9]&lt;br /&gt;In mid-November a group of about 200 representatives from opposition parties who were demonstrating outside of the hotel where most republic Supreme Soviet deputies stay, were forcibly disbanded by republic OMON after calling for Karimov's resignation, the recognition of the Islamic Revival Party, and the nationalism of Communist Party property.[10]&lt;br /&gt;54 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;The government is denying both foreigners and Uzbek citizens the freedom to travel. Karimov has stopped journalists from traveling to areas of the republic where tensions are running high and even sent some foreign and Russian journalists out of the republic. He is also obstructing lawyers from visiting political dissidents who have been arrested.[11]&lt;br /&gt;In October 1990 the Supreme Soviet passed a law guaranteeing the protection of militia workers. The law states that words or even intonation can be interpreted as a threat or insult and can be punished by a fine or arrest. Another parliamentary decree authorizes the militia to make extensive use of rubber truncheons and special methods against protestors.[12]&lt;br /&gt;Another government decree states that state owned enterprises will not assist political organizations--thereby slowing down the formation of political parties. Opposition groups in other republics such as Azerbaijan are able to take control of already existing communist cells in factories and use enterprise facilities to hold meetings.[13]&lt;br /&gt;In the last republic elections almost half the candidates were elected on a single-candidate basis, most of them Communist officials. Harassment of independent candidates took place and in dozens of instances contrived pretexts were cited as refusal for candidates to be nominated for positions.[14]&lt;br /&gt;The Supreme Soviet also passed a decree outlining measures to stabilize the social and political situation in the republic which in fact outlaws most political parties. Furthermore, by decree, no parties whose aim is to "change the existing order" are allowed. This would apply to almost any opposition party.&lt;br /&gt;On 17 September 1991 Karimov issued a decree banning all political activities in the republic government and educational establishments. In other republics, and to some degree in Uzbekistan, the intelligentsia is the strata where political parties and groups first blossom--this includes university professors.[15]&lt;br /&gt;55 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;On 1 October of this year the Republic Supreme Soviet dismantled the Council of Ministers and set up a cabinet of ministers attached to the republic President--Karimov--thus enhancing the powers of the President.[16]&lt;br /&gt;On 12 November an Uzbek Supreme Soviet committee decided not to revoke the residence permit system.&lt;br /&gt;On 14 November, a letter signed by unknown republic Supreme Soviet deputies was publicized in Russian press that called for immediate presidential elections and also for the strengthening of presidential authority stating that the well- being of the republic depends on the trust for the President personally. It is likely that Karimov was behind this move as a ploy to confuse and divide opposition groups. Furthermore, opposition groups probably do not have the infrastructure in place to run a successful republic wide presidential race in the near-term so such a timetable would be in Karimov's interest.&lt;br /&gt;While the opposition group Birlik has been allowed to register as a political party, the Uzbek Justice Ministry is not allowing the group to nominate a candidate for the presidential race.[17]&lt;br /&gt;Karimov claims that the republic is not yet ready for democracy. In an interview in the London Independent published on 18 September 1991 he claimed that he may be too authoritarian for many but he is the barrier against renewed ethnic fighting. There could have been another six or seven Fergana's without firm action by his government and multiparty democracy must be limited because of the danger of ethnic violence. He has also said, "A firm hand is needed in today's explosive situation, and the people of Uzbekistan will not accept western-style democracy because of their history and national character."[18] According to Russian press, Karimov has announced that Uzbekistan will carry out reforms according to the Chinese model--that is economic reform with no political reform.[19]&lt;br /&gt;56 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;As Moscow Komsomolskaya Pravda points out in an article published on 21 September, the idea of Uzbekistan following a Chinese model is problematic for two reasons. One, the Uzbek leadership must be ready to use force against its populace. They are currently only planning a 700 man National Guard--there are over 19 million people--and the Russian dominated USSR security forces have claimed they do not want to be involved in putting down internal republic unrest. The other point that Komsomolskaya Pravda makes is that dissent has already taken root in Uzbekistan perhaps making it too late to halt political reform.[20]&lt;br /&gt;Opposition Organizations:Even under the repressive conditions described above, Karimov does have opposition. Some of the opposition is unorganized or just emerging such as members of the intelligentsia that are discussing the creation of a purely national, one-religion state, according to Birlik leaders. Other segments of the opposition have been around for several years and are more organized. These include: Birlik: Birlik, meaning Unity, was founded in 1988 and today has departments in almost all rayons and oblasts in Uzbekistan. Its leaders claim to have the largest mass organization opposed to Uzbek authorities. They claim from 300,000 to a half million members and millions of sympathizers[21]--Karimov's new party claims only 300,000 members.[22] The organization--headquartered in Tashkent--is an umbrella group whose membership ranges from moderate opposition forces all the way to Muslim fundamentalists. It proclaimed itself a political party at a congress in Tashkent on 28 October of this year and the Uzbek Ministry of Justice registered it as an official political party on 12 November. Birlik's program includes the demand to restore to Central Asians their true history and a democratic secular state on the Turkish model.[23] The goal of the organization is the deliverance of Uzbeks and other peoples of the republic form social lethargy, indifference&lt;br /&gt;57 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992) and fear and the stimulation of social and political assertiveness. Birlik calls itself a social and political organization which wishes to extricate Uzbekistan from crisis and convert it into an independent democratic republic. The new chairman is Abdurakhim Pulatov, a doctor of science who ran a scientific institute and was the Birlik movement's co-chairman. The other co-chairman was Pulat Akhunov, a teacher and USSR Peoples deputy from the Komosomol.&lt;br /&gt;Erk: Erk--once a part of the Birlik movement--was the first Uzbek opposition officially registered by the Uzbek authorities. This came about on 5 September, only after the aborted coup in Moscow and appears to have been an attempt to appease nationalists and democrats. The party's name means freedom. The Party brings together members of the intelligentsia. Its stated goal is the struggle for human rights, national revival of Uzbekistan, and complete independence. It claims some 5,000 members. Erk's leader, Mukhamed Salikh, is a member of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet and secretary for the Uzbek Writer's Union. The party calls for opposition to the Communist Party and full democratization of all Uzbek society.[24]&lt;br /&gt;The most potentially destabilizing force against Karimov is the recently formed republic Supreme Soviet opposition group which is calling for immediate Presidential elections. In early October Karimov was confronted with unprecedented criticism at the republic Supreme Soviet session. Between 100-200 out of 500 parliament members expressed no confidence in Karimov and announced the formation of an opposition headed by Vice President Mirsaidov.[25] Meanwhile, Moscow television reported that there were simultaneous demonstrations of many thousands of people in Andijan and Namangan oblasts demanding the resignation of Karimov and a ban on his party. Republic press denied these accusations. The recent presidential decree that puts the republic Premier under the control of the President as his Vice President may have been a preemptive move on Karimov's part to gaining more&lt;br /&gt;58 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;control over Mirsaidov's actions. Mirsaidov also has a background in economics and came up through the Communist party ranks. He spent five years as Tashkent mayor. His commitment to democracy is unknown.[26]&lt;br /&gt;Other parties and groups which have been around for awhile but about which there is little information include the Islamic Rebirth Party. This group has been outlawed and many of its members jailed. Its size is not known. Members of the popular movement, Humaneness and Charity, are part of the group. The group also calls for all democratic movements to work together. Its leader is Akhmad-Kadi Aktayev.[27] Other parties and groups are new or just beginning to flex their muscles. For instance, a newly formed wing of Eduard Shevardnadze's Movement for Democratic Reform. Its size and strength are not known. Its leader is Doctor of Historical Sciences Fayzulla Iskhanov, a member of the Republic Academy of Sciences. This party calls for the unification of democratic movements and a rule of law state.[28]&lt;br /&gt;There are also organizations made up of ethnic minority groups. The largely Russian Intersoyuz group is no longer a major player in the republic but the mainly Tajik Samarkand Society is. This is based in Samarkand. The group calls for cultural autonomy of Tajiks and other Muslim non-Uzbeks in the republic. It also calls for a high-level commission to be constituted to investigate the rights of Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Tajiks in Uzbekistan. Its members and leaders have been jailed and the society banned in Uzbekistan.[29]&lt;br /&gt;Arguments Against Democracy in Uzbekistan:&lt;br /&gt;As Karimov himself states, one argument against building a democracy in Uzbekistan, at least for the near term, is the Uzbek's lack of democratic political culture. The region now known as Uzbekistan has an ancient history as the cultural, spiritual, and--during some periods--governmental center of&lt;br /&gt;59 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Central Asia. The region, however, has no democratic history, instead it was ruled by strong authoritarian leaders.&lt;br /&gt;The region's rich spiritual ties to Islam also work against the formation of a true democratic state. Islam is a strong force in Uzbekistan, though more as a cultural phenomenon than as a political one. If an Islamic government were imposed, it is unlikely that the ensuing leadership would be democratic. Other phenomenon that argue against the building of democracy in Uzbekistan are the republic's out of control population growth, growing unemployment among male youths, and economic deterioration that increase the prospects of political instability there. About 50 percent of the republic lives below the poverty line and about 50 percent of the republic's population is made up of dependents--people who do not work, mainly the elderly and children.[30] The few remaining republics in the Soviet Union will not be able or willing to fund the Central Asians as they had. In return, Uzbekistan and its neighbors will have to spend hard currency to obtain badly needed infrastructure, health care, and other goods from outside of the former Soviet Union. While some of the hard currency will come from selling cotton and gold on the open market--this will not pay for all the needed goods. The ensuing increase in poverty will result in more instability.&lt;br /&gt;Karimov has already taken action, however, to win support through economic bribery. On 17 November, he issued a decree raising the pay 40-50 percent for workers in the education, health, culture, social welfare, housing, and public utilities sectors. He is also raising student stipends 30 percent. These are traditionally key segments of the population where discontent ferments.[31]&lt;br /&gt;Prognosis:&lt;br /&gt;Karimov is fostering one of the more repressive regimes in the former Soviet Union. Uzbekistan lags most of the republics in reformist legislation that guarantees the rights of individuals.&lt;br /&gt;60 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Obstacles are constantly put in the way of opposition groups' growing so powerful as to be able to take on Karimov. Birlik's new standing and the upcoming Presidential elections, while positive developments, do not significantly change the equation. The recently formed parliamentary opposition group may be able to stand in the way of more repressive legislation but it does not appear to have the votes needed to overturn the existing legislation nor is its commitment to democracy known.&lt;br /&gt;The Uzbek Presidential elections will be a significant test of Karimov's resolve for democratic reform. If he holds fair, democratic elections and allows other parties to run candidates against him, not only will he be overturning his own policies but he will also probably gain support among the populace. Existing press laws and Karimov's position as Republic President, however, put all other candidates at a disadvantage. It is not likely that they will get the exposure, through media time or ability to travel and campaign throughout the republic, that they will need get their message out. By merely adhering to the current repressive laws, Karimov will be able to set himself up to win the Presidential election. Karimov's popular election to this post will serve to underscore his legitimacy and a poor showing by opposition candidates will give Karimov the ammunition he needs to further marginalize opposition groups. Growing nationalism, economic deterioration, unemployment, population growth, and ecological disaster indicate that instability will grow in Uzbekistan. Any leader elected democratically in the next few years would have difficulty staying in power under the dire circumstances that Uzbekistan faces. Karimov may be able to stay in place but only by increasing repression while continuing to massage Uzbek nationalist feelings and by continuing to bribe those segments of the population that appear to be the most anti-Karimov. If he is successful in reforming the economy on the Chinese model, social unrest may dissipate for a time but in the&lt;br /&gt;61 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;longer term it will likely cause such schisms in the republic that it will lead to Karimov's ouster.&lt;br /&gt;Notes:&lt;br /&gt;1. This paper reflects the views of the author and not necessarily those of the US government. 2. Moscow Tass 15 July 1990.3. Izvestiya 14 September 19914. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 August 1991.5. Interfax 1 November 1991.6. Tass 18 November 1991.7. Izvestiya 14 September 1991.8. Ibid.9. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 July 1991.10. Interfax 18 November 1991.11. Interfax 16 July 1991.12. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 July 1991.13. Izvestiya 14 September 1991.14. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 July 1991.15. Tashkent Radio 17 September 1991.16. Moscow Tass 1 October 1991.17. Interfax 20 November 1991.18. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 July 1991.19. Moscow World Service 17 September 1991.20. Komsomolskaya Pravda 21 September 1991.21. Izvestiya 14 July 1991.22. Komsomolskaya Pravda 27 July 1991.23. Moscow Central Television 16 November 1991.24. Moscow Tass International Service 5 September 1991.25. Moscow Central Television First Program 2 October 1991.26. Tass 26 March 1990.27. Interfax 9 July 1991.28. Izvestiya 24 October 1991.&lt;br /&gt;62 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;29. Interfax 10 June 1991.30. Moscow Television First Program 24 October 1991.31. Moscow Radio Rosii 17 November 1991.&lt;br /&gt;NEWS OF THE PROFESSION&lt;br /&gt;AACAR BULLETIN would like to thank those individuals and institutions who kindly furnished the information presented in this section.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR held its Membership Meeting on 23 November 1991 in Miami, in connection with the AAASS annual convention. Members directed the AACAR President Prof. Audrey L. Altstadt to conduct the elections to the AACAR Nominations Committee and the AACAR Elections Committee, nominating the individuals to be placed on the ballot. The said Committees, upon election, will perform their functions per AACAR By-Laws to replace the two outgoing members of the AACAR Executive Council. Accordingly, paid-up members were mailed ballots. The returns are announced by the President: Nominations Committee: Thomas Noonan (U Minnesota); Uli Schamiloglu (U Madison-Wisconsin); Nazif Shahrani (Indiana U)(Chair). Elections Committee: Iraj Bashiri (U Minnesota); Peter Golden (Rutgers U); H. B. Paksoy (Harvard U-CMES)(Chair).&lt;br /&gt;The Members were informed that the term of the Founding Editor of the AACAR BULLETIN was completed under the AACAR By- Laws. The attendees of the Membership Meeting suggested that the members be polled as to a successor, even though there is no such provision in the By-Laws. That item was also placed on the ballot sent to Members. Having been duly nominated, agreed to serve, and obtained the necessary support from his institution, Reuel Hanks&lt;br /&gt;63 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;(Department of Political Science and Sociology, Kennesaw State College) has been appointed as the new Editor of the AACAR BULLETIN.&lt;br /&gt;During its Annual Meeting, Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) Board of Directors voted unanimously to elect AACAR an affiliate of AAASS, and so informed AACAR. AACAR would like to thank the AAASS Board of Directors.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR also held its sponsored panel, Democratization in Central Asia, at the AAASS annual meeting.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR will hold its next Membership Meeting in conjunction with the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), of which AACAR is an affiliate, 28-31 October 1992 in Portland, Oregon. AACAR Members are requested to register for the MESA convention.&lt;br /&gt;26th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) will convene in Portland, Oregon, 28-31 October, 1992. For registration information, contact: Secretariat, MESA, University of Arizona, 1232 Cherry Ave., Tucson, AZ 85721. Phone: 602/621- 5850; Fax: 602/321-7752.&lt;br /&gt;The 44th Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) will convene in Washington DC, 2-5 April, 1992. For details, contact: AAS Secretariat, 1 Lane Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109. Phone: 313/665-2490; Fax: 313/665-3801. Second Graduate Conference in Difference and the Turkish Language in the Arts: "Poetics of Change" has issued a call for papers. "Graduate students and recent PhD.'s are invited to submit paper abstracts for a conference to be held at the OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY on Saturday and Sunday May 9-10, 1992. Papers may analyze literary and social texts which espouse or disparage,&lt;br /&gt;64 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;conceal or claim title to change, in the Ottoman Empire, Turkish Republic, or Turkic Central Asia. Abstracts should specify sources, theoretical concerns, and conclusions. Accommodations will be provided, and plans to publish the papers are underway." Contact: Professor Victoria Holbrook, Director, Graduate Conference in Difference, The Ohio State University, JaNELL/256 Cunz Hall, Columbus, OH 43210. Tel: 614/292-8913.&lt;br /&gt;Permanent International Altaistic Conference (PIAC) will hold its 35th Meeting in Taipei (Republic of China) September 12-17 1992, under the joint sponsorship of the National Taiwan University and the Center for Chinese Studies Materials of the United Press News Cultural Foundation. A circular providing details on accommodations, registration fees, visa requirements will be sent upon request. Contact: Prof. Denis Sinor, Secretary General. PIAC, Indiana U, 101 Goodbody Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405. Fax: 812/855-7500.&lt;br /&gt;A circular is received extending an invitation to the conference "First Zeki Velidi [Togan] Reading," jointly sponsored by the BASHKURT STATE UNIVERSITY, INSTITUTE OF HISTORY, LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE OF BASHKURT SCIENTIFIC CENTER AT THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, to be held in September (n.d.) 1992 at Ufa. The unsigned statement reads: "Zeki Velidi... led the national liberation movement of Bashkurt people in 1917-1920... a world famous orientalist, author of scores of fundamental works on history, culture, ethnography, folklore of Turkish peoples' history and languages. In 1990, his 100th birth anniversary was widely celebrated in Ufa, and a decision was taken to regularly hold "Zeki Velidi Reading" on a wide range of problems dealing with the famous scholar's heritage. The participants will discuss "History and Culture of peoples of Eurasia in Ancient Times, Middle Ages and Modern Times." Sections of History, Archeology, Historical Ethnography and History of Turkish Language." An abstract no more than two pages in length should be sent in&lt;br /&gt;65 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;duplicate, by 1 April 1992 to: 450074, Ufa 74, Frunze Street, University, Historical Faculty, Department of Archeology.&lt;br /&gt;Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies (RIFIAS), INDIANA UNIVERSITY announces "Rockefeller Foundation Residency Fellowships aimed at exploring indigenous primary sources on the history and civilization of Inner Asia. The Fellowship program is intended to support the study of indigenous Inner Asian sources by specialists who are equipped with the necessary philological and disciplinary skills. The RIFIAS library, in addition to its general collections, and current journal subscriptions, also houses several special collections. The Tibetan collection, housed separately, consists of several hundred volumes of Tibetan texts reprinted in India, as well as 350 original Tibetan blockprints. The most recently developed special collection, the Central Asian Archives, comprises (1) a collection of microfilms and photocopies (obtained primarily from Soviet libraries) of out-of-print publications dealing with Central Asia (2) a collection of microfilms of Persian, Turkic and Arabic manuscripts containing historical, biographical and geographic works on Islamic Central Asia. This collection currently comprises nearly 750 microfilms of manuscripts and over 800 microfilms and photocopies of published works." Details may be obtained from Professor Yuri Bregel, Director, RIFIAS, Indiana University, Goodbody Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405. Phone: 812/855- 1605.&lt;br /&gt;American Friends of Turkey voted to change its name to The American-Turkish Friendship Council. The Council issued a discussion paper "Issues and Opportunities in Turkish Education" by Prof. Howard Reed, Department of History, U of Connecticut. Copies may be obtained from: The American-Turkish Friendship Council, 1010 Vermont Ave., NW, Suite 1020, Washington, DC 20005-4902. Tel: 202/783-0483. Fax: 202/783-0511. The Council is also sponsoring an annual Conference and Exposition, with panels and lectures, details of which may be obtained from the above address. In the past, Profs. Walter Denny&lt;br /&gt;66 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;of U of Massachusetts-Amherst; Jane A. Scott of Harvard U; Stanford Shaw of UCLA; Justin McCarthy of U of Louisville presented papers.&lt;br /&gt;The 5th International Conference on Central Asia, "Democratization in Central Asia," will be held at the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, 10-13 September, 1992. Topics include social, economic, political, cultural, literary and linguistic changes from 1600-1992. Contact: Prof. Kemal Karpat, 4121 Humanities Bldg., U Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706. Madeline Zilfi (Department of History, U of Maryland-College Park, MD 20742) has been appointed Editor of the Turkish Studies Association Bulletin.&lt;br /&gt;Uli Schamiloglu (U of Wisconsin-Madison) has received a $30,000 grant from the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. This will fund the first year of a new project entitled "The Invention of National Identity and Historical Tradition: The Case of the Muslim Turks of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union".&lt;br /&gt;Prof. Warren Walker, Director of the Archive of Turkish Oral Narrative, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY writes: "Next time you are in Santa Fe, New Mexico, you might be interested in visiting the Turkish Folk Art and Culture Exhibit at the Museum of International Folk Art. All of the items on display were purchased from living folk artists and artisans. The exhibit will remain in place until mid-1993. On weekends the exhibit is animated with performances (music, dance, storytelling), with demonstrations by artists and craftsmen, with slide lectures, and with Turkish folk poetry readings (in English)." For further details, contact: Prof. Warren Walker, Archive of Turkish Oral Narrative, Library, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409. Tel: 806/742-1922.&lt;br /&gt;Silk Bridges, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization. Jeff T. Cunningham, President, writes: "Silk Bridges was formed to conduct cultural exchange projects between the US and Central Asia... and is creating an exhibit involving contemporary art&lt;br /&gt;67 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;from Uzbekistan and related events, for rural and urban audiences in the US... which will offer people in the US a fresh perspective... The Silk Bridges exhibit tour in 1992-1993 to several sites, nationally (Washington DC, New York, Chicago, Minneapolis) with the aim of improving awareness across cultural, geographical and religious divides... The extraordinary cultural diversity of Uzbekistan is attributable to its place for over 2000 years on the East-West trade routes known as The Silk Road..." Contact: Jeff Cunningham, P O Box 1005, Brattleboro, VT 05302. Tel 802/257-4944; Fax: 802/257-0294.&lt;br /&gt;Organized and hosted by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Centre d'Edtudes et de Recherches Internationales, the conference "LA TURQUIE ET L'AIRE TURQUE DANS LA NOUVELLE CONFIGURATION REGIONALLE ET INTERNATIONALE: mont e en puissance ou marginalisation?" was held in Paris 28-29 October 1991. A summary of transactions will be published in the FNSP/CERI journal Cahiers d'Etudes sur la M diterran e orientale et le monde turco-iranien. For subscriptions, contact: Semih Vaner, FNSP/CERI, 4 rue de Chevreuse, Paris 6e France.&lt;br /&gt;Stiftung Bibliotheca Afghanica has issued: Strategic Surprise: The Afghanistan Example by Dr. J rg St ssi-Lauterburg. Copies of this work, and other documentation published by the SBA, may be obtained from: Paul Bucherer-Dietschi, Director, Stiftung Bibliotheca Afghanica, Benzburweg 5, CH-4410 Liestan, Switzerland. Tel. 061 921 98 38.&lt;br /&gt;Modern China, an interdisciplinary quarterly, edited by Philip C. C. Huang (UCLA), is issued by SAGE Publications. Vol. 18 No. 1, January 1992 (Louis Putterman, Guest Editor) contains papers by Louis Putterman, Barry Naughton, Gary H. Jefferson &amp; Thomas G. Rawski, Flemming Christiansen. Subscriptions: SAGE Periodical Press, 2455 Teller Road, Newbury Park, CA 91320. Tel: 805/499-0721. FAX: 808/499-0871.&lt;br /&gt;Bulletin of the Asia Institute Vol. 4 (1990) Aspects of Iranian Culture. In Honor of Richard Nelson&lt;br /&gt;68 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Frye is available. Vol. 5 (1991) is also issued. Orders: $50 US + $5 postage per volume, Iowa State University Press, 2121 S. State Ave. Ames, Iowa 50010. Bulletin of the Asia Institute may be contacted at: 3287 Bradway Bld. Bloomfield Hills, MI 48301. Tel. 313/647-7917. Fax: 313/258-1439. Att: Cynthia Fogliatti or Carol Altmann Bromberg.&lt;br /&gt;Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies [AJAMES], under the direction of Prof. YUKAWA Takeshi, Editor in Chief, is available. For subscriptions, contact: Prof. NAGATA Yuzo, ILCAA, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 4-51-21, Nishigara, Kita-ku, Tokyo, 114, Japan.&lt;br /&gt;Worldwide Antiquarian has two new catalogues: Orientalia (No. 120); The Middle East (No. 115). Worldwide Antiqiuarian, P O Box 391, Cambridge, MA 02141. Phone: 617/876-6220; Fax: 617/876- 0839.&lt;br /&gt;Beyoglu Kitap ilik Ltd. issued a new catalogue entitled "Kirkambar." Beyoglu Kitap ilik Ltd. Galip Dede Cad, 141/5, T nel 80020, Istanbul, Turkish Republic. Bookshop Phone: 90/145 49 98; 90/152 30 78; Office Phone: 90/149 06 72. Fax: 90/149 16 24.&lt;br /&gt;ISIS Ltd. is issuing its regular catalogues, entitled Books from Turkey. Contact: ISIS Ltd, Semsibey Sokak 10, Beylerbeyi-Istanbul 81210, Turkish Republic. Phone: 90/321 38 51; 90/321 66 00.&lt;br /&gt;Camel Book Company Catalogue No. 7 is: Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan &amp; India. Camel Book Company, P O Box 1936, Cathedral Station, NY, NY 10025.&lt;br /&gt;The Studio/Johnstone--Fong Inc. Issued List # 101, containing selections from the library of Alice Boney. The Studio, 1600 East Street Road, Kennett Square, PA 19348. Phone: 215/739-3170. Fax: 215/793-3176.&lt;br /&gt;Asian Rare Books Inc. issued a new list and has a new address: 175 Fifth Avenue Suite 2138, NY NY 10010. Phone: 718/259-3732. Fax: 212/529-3511. It should be noted that this is a new address.&lt;br /&gt;Council on Foreign Relations Press has a new catalogue. Council on Foreign Relations Press, 58 East 68th Street, NY NY 10021.&lt;br /&gt;Oxus Catalogue Sixteen is: War, Revolution and Diplomacy (Europe,&lt;br /&gt;69 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Russia, Asia). Catalogue Fourteen is: Asian Travel, History, Memoirs. Oxus Oriental Books, 121 Astonville Str, London SW18 5AQ. Phone: 44/081 870 3854. Fax: 44/081 877 1173.&lt;br /&gt;JOPPA Books Ltd. Continues to issue specialized lists. May '91 list is: Literature. JOPPA Books Ltd. 29 Milner Drive, Cobham, Surrey KT11 2EZ. Phone 44/0932 86 82 69. Fax: 44/0932 86 40 71.&lt;br /&gt;Yak and Yeti Books issued Catalogue No. 20: The Himalayan Region, Central Asia and Tibet. Yak &amp;amp; Yeti Books, P O Box 5736, Rockville, MD 20855. Phone: Weekdays (6PM to 10PM; Weekends 9AM to 9PM) 301/977-7285.&lt;br /&gt;TURQUOISE a book club, has issued a new catalog. Contact: 132 East 61st Str. 2nd Floor, NY NY 10021. Phone and Fax: 212/759-6424.&lt;br /&gt;BIBLIOGRAPHY&lt;br /&gt;A work's being listed in this section does not preclude subsequent review in the AACAR BULLETIN.&lt;br /&gt;Khairulla Ismatullaev, "AKS de Uzbek Tilinin Urgelinisi" Uzbek Tili ve Adabiyati (Tashkent) March-April, 1991.&lt;br /&gt;Paul Henze, "Turkey and Georgia" [Interview] Yeni Forum (Ankara). October 1991.&lt;br /&gt;Masayuki YAMAUCHI, The Green Crescent Under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia 1919-1922 (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991). No. 42.&lt;br /&gt;Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans (NY: The Royal Institute of International Affairs/Council on Foreign Relations, 1991).&lt;br /&gt;James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignity (Westview Press, 1991).&lt;br /&gt;The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Crisis in Context, Rachel Denber, Ed. (Westview Press, 1991).&lt;br /&gt;Audrey L. Altstadt, The&lt;br /&gt;70 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity Under Russian Rule (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1992). Studies of Nationalities in the USSR Series.&lt;br /&gt;ADDENDA TO: SURVEY OF CENTRAL ASIA RELATED ACADEMIC PROGRAMS AND COURSEWORK IN NORTH AMERICA (RECEIVED SINCE THE PREVIOUS ISSUE)&lt;br /&gt;1. INSTITUTION: University of FloridaDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Anthropology Dept.SURVEY RESPONDENT: Paul J. Magnarella, Professor of AnthropologyADDRESS/PHONE: Anthropology Dept, U of Florida, Gainesville FL32611904/392 4453FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Turkish Republic, Turkic peoples of the Middle East and Central AsiaFACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Political, Economic and Cultural Relations between the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Turkic Republics&lt;br /&gt;2. INSTITUTION: Oakland UniversityDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Department of HistorySURVEY RESPONDENT: Linda Benson, Assistant Professor of HistoryADDRESS/PHONE:Department of History, Oakland U, Rochester MI 48309FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Xingjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region (Xingjiang, Chinese Turkistan)Modern history; Uygur cultural and political historyFACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:&lt;br /&gt;71 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Book length study of China's Uygur nationality, with emphasis on the 20th century and development of nationalism among China's Turkic peoples.COURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:History 377: Empire of the Steppes (4 cr.)&lt;br /&gt;3. INSTITUTION: The University of Texas at AustinDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Department of Oriental and African Languages and LiteraturesSURVEY RESPONDENT: G liz Kuruoglu, LecturerADDRESS/PHONE:Department of Oriental and African Languages and Literatures2601 University AvenueAustin TX 78712CONTACT FOR ADMISSIONS:Center for Middle Eastern Studies;Center for Slavic and East European StudiesFACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Reciprocal construction in Turkic languagesCOURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:Turkic Peoples of USSRUzbekistan, language and cultureAzerbaijan, language and culture&lt;br /&gt;4. The following update to previously published entry is received from:INSTITUTION: The University of Wisconsin-MadisonDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Central Asian Studies (Kemal Karpat, chair)SURVEY RESPONDENT: Uli Schamiloglu, Assistant ProfessorADDRESS/PHONE:Dept. of Slavic Languages720 Van Hise Hall&lt;br /&gt;72 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;University of WisconsinMadison, WI 53706(608)-262-3498CONTACT FOR ADMISSIONS:Graduate School, Social Sciences &amp; Humanities228 Bascom Hall, University of Wisconsin-MadisonMadison, WI 53706 USAtel. 608-262-2433Dept. of Anthropology5240 Social Science Building, 1180 Observatory Drivetel. 608-262-2866/2867/2868/2869&lt;br /&gt;Dept. of Economics7122 Social Science Building, 1180 Observatory Drivetel. 608-262-3559&lt;br /&gt;Dept. of GeographyM382 Science Hall, 550 North Park Streettel. 608-262-3861&lt;br /&gt;Dept. of History3211 Humanities Building, 455 North Park Streettel. 608-263-1962/1800&lt;br /&gt;Dept. of Linguistics1168 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drivetel. 608-262-2292&lt;br /&gt;Dept. of Political Science110 North Hall, 1050 Bascom Malltel. 608-263-1878/2414&lt;br /&gt;Dept. of Slavic Languages&lt;br /&gt;73 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;720 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drivetel. 608-262-3498&lt;br /&gt;Dept. of South Asian Studies1244 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drivetel. 608-262-0524&lt;br /&gt;FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Sarah Atis (South Asian Studies)--Turkish language and literatureMark Bassin (Geography)--Geography of the Soviet UnionMark Beissinger (Political Science)--Soviet domestic and nationality politicsVincent Fourniau (History)--History of Central AsiaKemal Karpat (History)--Modern Middle East, Ottoman Empire, and Central AsiaAnatoly Khazanov (Anthropology)--Central Asian and Soviet anthropologyDavid Knipe (South Asian Studies)--Religions of South AsiaDavid McDonald (History)--History of Imperial RussiaMuhammad Memon (South Asian Studies)--Islam, Urdu language and literatureCatherine Poujol (History)--Tajik language and civilizationUli Schamiloglu (Slavic Languages)--Central Asian Turkic languages, history and linguisticsJohn Street (Linguistics)--Classical and pre-classical MongolianAndr Wink (History)--History of Medieval India and Central AsiaDEGREES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:&lt;br /&gt;74 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Students are encouraged to enroll in a discipline department.The Graduate School allows independent Ph.D. programs (though not for the M.A.) for students admitted into an academic department. Interested students may contact the Dept. of Slavic Languages regarding a possible independent M.A.concentration in Central Asian languages. A proposed inter-disciplinary M.A. program in Soviet and East European programs could, if approved, also accommodate students interested in Central Asian Studies.COURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:Anthropology:Topics in Ethnology: Peoples and Cultures of the Asiatic Part of the Soviet UnionTopics in Ethnology: Peoples and Cultures of the European Part of the Soviet UnionProblems in Anthropology: Pastoral Nomadism&lt;br /&gt;History:Invasions and Empires: Central Asia from Genghis Khan to StalinUndergraduate Studies in History of Africa, Asia, or LatinAmerica: Central AsiaSeminar in Problems of Islamic History: Central Asia&lt;br /&gt;Central Asian Studies:Elementary Kazakh I-IIIntensive Uzbek I-II&lt;br /&gt;75 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Civilization of Central AsiaProseminar: Introduction to Turkic LinguisticsProseminar: The Golden Horde &amp;amp; The Rise of the Central Asian NationsIndividual Research in Central Asian Studies&lt;br /&gt;South Asian Studies:First, Second, Third, Fourth Semester TurkishReadings in Modern TurkishIslam: Religion and CultureProseminar in Languages and Literatures of South Asia: Turkish FolkloreTurkish Literature in TranslationIntroduction to the Mongolian Languages: Classical MongolianReadings in Classical and Preclassical Mongolian&lt;br /&gt;BOOK REVIEWS&lt;br /&gt;R. D. McChesney, WAQF IN CENTRAL ASIA: FOUR HUNDRED YEARS IN THE HISTORY OF A MUSLIM SHRINE, 1480-1889. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) XV + 319 Pp. Maps, Glossary, Bibliography, Index.&lt;br /&gt;This book follows the expansion of the shrine of 'Ali ibn Abi Talip and its awqaf in the vicinity of Balkh from their establishment by Sultan Husayn Bayqara in 1480 until their incorporation into the Afghan state in 1889. The author skillfully interweaves several general themes: the condition of&lt;br /&gt;76 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;the shrine's extensive awqaf, which included a vast irrigation system that sustained a large agricultural base, the political and administrative activities of the shrine's Ansari managers (mutawallis), and the rationale and policies of the various political regimes that controlled the region of BAlkh. McChesney has in fact also produced a useful chronological history of Balkh and the khanly or amirid states of Central Asia for the period 1480-1889. He points out the clash of the Chinggisid political principles of the steppeland with the centralizing tendencies of the Irano-Mughal states, provides a clearer history of the region by explaining the significance of such terms as amir, khan and sultan in their Central Asian context, and argues that under Chinggisid principles the waqf enjoyed, like Balkh itself, a large degree of autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;By focusing on a single massive waqf over a period of four centuries the author is able to identify trends or major changes in the history of the shrine and to point out the importance of this massive waqf to the economy of the region. Although his analysis relies heavily on a handful of important documents spaced more than a century apart, and upon a wide array of Russian and Persian language studies, he manages to draw from these materials a detailed description of the political, economic and social forces with which the powerful mutawallis of the shrine complex had to contend. These documents, decrees of the ruling authority, waqf summaries of the Uzbek amirs who benefited the shrine, and inventories of waqf documents collected by Russian scholars, provide McChesney the opportunity to estimate the waqf's size and to describe its administration and functions. There are, however, gaps in the author's review.&lt;br /&gt;Information about the shrine and its awqaf from its founding in 1480 to 1651 is rather scanty. Here McChesney offers only a suggestive interpretation of the shrine's relations with the various Chinggisid, Uzbek and Mughal leaders who conquered the region.&lt;br /&gt;77 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;The manshur of Subhan Quli of 1668-69, followed by a series of annexes, provides a wealth of information about the shrine and its awqaf from the middle of the 17th century to 1738. Following the withdrawal of the forces of Nadir Shah in 1747 the shrine experienced a period of virtual autonomy until it was incorporated into the expanding Afghan state. The Afghans, who benefited the shrine and made its surrounding town, Mazhar-i Sharif (the noble shrine), their provincial capital instead of Balkh, put an end to Chinggisid practices and the shrine's autonomy by extending a centralized state system over the area. With 'Abd al-Rahman's decree of 1889 the shrine and its awqaf fell under state control and its administrators were transformed into government employees. This process had already occurred in other Muslim countries as centralizing state bureaucracies gained control of religious institutions and revenues previously outside close government supervision.&lt;br /&gt;McChesney clarifies many technical terms related to waqf administration, land tenure and political theory and emphasizes the enormous significance of waqf for the social, economic and political life of the Muslim community in the vicinity of Balkh. His work is a major addition to the growing number of studies on the institution of waqf. Throughout the study, however, the emphasis is on the small number of Ansari officials who administered the waqf and their relations with the different political regimes that dominated the region. Little information is provided on the educational, devotional or philanthropic activities of this great shrine. One gets little sense, for instance, of what daily life at the shrine was like. Despite the wealth of information contained in the materials he has consulted, large gaps remain in his chronology. Surprisingly, little is yet known about the shrine in the first half of the nineteenth century. A great deal of what McChesney has written on the history of the shrine, its administrators and its irrigation system remains speculative, as he himself repeatedly admits.&lt;br /&gt;78 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;This study is nevertheless a model of analysis that throws new light on the general topic of waqf. The author has successfully demonstrated the difficult task of the shrine's administrators to hold the waqf together over a 400 year period, defend the prerogatives of the shrine amid the shifting balance of power in Central Asia and to maintain the vast irrigation system which supported the shrine's huge landholdings. This study will also serve as a basic source for the history of Central Asia for years to come.&lt;br /&gt;Daniel CreceliusCalifornia State University -- Los Angeles&lt;br /&gt;Edward A. Allworth, THE MODERN UZBEKS, FROM THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT: A CULTURAL HISTORY (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1990); xiv + 410 pp.&lt;br /&gt;This latest volume in the Hoover Institution's "Studies of Nationalities in the USSR" series is the work of Professor Edward Allworth, whose extensive contributions to the study of Uzbekistan, and of Soviet Central Asia in general, stretch across four decades; he began laboring in this field when it was much less crowded than today, and his role in promoting Central Asian studies, from a time well before the region drew the scholarly and public attention it now enjoys, leaves all students of the region in his debt. With his extensive knowledge of Soviet and pr/e-revolutionary Central Asian literature and its "practitioners," Allworth is naturally well-suited to analyze and distill the cultural experience of "the modern Uzbeks" for a much-needed volume on what is arguably the most important Soviet (if that label retains any meaning today) nationality of Muslim heritage.&lt;br /&gt;79 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Unfortunately the present work is a curious combination of creative insights and well-honed (if occasionally insufficiently substantiated) judgments reflecting his years of experience in the field, on the one hand, mixed with outdated approaches, omissions, technical lapses, and an "inventive" but ultimately lamentable organizational scheme, on the other. There is much that is good in the book, and with a number of caveats I will recommend parts of it to my own students; but there is much that is questionable, clearly flawed, or downright embarrassing, and it is a pity that it is this book, nonetheless, which will no doubt be consulted for years to come by non-specialists seeking to understand the Uzbeks and Uzbekistan.&lt;br /&gt;To be sure, portions of the book were doomed to be quickly out of date due to the enormous changes throughout the Soviet Union and their belated effects in Central Asia beginning in earnest only in 1988; though published in 1990, the volume appears to have been substantially completed in early 1987. The author cannot be blamed for accidents of timing, but it is nevertheless a pity that the work does not reflect even the beginnings of the vigorous and open debates about nearly all aspects of Uzbekistan's experience under Russian and Soviet rule which prevailed from 1988 well into 1990.&lt;br /&gt;Even so, a quite respectable purpose of such a book would be to acquaint the general reader with the historical and cultural heritage of the Uzbeks; and in pursuit of such an aim, clear presentation is essential, and selectivity is clearly unavoidable. On both counts, however, the book is flawed: its structure is often confusing, and its selection of material at worst appears haphazard and at best tells the story of only a thin layer of the Uzbek people.&lt;br /&gt;The book is divided into two major sections. The first, entitled "The Bases of Uzbek Group Identity," contains a thematic treatment of aspects of Uzbek and Central Asian history, considered as formative elements which produced the Uzbek people&lt;br /&gt;80 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;and its culture, from the time of the first use of the term " zbek" as an ethnonym down to the 18th century. The second, labeled "Conflict between Old and New Modernity," contains 12 chapters which also appear, from their titles, to follow a thematic or topical approach, but which in fact provide an essentially chronological discussion of Central Asian and Uzbek history through the 19th and 20th centuries.&lt;br /&gt;In order to begin on a positive note, let us consider the second section first, for not surprisingly, in view of Allworth's expertise, it offers the book's brightest spots. Here again, however, organization is a problem: where we expect in this section to find treatments of issues corresponding to the chapter titles such as "Education," "Culture and Religion," "Politics," or "Intelligentsia," we find instead an admittedly more inventive, but nonetheless misleading approach in which such headings implicitly signal major themes of successive periods in the 19th and 20th centuries. Thus chapter 7 ("History") deals in fact with 19th century Central Asian historical writing, chapter 8 ("Education") and 9 ("Culture and Religion") concentrate on the cultural developments of the Jadidists, and we follow in subsequent chapters the era of politicized Jadidism, the revolution, the national delimitation, the decimation of the Uzbek intelligentsia, and the revival of attention to remade "Uzbek" traditions beginning in the 1950s.&lt;br /&gt;In this second section, several chapters stand out as good summary treatments of issues handled more thoroughly by others, while others offer real, original contributions thanks to Allworth's deep knowledge of the Uzbek literary scene. In the first category are chapters 10 and 11 ("Politics" and "Homeland"), covering the politicized reformists and the early post-revolutionary developments; here one may quarrel with the inadequate attention given to the Basmachi resistance, for instance, but on the whole we have a reasonably good summary of events and trends.&lt;br /&gt;81 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;In the second category fall chapters 12, 13, and 14 ("Disintegration," "Monuments or Trophies," and "Genealogy"). The first includes welcome remarks on the Central Asian distrust of what Allworth calls "Kazan Tatar tutelage," which provide a useful antidote to recently revived voices in "Pan-Turkic" mode (now heard more from Turkey than from Tataristan) that amount to implicit assertions of "cultural hegemony" over Turkistan; the same chapter also highlights the disproportionate pressures against the Uzbeks during the 1920s, pressures which are useful to recall when comparing Uzbek political attitudes and behavior, even today, with those of other Central Asian peoples. Likewise, chapter 13 provides an insightful discussion of the colonial-style treatment of Central Asia's cultural heritage in both the Tsarist and Soviet periods, while chapter 14 takes up the Soviet-era debate on Uzbek ethnogenesis and, as one example of the role of Soviet-era historiography of Central Asia in constructing a new Uzbek communal identity, focuses on the treatment of Timur.&lt;br /&gt;With the remaining chapters we are on more "standard" ground as Allworth discusses the Uzbek intelligentsia and its evolving contributions to the understanding of what "Uzbek" means. Despite the value of such a focus -- for in large measure it is the Uzbek literary lite that has asserted the right to articulate the Uzbek people's national and cultural aspirations -- it is disappointing that Allworth seldom reaches beyond this lite to discuss the social and economic concerns of Uzbek villagers, for instance, or problems of younger Central Asians outside the educated urban upper class, or other issues less prominently evoked by the generation of Uzbek writers with whom Allworth shows the greatest familiarity.&lt;br /&gt;In the latter regard it is particularly regrettable that there is greater attention given to an essentially "accommodationist" school of the literary lite than to the younger generation of Uzbek writers, especially poets, who though&lt;br /&gt;82 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;active through the 1980s have emerged into high-profile positions only in the age of glasnost'. Allworth is to be applauded for highlighting the work of Rauf Parfi (pp. 324-325), but he is accorded barely one page (as against three for Jamal Kamal, and over four for Raim Farhadii, who writes primarily in Russian and whom Allworth himself calls a "hybrid" and an "anomaly"); and where are Muhammad Solih, Zohir Alam, Khurshid Davron, Usmon Azim, Shavkat Rahmon, or other younger writers whose works promise so much more to our understanding of "Uzbekness" today? In effect Allworth has missed an opportunity to present the voices of this new generation of strongly (even stridently) nationalistic writers, many of whom are in the forefront of the political and cultural dynamism evident from 1988 on but whose stature deserved recognition well before this.&lt;br /&gt;The most scandalous omission lies in the lack of any mention whatsoever of the role of cotton agriculture in Soviet-era Uzbek history. To be sure, Allworth labels his book a "cultural history," but to divorce such an overarching fact of Uzbek life as cotton monoculture --a target of Uzbek critics in the 1920s and 1980s-- from cultural history is to miss much of the story of Uzbekistan in the 20th century. Similarly, we find no discussion in the book of the enormous environmental problems with which Soviet rule has left Uzbekistan, nor any hint of the emergence of those problems as a rallying point for precisely the group --the literary lite-- which usually occupies the author's interest. The often groping process whereby the intellectual lite in Uzbekistan has sought, under the "unnatural" constraints imposed by Soviet rule, to come to terms with "Uzbekness" undeniably offers a fascinating case study in the construction of communal identities, but it does not serve the ends of "cultural history" to lose interest when the same intellectual lite grapples with more concrete problems of more urgent concern to the rest of the Uzbek people.&lt;br /&gt;83 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;This second section of the book is also flawed by other omissions and what would seem to be hackneyed emphases. We find virtually no discussion of any aspect of Uzbek "culture" outside literature and theatre; the visual arts and music, for instance, are essentially ignored. There is virtually no discussion, more importantly, of the Russian conquest of Central Asia, either in the form of a much needed narrative account to provide the reader some historical footing, or in the form of a discussion of Soviet historiographical treatment of the "unification" of Central Asia with the Russian empire; the latter would have been at least as illuminating as the discussion of Timur's image. The 1916 rebellion in Central Asia is also given short shrift, although here we detect something else at work: Allworth places himself squarely on the side of the Jadidists in their critical (or silent) stance toward the 1916 revolt (p.160). This is despite the clear weight of evidence that the revolt enjoyed widespread popular support and, more significantly, marked a spontaneous (if inchoate) reaction to the serious social and economic dislocations which affected the bulk of the Central Asian population -- but which many Jadidists, in their fascination with Russian and western culture, were quite late to appreciate. And indeed a dominant theme throughout Allworth's treatment of the Tsarist era is an implicit deprecation of traditional Central Asian civilization and a standard but tiresome overemphasis of the Jadidist reformers. Instead of providing insight into the patterns of traditional Muslim education or religious life or cultural expression --patterns which would go far to enhance the reader's understanding of contemporary Uzbekistan outside the cities and lite circles-- we find the same exclusive fascination with the indigenous "reformist" voices who often disparaged their own traditions in emulation of the "west" in the form of Russia. Reform schools, reformist religion, and the emulation of Russian literary genres are all discussed at length, even though these trends touched only a&lt;br /&gt;84 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;small layer of Central Asian society in their own time, and even today can help us tell much less than half the story of life in Uzbekistan; meanwhile, for example, the style of the traditional maktab (which survives to this day, in various guises, in villages and cities alike), the enormous strength of "popular" religion and its contribution to shaping group identity, and the vital oral literary traditions of Uzbekistan are ignored.&lt;br /&gt;Allworth is occasionally explicit (and uncritical) in citing Tsarist- and Soviet-era assessments of Central Asian civilization which portray Central Asia in almost exclusively negative terms, but which quite transparently represent standard colonialist denigration of a colonized people's culture. A telling example is his citation (pp. 109-110) of a Russian traveler's scornful report of a Bukharan mulla who could recite the Muslim Alexander tale but "knew virtually nothing about the 'actual' history." Allworth seems to miss the irony of criticizing the learned Bukharan for belonging to his own cultural tradition with its own construction of "actual" history, instead of to the evidently "correct" tradition, that of 19th-century Europe.&lt;br /&gt;Beyond such explicit cases, however, such an attitude --that the only thing positive about Central Asian society came from the Russian-influenced reformers-- is implicit in much of the book. To be sure, Allworth is hardly alone in his focus on the Jadidist lite; such attitudes are common in much of the writing of many who approach Central Asia from the standpoint of Russian and/or Soviet studies. In view of the "shallowness" of much of contemporary Central Asian studies, in which superficial discussion of part of the 19th century can pass for the historical and cultural background sought by specialists on contemporary Soviet Central Asia, it unfortunately appears that a deeper and more balanced appreciation of Central Asian civilization in the 19th century, free of the pre- and misconceptions derived knowingly or unknowingly from two layers of colonialist scholarship, remains far in the future.&lt;br /&gt;85 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Allworth's perspectives on the 19th century are flawed by problems of other types as well, namely simple factual errors and omissions. His dismissal of 19th-century Central Asian historical tradition must rest on a lack of familiarity with the rich and largely untapped body of historical works produced in the khanates of Qoqand, Bukhara, and Khiva; virtually all of this remains unpublished and is of difficult access, but it is not impossible to have a clearer idea of its scope than is implied in Allworth's treatment. Even in the case of the Khivan material, which he discusses at length (pp. 114-118), he seems unaware of the scholarly studies on such figures as Mu'nis and Agahi, Bayani, and Thana'i, produced outside Tashkent.&lt;br /&gt;Such problems are not uncommon in the second section of the book, but the first section is rife with these and similar flaws. This section, occupying the first 100 pages of the book, is divided into six chapters ("Ideas of Community," "Symbols and Values of Sovereignty," "Names and Tribes," "Leadership," "Ideology and the Literature of Praise," and "Diplomacy"), each of which stands as a separate meditation intended to illuminate some aspect of the Uzbek character or of the Uzbek value system. Here, as suggested, there are to be found interesting and insightful comments and anecdotal illustrations drawn from episodes in Central Asian history; but if a non-specialist seeks an extended historical narrative to orient himself in the Uzbek heritage before the Russian conquest he will not find it here or anywhere in this book. Although there is certainly merit in approaching the historical heritage of Central Asia through its reverberations and evocations in contemporary Uzbek intellectual life, such an approach presumes a familiarity with at least the outlines of Central Asian history which is hardly widespread among the expected readership of the Hoover Institution's series. Rather, we find for example bits and pieces of the career of Abu'l-Khayr Khan, ruler of the nomadic Uzbek confederacy in the 15th century, scattered through the various chapters and sections&lt;br /&gt;86 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;of chapters, with the same bits and pieces (e.g. his capture of Khorezm) recounted on several occasions for different purposes. And poor Sh bani Khan: he pops up again and again in fragments of his life or writings, and several sections in the "Leadership" chapter are focused (though that word does not quite apply) on him, but we never have a connected treatment of the career of the leader of the Uzbek conquest of Central Asia. Perhaps such a treatment would be considered old-fashioned today, and Allworth's shuffling of events and people through several chapters may represent a fresh organizational approach, but it is hardly appropriate for a book intended to introduce a reader more at home in the 20th century than in the 16th to the history of the Uzbeks or Uzbekistan; indeed, with major and regrettable exceptions there is more of a connected, chronological narrative, though disguised by the chapter headings, in the second part of the book, where most readers are arguably better informed. This first section of the book suffers not only from this scattershot approach to Uzbek history, but from a number of highly doubtful and in any case poorly argued conclusions and factual lapses. For instance, what is the point (and what is the basis!) for blaming Abu'l-Khayr Khan for introducing "Mongol vindictiveness" and "nomadic impatience" into "the developing Central Asian outlook" (p. 28)? Are we really still stuck with maintaining the contrast, entirely inappropriate in Uzbek-era Central Asia, between "mysticism" and the "narrow, fanatical rigidity" of the "clergy" (p. 70)?&lt;br /&gt;In the latter regard it is disappointing to note that one of the weakest aspects in the book is the treatment of religion, despite the series editor's promise in the foreword that Allworth "offers cogent comments on the role of Islam as a spiritual force strengthening the Uzbek ethnic unity . . ." What we have instead is occasional discussion of traditional religious expression in literary form, factual errors and omissions (e.g. he equates the Qadiriyah with the Jahriyah [p. 73], and he mentions Sh bani&lt;br /&gt;87 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;Khan's pilgrimage to the shrine of "Khwajai Buzurg," where the ruler met "a grandson of Buzurg," hiding the fact that "Khoja-i Buzurg" ["the Great Khoja"] is Baha' ad-Din Naqshband), and a deplorable lack of attention to the enormous, and often definitive, political, social, economic, and cultural roles of Islamic figures and institutions in Uzbek-era Central Asia. To be sure, Allworth devotes a chapter in the second part of the book to "Culture and Religion," but here again, predictably and sadly, it is only the "reformist" aspect of religion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that is given attention; this is in accord with the usual western fascination with the Jadidists, but does little to illuminate the traditional roots either of contemporary Islam in Central Asia or even of the patterns of religious life which the liberal Jadidists sought to reform.&lt;br /&gt;In particular, in his treatment of the content of Uzbek communal identity and Uzbek ethnogenesis, minimal attention is given to the prevailing indigenous understanding of Uzbek origins as formulated and transmitted before the impact of Russian rule; such attention would require us to step back, however, from our overemphasis on precisely those elements of "Uzbek" culture most infused with Russian and western attitudes. At a time when it is more vital than ever to listen to indigenous Uzbek voices, and at a time when it is increasingly difficult to find indigenous voices throughout Central Asia untainted by the impact of the modern Soviet worldview, it is particularly unfortunate that Allworth has missed an opportunity to acquaint the general reader with more of what informed the pre-Russian Central Asian experience --especially insofar as that experience promises to be increasingly invoked in the process of re-constructing Uzbek identity.&lt;br /&gt;In short, the book's treatment of the steppe period of Uzbek ethnohistory and of the first three centuries of the Uzbek era in Central Asia is grossly inadequate; one objects to facts,&lt;br /&gt;88 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;evaluations, and characterizations on virtually every page, and the fact that this section necessarily comes first seriously mars the impression the entire book gives. As "historical background" for a work focused exclusively on the life of a contemporary Soviet nation it is unsuitable enough; as a section in a book promising a study of the Uzbeks "from the 14th century," it is for the most part altogether without merit.&lt;br /&gt;Finally, as yet another regrettable feature of a book intended for a general readership must be mentioned a number of technical problems, above all the deplorable transcription system, which often serves to make names of prominent people unfamiliar at first glance. If we can forgive the transcription of Arabic and Persian names from the 16th century as if their bearers were 20th-century Uzbeks, there seems to be no justification for "Uzbekifying" the Russian ending "ov"/-"ev" in Russianized Uzbek family names, especially when the figures under discussion are known already through too many transcribed forms. In this case one refrains from the otherwise justifiable criticism of the book's "foolish consistency," because in fact the element of consistency is lacking. These problems spill over into the bibliography, where in addition to the lack of notation, for instance, regarding what language particular works have been translated into when listed under an Uzbek and/or Russian title, we find an apparent disregard for the nature and status of the sources; Allworth cites such works as the MATLA' AS-SA'DAYN from the partial modern Uzbek translations rather than from standard published texts, and on at least one occasion cites, through a reference of Bartol'd's, a manuscript preserved in "Petrograd University."&lt;br /&gt;Such flaws are, however, a relatively minor part of what is disturbing about this book. More serious is the pattern of errors and omissions and misleading emphases outlined here only in small measure. The book will undoubtedly be widely used and cited; its interpretations and priorities will be adopted in&lt;br /&gt;89 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;later non-specialist writings, and its transcriptions will creep into articles and term papers. As unfortunate as this may be for the goal of advancing Central Asian studies, the real disappointment lies in the fact that the book is not the one the modern Uzbeks deserve.&lt;br /&gt;Devin DeWeeseDepartment of Uralic and Altaic StudiesIndiana University&lt;br /&gt;Cyril E. Black, Louis Dupree, Elizabeth Endicott-West, Daniel C. Matuszewski, Eden Naby, and Arthur N. Waldron. The Modernization of Inner Asia. An East Gate Book (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1991).&lt;br /&gt;The Modernization of Inner Asia, an innovative and unique attempt to integrate theories of modernization with the data for Inner Asia (for the purpose of this volume a convenient geographic designation for the area stretching from Mongolia in the east to Iran in the west), appears as the third volume in the series Studies on Modernization of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University. Two earlier volumes have already appeared in the same series on the modernization of Japan and Russia (1975) and the modernization of China (1981); a fourth volume on the modernization of the Ottoman Empire and its Afro-Asian successors has been announced. The present volume is the result of the collaboration of a group of scholars, with Louis Dupree writing on Afghanistan; Elizabeth Endicott- West on Mongolia and Tibet; Daniel C. Matuszewski on the Turkic and Iranian regions of Russian and Soviet Central Asia; Eden Naby on modern Iran, knowledge and education in Central Asia, and modern Sinkiang; and Arthur N. Waldron on Turkic Sinkiang. Cyril&lt;br /&gt;90 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;E. Black wrote the introduction, conclusions, and interpretive sections and edited the text [p. xvi].&lt;br /&gt;Modernization is defined as "the process by which societies have and are being transformed under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution". The three factors which this work considers particularly relevant to the concept of modernization are "the advancement of knowledge, as reflected mainly in the scientific and technological revolution, as the primary source of change that distinguishes the modern era from earlier eras; the capacity of a society in political, economic, and social terms to take advantage of the possibilities for development offered by the advancement of knowledge; and the utility of various policies that the political leaders of a society may follow in seeking both to convert its heritage of values and institutions to modern requirements and to borrow selectively from more modern societies". Modernity assumes the adoption of universal commitments, rational inquiry and behavior, a belief in mastery over one's environment as opposed to fatalism, the possibility of choice of identity, separation of work from family, a movement away from the predominance of age and gender, race giving way to common humanity, and government based on participation, consent, and public accountability [pp. 17-20]. This work organizes its treatment of these issues for the premodern era (-1920s) into chapters on the international context, political institutions, economies, social structure, and knowledge and education. The treatment of the modern era (1920s-1980s) is similarly organized into chapters on the international context, political development, economic growth, social integration, and advancement of knowledge. The concluding third part includes chapters on patterns of modernization and Inner Asia and world politics. This approach results in a refreshing focus on political, social, economic, and cultural data that often remain unconsidered in traditional scholarship on this part of the world. Given the theme and broad scope of this work, it would have made sense to&lt;br /&gt;91 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;also include separate coverage of the influential modernizing role of the Azeris, Crimean Tatars, and Kazan Tatars.&lt;br /&gt;The sections devoted to Iran and to a lesser degree Afghanistan offer substantial factual information and analysis informed by a significant body of disciplinary research by Western and indigenous scholars who have enjoyed relatively free access to the data for these areas. What little Western disciplinary research exists for Soviet Central Asia, Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Tibet, however, has been hampered by limited access to quantitative data and to primary and secondary sources written in the indigenous languages for these areas. Moreover, scholarship in the PRC and the former USSR has usually been based on assumptions not shared in the West. As a result, much of the fundamental research on a broad range of topics for these same areas is yet to be carried out, and the confusion in the literature regarding a number of basic facts and concepts has carried over into this volume as well. Considering for a moment questions of fact, the statement that ethnicity patterns in Mongolia were not influenced by Turkic migrations [p. 12] ignores the T rk, Uygur, and other states (6th century C.E.-) centered in Mongolia as well as the Turkic origin of many of the Mongol tribes of the medieval period. Elsewhere there is the misleading statement relating to the years 1851-1914, which should be understood as the dates for Ismail bey Gaspirali and not for his newspaper Terj man (actually published 1883-1918) [p. 50].&lt;br /&gt;Turning to conceptual issues, though it is stated that nomadic military leaders "helped bring into being states whose primary purpose was securing, usually by force or the threat of force, some share of the wealth of settled areas" [p. 10], elsewhere in the same volume this is dismissed as an "age-old stereotype concerning a supposedly eternal nomadic greed for the wealth of sedentary neighbors" [p. 64]. At one point it is stated that the nomads' "mobile way of life gives them little opportunity for handicrafts" [p. 7], though elsewhere it is stated that "nomads&lt;br /&gt;92 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;also produced rugs and embroidery on rough portable looms as well as felt, ropes, and leatherwork for their own use and barter with the towns and agricultural settlements" [p. 88]. At one point it is considered that conflicts among Mongolian factions over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the reassertion of local sovereignties contributed to the political disintegration of Inner Asia [p. 12], while elsewhere it is considered that fragmentation from the 16th century on was the result of the gunpowder revolution, changing trade patterns, and an increasingly conservative religious establishment [p. 64]. Especially revealing is the confusion over the premodern bases of identity. Language is considered one of the bases of premodern identity in Mongolia [p. 37], while elsewhere it is stated that religion formed a main basis of identity [p. 57]. This can also be compared with the statement that for most Mongols of the early 20th century "political power could be envisaged only in religious and imperial terms" [p. 202]. Elsewhere Central Asians are considered to have identified themselves "by regional, clan, or tribal designations or, alternatively, by simple designation as a Muslim" [p. 71] and that the jadid reformists raised the issue of language and identity [p. 148]. These various statements could reflect differing premodern bases of identity in these various societies, but more likely they reflect the differing assumptions of modern authors regarding the bases of premodern identity. Given such unresolved conceptual issues, it is difficult to avoid asking whether the state of scholarship on this region offers an adequate basis for a synthetic treatment of modernization for all of the modern political units included in this volume. The late editor, who was not a specialist on any area of Inner Asia, must also accept a share of the responsibility for such inconsistencies in this volume. Finally, the section in this work devoted to contemporary Central Asia has now taken on historical value as a result of the collapse of the USSR. This work states that there is a strong&lt;br /&gt;93 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;basis for a distinctive Uzbek identity, but that the basis for a Kazakh identity is weak. It also considers that "the Uzbeks are foremost among the Muslim peoples of this region in pressing for their own policies and in taking advantage of the Soviet-imposed institutions to pursue their goals", and that the Kirgiz and Turkmen republics lack the basis for asserting independent policies [pp. 326-327]. Events in the wake of the collapse of the USSR may suggest the need to question the validity of the assumptions upon which these and other statements in this work concerning Central Asia are based.&lt;br /&gt;Uli SchamilogluUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison&lt;br /&gt;Lee, Hong Yung, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991). xvi + 437 pp.&lt;br /&gt;This is a work of exemplary scholarship: exhaustive and meticulous in its research, clear and crisp in style, comprehensive in substance, and analytically rich in interpretation. An opening theoretical chapter makes a persuasive case for the centrality of the cadre (i.e., political official) system for understanding Chinese politics and political economy. Two chapters then cover the cadre systems of the revolutionary and earlier Maoist periods and their legacies. Professor Lee makes precisely the right choice in devoting four chapters to the Cultural Revolution, a period which remains too little understood both in the West and in China too, but which we can be sure continues to shape China. Five chapters then treat the reform period, covering cadre rehabilitation and restructuring of the bureaucracy and the Communist Party. Two further chapters give&lt;br /&gt;94 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;historical and contemporary accounts of personnel management and the fascinating, dark world of China's system of dossiers. A long, meaty analytical conclusion follows, offering in which the author offers a perceptive political sociology of the 1989 events, and also has the courage to make some closely and perceptively argued predictions.&lt;br /&gt;At bottom this is a work of political sociology as well as political science. An essential concern is the relationship of state and society. One of Professor Lee's starting points is "the simple premise that the less institutionalized a political system, the more likely political elites will bring the ideology, experiences and outlook of the social classes from which they came into the political process" (387). Though structuralists would argue that institutional arrangements can also be the bearers of class interests --a point to which I shall return-- he is certainly right that China's low level of political institutionalization in both the Maoist and reform periods permits class interest to be brought very directly into the state through the cadres who staff it. Thus, Maoist China was shaped by its cadres' "rural orientation, which stressed subsistence and self-sufficiency, moralized politics, distrusted exchange through a market mechanism, and knew little about the functional prerequisites of modern society" (392). In Professor Lee's analysis, then, the Maoist state and political economy is a reflection of aspects of Chinese society, rather than a totalitarian deus ex machina, charismatic creation, or imperial holdover. (On the last point, he elucidates a number of very important differences between the Maoist leadership and its imperial predecessor, helping to undercut simplistic notions about a Mao Dynasty. And on the first, he strikes a blow at totalitarian theory by offering several fascinating contrasts with the state socialisms of Eastern Europe and the USSR.) Likewise, the post-Maoist state is beginning to reflect the&lt;br /&gt;95 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;character of its rising class of technocratic elites, which is his major theme. This does not augur well for democracy. In a well textured, complex analysis, Professor Lee argues that the technocrats are "more prone [than their Maoist predecessors] to bargain and compromise". They are capable of developing "a collective style of leadership and formal procedural rules in making decisions" (407). But "the new Chinese leaders are authoritarian in their political outlook" (289); "they are not democrats politically. Because of their training, they are averse to uncertainty and the slow process of decision making" (411-412). They were, after all, relatively passive in the spring of 1989. Like their Maoist predecessors, many of them believe that they know what is best for China, though they base their claim on knowledge, rather than political virtue as the Maoists did. (Fang Lizhi's almost Platonic elitism is a fine example, though Professor Lee's generosity of spirit probably spares Fang specific mention.) Yet, the technocrats will have difficulty becoming a political elite, because of their long exclusion from politics in the Maoist and even the post-Maoist period. This, he argues, is a major difference between China and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where technocrats were coopted early into the state. Another obstacle is the deep roots and resilience of the rural-based revolutionary leadership, which showed its power in 1989.&lt;br /&gt;Moreover, it is to Professor Lee's great credit that he does not fall into the common trap of overrating the importance of his subject of study. He is acutely cognizant of the continuing power of rival social groups and their political leaders. He knows that rural leaders support "political Leninism" (412). He knows that even in the spring of 1989 workers "had few interests in common with the students and intellectuals" (i.e., the fledgling technocrats). And he knows that these are enormous, strategically located, and crucially important groups that cannot&lt;br /&gt;96 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;be written out of the political system or analysis of it. Toting all this up, Professor Lee expects China to move toward a more pluralistic one-party dominant system, in which the Communist Party "may become like the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, with various factions that hold slightly disparate policy preferences but work together within a broad ideological consensus" (427). If the technocratic bureaucrats have a constructive role to play, it can be as "political managers" (426) or "power brokers" (384). But this outcome is far from assured, for it assumes some democratization of the Party (426). Perhaps more thorny, the repositioning of political elites into loci where they can mediate disputes and engage in rational allocation of resources also presumes the separation of the state from the economy. This has not happened in the first thirteen years of reform even in its urban strongholds (not to mention a good deal of the countryside in the hinterlands, where the Party retains powerful levers of economic regulation and, in the crucial sector of rural industry, even entrepreneurship). The result has been the crisis of economic overheating and corruption which underlay the 1989 blowup and blowout.&lt;br /&gt;Thus, Professor Lee's final section is appropriately entitled "Uncertain Future". This is no analytical cop-out, for he does argue with great analytical acumen (as well as courage!) why one outcome (one-party politics dominated but not controlled by the new technocratic elites) is more likely than others (democratization or renewed Maoism). Returning to an earlier point, I might add that, in the view of the technocrats' own social and political weakness, the mode of class determination in the new state will be structural and indirect rather than personal and direct. That is, what will be important in the new state, and what will be a source of technocratic power, will not be who rules, but rather the rules of the games.&lt;br /&gt;Marc BlecherOberlin College&lt;br /&gt;97 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;TURKS AROUND THE WORLDJune 6 &amp; 7, 1992Vista Hotel, New York City&lt;br /&gt;Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA) the national representative of Turkish Americans and friends of Turks invites you to a unique yearly event "Second Annual Conference on Turks Around the World" to be held during ATAA's annual convention on June 4-7, 1992, Vista Hotel in New York City.&lt;br /&gt;If you have been monitoring the ebvents in the Eurasian Republics, or studying Turks around the world, or just simply want to learn more about them, you should be there. Hear the reports on what happened in the past 12 months and what may happen in the next 12 months. It is the only scheduled event where you can network with academicians, representatives from most of the Turkish republics, the US government representatives, and Turks in the US.&lt;br /&gt;To receive registration information, call (202) 483-9090, or write to:&lt;br /&gt;ATAA,Committee on Turks Around the World,1522 Connecticut Avenue NW, 3rd Floor,Washington, DC 20036.&lt;br /&gt;98 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring 1992)&lt;br /&gt;ISLAM and DEMOCRATIZATION in CENTRAL ASIA26-27 September 1992UMASS-Amherst&lt;br /&gt;Conference on ISLAM AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA will be held at UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-Amherst, on 26-27 September 1992. The program contains papers by: Audrey L. Altstadt (UMASS- Amherst); Muriel Atkin (George Washington U); Dru Gladney (U Southern California); H. B. Paksoy (Harvard U-CMES); Uli Schamiloglu (U of Wisconsin-Madison); Masayuki Yamauchi (U of Tokyo). Commentators will be announced separately. The Second day is devoted to outreach for pre-college teachers. Registration for attendance is $100, for conference only. Accommodation reservations may be made on campus at participant's expense, by contacting the Campus Center, UMASS-Amherst, MA 01003. Phone: 413/549-6000; or at motels in the city of Amherst and immediate environs. For registration applications, contact: Prof. Audrey L. Altstadt, History Department, Herter Hall, UMASS, Amherst, MA 01003.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/20075286-113519682716598592?l=aacarbulletin.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/20075286/posts/default/113519682716598592'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/20075286/posts/default/113519682716598592'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://aacarbulletin.blogspot.com/2005/12/vol-v-no-1.html' title='Vol V No. 1'/><author><name>AACAR Bulletin</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12319161662375419427</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20075286.post-113519672951304818</id><published>2005-12-21T12:24:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-12-21T12:25:29.640-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Vol IV No. 2</title><content type='html'>BULLETINOF THEASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN RESEARCHVOLUME 4, NUMBER 2&lt;br /&gt;ISSN: 0898-6827A A C A R B U L L E T I Nof the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research&lt;br /&gt;Editor: H. B. PAKSOYVol. IV, No. 2, Fall 1991EDITORIAL ADDRESS: BOX 2321 AMHERST, MA 01004&lt;br /&gt;IN THIS ISSUE&lt;br /&gt;-- Sultan H seyin Baykara (r. 1469-1506), RISALE-I HUSEYIN BAYKARA. In commemoration of the 550th anniversary of Ali Shir Navai (1441-1501).-- Alfred Rehder, SAKSAUL-- SURVEY OF CENTRAL ASIA RELATED ACADEMIC PROGRAMS AND COURSEWORK IN NORTH AMERICA-- News of the Profession-- Bibliography-- Book Reviews&lt;br /&gt;2 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;AACAR is an affiliate of the Middle East Studies Association. AACAR BULLETIN is indexed by the PERIODICA ISLAMICA.&lt;br /&gt;The AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board: Thomas Allsen (Trenton State College), Muriel Atkin (George Washington U), Peter Golden (Rutgers U), Thomas Noonan (U of Minnesota), Omeljan Pritsak (Harvard U) invites the submission of high quality manuscripts in the field of Central Asian Studies for publication. AACAR has negotiated contracts with a number of publishing houses for the purpose. Contact: Prof. Thomas Allsen, Secretary of the AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board, History Department, Trenton State College, Trenton, NJ 08650.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR and AACAR BULLETIN are COPYRIGHTED 1991. All rights reserved. No portion of AACAR BULLETIN may be reproduced in any manner without permission in writing from the Editor. Photocopying information for users in the USA: The Item-Fee Code for this publication indicates the authorization to photocopy items for internal, client or personal use is granted by the&lt;br /&gt;3 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;copyright holder for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service, provided the stated fee for copying, beyond that permitted by Section 107 or 108 of the U. S. Copyright Law, is paid. The appropriate remittance of $5.00 per copy per article is paid directly to the Copyright Clearance Center, 27 Congress Str., Salem, MA 01970 USA. The Item-Fee Code for AACAR BULLETIN is: 0898-6827/91 + $5.00 + .00&lt;br /&gt;All information reported is believed to be correct at the time of publication. AACAR BULLETIN suggests that readers verify the events and particulars of an announcement with the named organizers and contacts, and regrets that AACAR BULLETIN can assume no responsibility for cancellations, dates, amendments, postponements or the like. AACAR BULLETIN reserves the right to edit any material submitted for space considerations, and generally list them in the order of arrival. As customary, inclusion of an event or item in an issue does not necessarily imply endorsement by AACAR BULLETIN, AACAR or its Officers. All opinions expressed are those of their authors.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR BULLETIN gratefully acknowledges the subvention received from the Department of History, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST toward the publication of this issue.&lt;br /&gt;4 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;RISALE-I H SEYIN BAYKARA&lt;br /&gt;Central Asians are currently celebrating the 550th birth anniversary of the acclaimed Central Asian poet and statesman Ali Shir Navai (1441-1501). AACAR BULLETIN joins the celebration by reproducing in transliteration the contents of a pamphlet written in Navai's lifetime praising Navai's work. Due to technical difficulties (none of which would have constituted an obstacle, save for the limitations of our budget), the Chaghatay text below cannot contain all of the appropriate diacritics. For the same reasons, at times some superfluous diacritics have also crept in. For those with facility in the original Chaghatay, we trust this would but be a minor irritant.&lt;br /&gt;To our knowledge there is no translation of this work. Reportedly of Uyghur descent, Navai was one of the premier literati and statesman of his time, wrote voluminously and with apparent ease in Chaghatay, a Turkish dialect, and Persian, and concomitantly was the long serving 'prime minister' (perhaps better described as the boon companion) of the Timurid H seyin Baykara (r. 1469-1506) of Herat and Khorasan. Much of his writings remain untranslated.[1] In 1500, zbeks --a newly constituted confederation on the historical pattern of previous Turkish confederations[2]-- of Shibani (a.k.a. Shaybani) Khan entered Transoxiana. Shibani Khan declared the end of the Timurids. Shibani himself fell in battle in 1510, fighting against the Safavids (dynasty r. 1501-1736)[3] of Shah Ismail (r. 1501-1524). Shah Ismail was in return defeated by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (r. 1512-1520) at Chaldiran, in 1514.[4] Shibani and zbeks also fought Bab r, founder of the "Moghul" empire in India,[5] portions of which events are covered in Baburnama.[6] Bab r sought and received the aid of Shah Ismail and his kizilbash Safavids.&lt;br /&gt;5 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;A direct descendant of Timur (d. 1405), Sultan H seyin Baykara (r. 1469-1506), ruled Herat and Khorasan.[7] The politics of the place and period was apparently such that Baykara saw it fit to praise Navai in writing. The occasion must have been after Navai completed his MUHAKEMAT AL-LUGHATEYN, in which the relative merits of Turkish (in its T rki, otherwise known as Chaghatay, dialect spoken in Central Asia) and Persian are discussed.[8] The method of arguments adumbrated in that work can not necessarily hold in today's environment. However, the implications are clear. Navai, as well as Baykara, are making their positions clear: they are on the side of T rki. Earlier, under the patronage of Sultan Mahmud of the Turkish Ghaznavid dynasty,[9] the Persian poet Firdawsi collected the fragments of the old Persian epics and reworked them into his SHAHNAMA.[10] This pamphlet by Baykara was first discovered in a regional library of the Turkish Republic, bound with the works of another medieval author. It appears to be the only known copy.&lt;br /&gt;The facsimile of the Baykara pamphlet and its Latin alphabet transliteration were published in the Turkish Republic by I. Ertaylan, immediately after the Second World War. Compliments of the AACAR BULLETIN, facsimiles of the original of this pamphlet and its Latin alphabet transliteration, have been sent separately to various educational and research institutions in Central Asia. We trust that they will be made available to the rest of Central Asians, as a part of this year long Navai celebration.&lt;br /&gt;NOTES:&lt;br /&gt;1. For the collected works of Navai, see A. S. Levend, ALI SIR NEVAI (Ankara, 1965-68) 4 Vols. T rk Dil Kurumu Yayini. See also ENCYCLOPEDIA ISLAM.&lt;br /&gt;6 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;2. See H. B. Paksoy, "Z. V. Togan: The Origins of the Kazaks and the zbeks" presented to the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies. (Chicago. April 6, 1990).&lt;br /&gt;3. Roger M. Savory, IRAN UNDER THE SAFAVIDS (Cambridge University Press, 1980).&lt;br /&gt;4. S. J. Shaw &amp; E. K. Shaw, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY (Cambridge University Press, 1976-1978) Two Vols. Second Printing 1978.&lt;br /&gt;5. For the period, see Lt. Col. Sir Wolseley Haig &amp;amp; Sir Richard Burn (Eds.) THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA (Cambridge, 1922-1953), Vol III, TURKS AND AFGHANS (Cambridge, 1928). M. G. S. Hodgson, in his THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY IN A WORLD CIVILIZATION (Chicago, 1974), 3 Vols., suggests that the above cited 1928 volume should now be corrected with other readings. See also V. Smith, OXFORD HISTORY OF INDIA (Oxford, 1958).&lt;br /&gt;6. THE BABUR-NAMA IN ENGLISH, (Memoirs of Babur) Anette S. Beveridge, Tr. (London, 1922). It has been reprinted in 1969.&lt;br /&gt;7. W. Barthold, FOUR STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA Vol. II, ULUG BEG. (Leiden, 1963).&lt;br /&gt;8. Ali Shir Navai, MUHAKEMAT AL-LUGHATEYN, Robert Devereux (Tr.) (Leiden, 1966).&lt;br /&gt;9. C. E. Bosworth, THE GAZNAVIDS: THEIR EMPIRE IN AFGHANISTAN AND EASTERN IRAN, 994-1040 (Beirut, 1973) (2nd Ed.)&lt;br /&gt;7 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;10. Theodor N ldeke, (Tr.) (Bombay, 1930).&lt;br /&gt;RISALE-I H SEYIN BAYKARA&lt;br /&gt;Subhanahu ve ta'ala.&lt;br /&gt;Hamd sena ol padisahlar padisahiga, kim her padisah,kim andin azimrak m mkin bolmagay, anin seraperde-iazamet u celali tigresinde kemine geda durur.&lt;br /&gt;Huday ki her sah-i enc m-sipahAning dergehide ir r kah-i rah&lt;br /&gt;Callat azamatuhu ve celaluhu ve ammat makramatuhu venavaluhu ve d r d-i bi intiha ol risalat tahtgahininmesned-nisinige kim her taht-giri, ki meh e-i livasikoyasdin tkey, anin saye-i alemide sefaathah-ibinevadurur.&lt;br /&gt;Resuli kim r s ld r bar a hayliIr r kevn u mekan aning tufeyli&lt;br /&gt;Sallallahu alayhi ve ala alihi ve hulafa'ihi veashabihi. Bu rakamning rakimi ve bu tahrirningmuharriri&lt;br /&gt;S rgen bu varak y zige hameBir gam-zede-i siyahname&lt;br /&gt;Al muhta ila rahmatillahi'l-Malik al-gafur, fakir-ihakir Sultan Huseyn bin Mansur mundak beyan kilur kim,n Tengri tabaraka ve ta'ala kainatni ademdin v cudgalikturdu ve mahlukatning yokin bar kildu, bariaferinisdin maksud insan irdi, kim andin haber bir r.Ba v cud ol, kim beni Ademni cemi'i mahlukatga m kerrem&lt;br /&gt;8 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;kildi, kim mundin artuk mertebe bola almas. Ve mundinbiyik r tbeni akil baver likmas; velikin bu nimets krin eda kilganda vade kildi, kim inayetni taze venimet bi-endaze kilgay, kim bu maniga muhbir durur.Eger i aning nimetlerining s kri edasida kisining herser-i muy bir til ve alardin her til hejd m ming senagakayil bolsa, andak kim sezavar durur. S kr-i nimetbecay kilt rmek m mkin irmes velikin her kisi z hodhaliga s kr-i nimet eda kilmay hem bolmas.&lt;br /&gt;Nazim:&lt;br /&gt;Aning s krin ayturda bolma mel lzi bils n er kilsa red ya kabulNikim Tengri emr etti me'mursinVeli evvelce m mkin turur sa'y kilKi huy eylegey Tengri S krige til&lt;br /&gt;Emma ger i halayikga s kr vacib turur velikin n ayet-i kerime sabit turur. Mundin malum bolur, kim hedaya veni'am tagi m tefavit bolgay. Si'ir:&lt;br /&gt;Hak nuri bile eger i r sen-d r cemHursid bile velik teng bolmadi sem&lt;br /&gt;Bes ka an, kim insanning hilkati meratibide tafav tzahir ve Hak ta'alaning ni'met ve ihsanida dagi herkisige z makduriga g re in'am kilgan cihetdin tefav daraga kirdi. Elbette kirek, kim s kr edasida tagitefav t bolgay.&lt;br /&gt;Siir:&lt;br /&gt;Gedaga s kr isi bolgay gedacaVelikin padisaha padisaca&lt;br /&gt;9 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Pers yakin, boldi kim padisahlar, kim alarni Hak Ta'alaalem m lkide tac-bahs u taht-nisin kildi, belkizillullah-i fil'l-arzayn itti, h k mleri alem iligerevan ve dehr ili kulluklarida natuvan. Beyt:&lt;br /&gt;Kaslarida halk isi efkendelikEmirleriga il itib bendelik&lt;br /&gt;Mukarrer turur, kim bu cemaatga s kr-i nimet edasiefzunrak ve s kr-g zarlik tili uzunrak kirek bolgay vebu salatin arasida tagi ba'zidan ba'ziga tevaf t bar.Nidin, kim Hayy-i Kadir ve padisah-i bi vezirninginayeti bar aga yeksan bolmadi. Ve ting-dest birmedi.Ol cema'atdin kim alarga s kr-i ni'met baridin k prekvacib-turur. Hayalga andak kil r, kim biri bu fakir-inatuvan ve bu sikeste-i bisaman turur, kim eger y zming yil mr tapib y z ming til bile s kr-g zarlikkilsam, aning in'amining y z mingidin birige eda-yis kr kila almagaymin. Ni e tagi bu nev bolsa, hatirtiler, kim ol kerem u inayet ve ol eltaf-ibinihayetning k ridin azi beyanga kilgey; belki mingdinbiri kalem tili bile varak y zige bitilgeni ol c mledinbiri bu, kim eger i ba'zi selatinga bu sikestebendesidin k prek memleket ve cah ve hezayin ve sipahbirdi; velikin alarning k nglige bu cihetdin gurur yoltapdi ve s kr g zarlik iside f tur y zlendi. Bu fakirgehimmeti nasib kildi, kim y z alarga birgence sevket vemilk k ngl mni magrur kila almas ve ubudiyyetimesbabiga kkusur salmas. Eger alarding ba'zinin itimadianing lutf u keremiga boldi ve eger alardin ba'zinidena'et-i neseb cihetidin mat'un kildi. Emma buza'ifning yitti ve belki yitmis ataga a aba u ecdadiminsaltanat ve belki vilayetga m serref ve makrun itti.Eger basidin saltanat bheti ve gururidin fakrul fenaehliga istigna ve ser b lendlig yitk rdi. Bu natuvandinol rafi'ussan g ruhga hakisarlik bile niyazmendlikyitk rdi. Beyt:&lt;br /&gt;10 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Ger alem ilige sah kildiFakr ehliga haki rah kildi.&lt;br /&gt;Ve bazi hem bolgay kim, alarni hilye-i z hd u ta'ataraste ve ziver-i ilm u belagat bile piraste kilibturur. Ve likin bi sikestening hatiriga bu tariknim stahsen ve dilpezir ve ol azizlerni makbul u binazirk rk zdi ve alar ruhiga mindin fatiha bile istimdad veol ruhaniyyetlerdin mining isimge k p f tuh k sadtig rdi ve ba'zining zamanida ihtiyarlik evlad-ibarif'at ve itibarlik erkan-i devletdin fukara vemesakinge ve ri'aya-yi mesakkat ayinga zulm-i bihad vete'addi-i bi'aded boldi. Bu ftadening asrida fukara umesakin bu gamlardin sad ve ri'aya-yi namurad bukayidlardin azad boldi. Ve ba'zinin zamanida sud r-izulm-pise ve nuvvab-i haric-endise evkafni bozdilar veaning hasili bile meclis-i ays u tarab yasab neva-yifisk u f cur t zdiler. Bu miskin evkafga muta'ayyinkilgalar bari harablarni ma'mur ve istihkak ehlinsaduman u mesrur kildilar. Ve alar zamanida evkafbozulgan cihedtin talebe mgm m ve m derris mahrumbolsa hala s k r, kim darussaltana'da tahmina y zhavza-i ders bolgay, kim faza'yil-i diniyye ve ulum-iyakiniyye ukar ve Rum aksasidin in serhaddiga digincedemi Islam biladidin kabil talibler bu avaze vem zakere-i biendazeni isidib, gurbet masakkatin ihtiyarkilib bu tahtgaha y zlen rler. Tagi Tengri inayetidinevkaf hasili bar aning harc mukabelesiga yiter ver zgarlari feragat bile ter ve bu mezk r bolganm derrisliga yakin hanikah bolgay, kim her kaysidaihtiyac ehli bigayet ve istihkak hayli binihayethorsend u behrmend bolurlar. Ve eger ol zamanlarvakrak i havfidin tacir-i mahacir ve kutta ul-tahrikbimidin sayir guraba ve m safir meskendin bir maksadgave vatandin bir mabedga yitmekde k p su det ve bihaduk bet k rerler irdi. Bu zamanda siyaset sarsari ol&lt;br /&gt;11 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;mahz l kavning v cudi has u hasakin memalik destidinit r b turur; belki duzeh atesgedesiga tig r b turur.Ve m safirga her menzilde bir ribat-i rh nihad belkiemniyyet i n bir kal'a-i sipihr-b nyad savuklarda rehneverdlerga andin vaye ve isigda cihan-gerdlerga andinsaya saya ve pehahdin baska tagi her dilhan anda hasilve tilegen nime asanlik bile vasil ve her kaysida ehl-itesad def'i ve kutta ul-tarik men'i n sipahidinfevci ve m te'ayyen yasaglikdin g ruhi m temekkin veeger ba'zinin vaktida mesacidisikleri medaris ve cemaatehli cemaat ilkide mahbus irdi. Bu fakir zamanidamuhasibler fikri mesacid hisabiga yetismes ve bav cudbu cemaat ehli anda sigismas; her kaysiga anca revnakve ihtiram ki ka'be-i mu'azzamada Mescid-i Haram veeger ba'zi eyyamda ser ahkamiga ve Islam ehl-i bid'athayliga zir-dest irken bolsa, bu eyyamda seri'at-i iNebevi ve ahkam i Mustafavi bazusi andak kavi turur kimyakind r, kim ihtisab ehli nci felekde Z hrem gannie ni ura urgaylar ve berbat u engini yirge urubsindurgaylar. Yine isler hem k pd r, kim fasili s zgemucib-i tatvil ve tahriri ba'is-i kal-u kil bolur. Bunev umurdin baska ve bu tavr halatdin ayru tagi Haksubhanahu ve tea'la bu nahif bendesining saltanatizamanida bir ni e kisige cilye-i z hur birib-turur vebu fakir mecliside alardin tesrif-i h zur erzanitutubdur kim, alarning v cudidin bu zaman cemi ezminegaracih turur. Ve bu devran bar a devirlerdin m mtaz, kibular tagi mucib i k p eday-i s kr turur, ki andinnatika tili lal ve kalem tili sikeste-mekal durur. Veol c mlening alem ve elzafi, fezatil deryasining d rr-ipaki ve velayet eflakining hursid-i tabnaki nazmcevahirining sahib-i intizami, hazret-i sayh al-IslamMevlana Abdurrahman Cami sallahu'llahu ve ibka turur,kim ta felek-i kadimi nihad savabit ve seyyardin y zming k z bile alem ehlige nazir turur. K zige andaknadir hayal kilmemis ve ta mihr-i cihan-numa belkihursid-i sipihr peyma cihan devriga sayir durur;&lt;br /&gt;12 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;pertevi hergiz anirg tig adim al-misal stige t smemis;cevahir-i bazmidin cihan sadeli tola d rr-i semin veleali nesridin eflak atlasiga zib u tezyin, tesanificemi-i ulumda bihad ve her tasnifde bezayin-i ma'anibi'aded. Siir:&lt;br /&gt;u mizan-i tab'i bolub genc-sencAnga bir terazu kilib Penc-GenKi hayran kalib nazm kilgan agiAnga yok ki Husrev Nizami tagi&lt;br /&gt;Lutf-amiz gazelleri sur-engiz ve sur-engiz beytlerilutf-amiz, kim k p yillar Hak subhanahu ve ta'alaalarning saye-i irsadin berdevam ve bu devlet eyyamigaanin tik sahib-i devletni m stedam tutsun. Ve yine hemnazm ehlidin hos-guyluk evcining s heyli bolur dikkisiler bar. Ve letafet-i nazm-i dastan ve metanet-iterkib i beyanida alem ili alarning tufeyli bolur dikfelek mevcud turur, kim burun alar dik felek cilvebirgen irmes. Ve hala tagi hi yirde kimse alarningnisan birmes. Ve Herat sanaha 'ilahu ani 'lafat venevahi side evvelce hatirga kil r ve evvelce sadik al-kavi ve sahib-vuk f il arzga tig r rlerse bir miggeyakin kisi, kim alarning isi ma'ani d rrlerin nazmsilkige tartmak bolgay ve dikkat g herlerige veznlibasi zib u zinetin birmek bolgay, kim hic devirdebular dik ilning melikdin edna ve hic de nuridin yiriyok irken durur. Ve bu ismi mezkur bolganlar ve evsalimest r bolganlar farisi nazm enc mni bezm t zgen vefarisi-g yluk bahriga asinalik k rk zkenler durur. Velikin ma'ani ebkariga bu k nge digince hi kisi t rkanelibas kiyd rmegen ve ol nazeninlernibu ziba hil'at bilecilve-i Z hurge kit rmegen turur ve bu m sk-bu ra'nalartab nihan-haneside uryanlikdin mahcub kalgan durur. Tabu ferhunde-zaman ve bu huceste-devran, kim bunatuvanning bari il k n mdin ve 'cavari kisi karamdinkulluk silkidin k k ltaslik payesiga yitgen ve&lt;br /&gt;13 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;m lazemet tarikidin musahabet sermayesin eyitgen haremkeb teri dik perde-saray halvetide mahrem ve surahibati dik sebistan suhbetide hemdem hak s z edasidadelir ya'ni Mir Ali Sir aslaha 'lahu sanahu, kimtehallusi Nevay 'ga meshur durur ve es'arida butehallus mestur T rk tilining lgen cesediga Mesihenfasi bile ruh ki rdi. Ve ol ruh tapkanlarga t rkiayin elfaz tar u pudidin tokulgan h lle ve harirkiyd rdi ve s z g listanida nev-bahar tab'idin revanasayaginlar bile rengarenk g ller a ti ve nazm deryasigasehab-i fikretidin ruh-perver katreler bile g nag nd rrler sa ti. Her sinif si'r meydaniga, kim tekav rs rdi, ol kisverni tig i zeban bile z hayta-itasarrufiga kiy -virdi. Aning nazmi vasfida til kasirve beyan aciz turur. Hatirga zining mesnevileridinnice beyt kil r, kim bu aytila-durgan ma'nide nazmikilib turur ve ol budur. Mesnevi:&lt;br /&gt;Min ol min, ki ta T rk-i bi-dadidurbu til birle ta nazm b nyadidurfelek k rmedi min kimi nadiriNizami kimi nazm ara kadirini nazmi dir irsem mini derd-nakki her lafzi bolgay anin d rr-i pakHuda yitk r r anca s r'at mangaki bolmas birige firsat mangabu meydanda Firdevsi ol g rd ir rki ger kilse R stem cevabin bir rrakam kildi ferhunde Sehname-iki sindi cevabida her hame-im sellem turur g yya bu isiki ma'razga kilmey turur her kisididi z tili birle ol kan-i genki si sal burdam be-Sehname rencani dirge bolsa ka an ragbetimir r an a Hak lutfidin kuvvetimki ger ni e tab bolsa kamil-suray&lt;br /&gt;14 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;bitilgeymin otuz yilin otuz ayeger has-i ma'ni ger iham ir ranin k nde y z beyti helvam ir rni Sehname kim hamsega ursam ilanin ni esi sari yitk rsem ilmidim bu kim eyleben feth-i babkolum birgey ol ni ege tagi tabotuz yil, ki ani Nizami dimis,kasda ir r iki yillik iska an ani dir bezmini t zgemindimekni halayikga k rk zgemin&lt;br /&gt;Ol vakt ki bu ebyat aning tab'idin bas urub irdi, ilkasida sa'irane laf ve madihane g zal k r n r irdi. Veal-hak n bu humayun firsatda ve bu ruz-efzun devletdehamse-i pen esiga ilig urdu ve aning itmamiga ciddkilt rdi. Eger i Seyh Nizami nazm ehlinin ustadi-dur,Azer hamsesin meshur budur, kim otuz yilda tekmil biribturur. Ve Mir Hosrev kim hamse ebyati 'adeddin otuzmingdin on sekiz mingge ihtisar kilib turur ve s hretimundak durur kim, alti yitti yilda t ketib turur. Bufesahat meydanining safderi ve belagat pisesininggazanferi ba-v cud ol, kim k p efsanelerde dil-pezirtefsirler buyurdi ve tab-pesend islahlar kildi.B nyadining ibtidasindin sivadining intihasiga a hemanaiki yildin tmedi. Ve aytilgan evkat bisabga kirse,dise bolgay, kim alti ayga yitmedi, kim aningefsaneleri renginligin ve ebyati sihr-ayinligin veterakibi metanenin ve ma'anisi letafetin mutala'akilgan kisi bilgey ve m lahaza kilgan kisi fehm kilgayyok, kim mesnevi slubida bil, kim her sinif nazm, kimArab f sahasi ve Acem b lagasi tezyin birib dururlar vetedyin kilib tururlar. Bu hem bercaga hame s r b dururve ta'arruz yitk r b turur, kim serhi divaniningfihristide mezk r ve mestur turur. Ni divan Allah Allahcengi, kim safi elfazdin tola g her bolgay ve sipihrevraki, kim pak ma'anidin memlu hasr bolgay.&lt;br /&gt;15 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Dime divan, gam u derd ehliga afet di aniK ymek u su'le-i gam birle kiyamet di ani&lt;br /&gt;Kaysi beyti, kim isk ehli camga ot urmas ve kaysimazmuni, kim hicran hayli cismin k nd rmes, belki k link kge savirmas. Kaysi misra'i, kim firak ciger huniningbagri kanin tamizmas. Ve kaysi lafzi, kim hicrandermandesi eski seli bile sabr u sekib hamsin akimas.Nazm iklimide kaysi birk kurganga k kilt rdi, kimisigi aning y zige a ilmadi ve kaysi azim kisverga taberigi bileterk-taz saldi, kim feth kilmadi. Bu k nnazm erkanining rub-i meskunida kahramanol turur ve bumemalik fethiga sahib kiran ani diseler bolur. Si'ir:&lt;br /&gt;r r s z milkining kisversitanikayu kisversitan hosrev nisanidime hosrev nisan kim kahramaniir r ger in diseng sahib-kirani&lt;br /&gt;Bu yanglig garayib asar ve bedayi si'arning huruci buevletde Zuhuri bu saltanatda bolgan, kim Hak subhanahuve ta'ala ani bu dergah-i felak-misal kullugining arifive bu zat i melek-hisal medahlarining nazimi kaldi. Hemmucib k p s kr turur. Ruba'iyye:&lt;br /&gt;ya Rab, koyu s kringi eda kilgaymin!ni til bile ani ibtida kilgaymin!y z canim eger bolsa fida kilgaymindisem ki eda boldi hata kilgayminYa Rab, mini kullugungga kadir eyle!ger yitse bela derd sabir eyle;yadingga tagi i imni zakir eyle&lt;br /&gt;In'amingga hem tilimni zakir eyle. Tamma bi'l-hayr tamsud Risale-i Sultan H seyn Mirzay Baykara. Al-hakirfakir Alivirdi ibn (___?) Kuli.&lt;br /&gt;16 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;SAKSAUL&lt;br /&gt;SAKSAUL (Saxoul/ Holoxylon/ Ammodendron) is a plant often mentioned in literature connected with Central Asia. It is primarily used as fuel in Central Asia. However, SAKSAUL often occupies a prominent place in Central Asian literature. With that in mind, what follows is the botanical description of this Central Asian native, as described in Alfred Rehder, MANUAL OF CULTIVATED TREES AND SHRUBS (NY: Macmillan, 1940). For locating and making available this entry, AACAR BULLETIN would like to thank Dr. Oswald Tippo, Botany Department of the UMASS-Amherst, and William C. Burger, Curator, Department of Botany, FIELD MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, Chicago.&lt;br /&gt;Holoxylon -- Shrubs or small trees with articulate branches, leaves reduced to small scales; flowers perfect, axillary, with 2 broad bracts; sepals 5, free; stamens 2-5, inserted on a lobed disk; stigmas 2-5: flower globose or cylindrical, surrounded by the accrescent sepals, all or some with a horizontal wing or back; seed horizontal; embryo spirally coiled. (Hal- salt; xylon- wood; referring to the saline habitat. About 10 species from the Mediterranean to Central Asia.&lt;br /&gt;Haloxylon Ammodendron - Saxoul. Shrub or tree to 6 meters, with thick gnarled trunk; light green, slender: scales short-triangular, obtusish, connate, puberulous inside: fruiting calyx with large suborbicular wings. Ural to Persia and Turkestan. Closely related genus: Anabasis L. Herbs or small shrubs: branches articulate, with opposite, terete, often scale-like leaves: flowers&lt;br /&gt;17 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;with small, sometimes subulate, bracts; stamens 5; fruiting calyx with horizontal wings, rarely without; seed vertical. About 18 species from the Mediterranean to Central Asia. Anabasis Tatarica: Shrub to 0.5 m., with upright green branches, leaves scale-like, connate, pubescent inside: flowers axilliary, forming terminal spikes; fruiting calyx with three wings. To the Altai and Songaria. Genus Salicornia L. is found in New Hampshire to Mississippi, West Europe, Algeria; Louisiana, Bahamas. Perhaps introduced in the 1800s.&lt;br /&gt;NEWS OF THE PROFESSION&lt;br /&gt;AACAR BULLETIN would like to thank those individuals and institutions who kindly furnished the information presented in this section.&lt;br /&gt;During its Spring meeting, the Middle Eastern Studies Association Board of Directors voted unanimously to elect AACAR an Affiliate of the MESA, and so informed AACAR. AACAR would like to thank the MESA Board of Directors, and the AACAR member Dr. Jefferey Roberts who saw the process through. AACAR Members are cordially invited to contact Dr. Roberts at the Department of History, Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, TN 38501 to participate in the AACAR panels at the 1992 MESA Convention.&lt;br /&gt;In early 1991, AACAR was extended Affiliate Privileges by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, courtesy of Dr. Dorothy Atkinson, AAASS Executive Director. AACAR has organized a panel for the AAASS '91 Miami Convention. Details may be found in the May 1991 issue of the AAASS NEWSLETTER, and the AAASS 1991 Convention Program.&lt;br /&gt;18 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;At its January 1991 teleconference, AACAR Executive Council voted to hold the AACAR Membership Meeting in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies annual convention, 22-25 November 1991 in Miami. (AACAR BULLETIN, Vol. IV, No. 1. Spring 1991) The AACAR Meeting will be restricted to members in good standing. AACAR Members are requested to make reservations directly with the providers of convention facilities: Intercontinental &amp; Hyatt Hotels, Miami, Florida; and register for the AAASS Convention. For AAASS advance registration information, please contact AAASS: 128 Encina Commons, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6029. Tel. 415/723-9668; or kindly consult the AAASS NEWSLETTER.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR BULLETIN is now being indexed by PERIODICA ISLAMICA, Edited by Dr. Munawar A. Anees, issued by Berita Publishing, 22 Jalan Liku, 59100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.&lt;br /&gt;Dr. Stephen Blank is appointed Book Review Editor of the CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY (London). Relevant books may be sent to Dr. Blank at: U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. * Edited by Marie Bennigsen Broxup, CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY general offices have been moved to: 6 Elmbank Gardens, London SW13 0NT&lt;br /&gt;A circular was received containing the following: "According to the decision of the 5th All- Union Turcology Conference, and the Soviet Committee of Turcologs, the First International Turcological Conference will be held in Kazan, in early June, 1992. The theme is THE LANGUAGES SPIRITUAL CULTURE AND THE HISTORY OF THE TURKS: TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY. The Conference will discuss linguistics, literature, folklore, history, archeology, ethnology, culture, religious faith, and the study of sources and texts. At&lt;br /&gt;19 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;the conference, an international symposium on the Tatar Encyclopedia will also be held. In connection with the conference, exhibits, concerts and excursions will take place. An honorarium of US$ 80 will be paid to the foreign participants." In the circular there is no indication as to how travel costs will be met. Contact: 420111 Kazan, Lobachevski Street 2/31, IIALI.&lt;br /&gt;UYGUR HALK MUSIKISI "Turkestan Chinois/Xinjiang: Musiques Oigoures" is a two compact-disc set (stereo, Digital Mastering) issued by the OCORA RADIO FRANCE. The collection is accompanied by a booklet in French, English, German and Spanish; providing details of its contents and brief information on the genre. Contact: Pierre Toureille, Director de la Collection, Maison de Radio-France, 116 ave. du Pr sident Kennedy, Pi ce 6345 - 75016 Paris. Tel: 16/1 42 30 26 16. Fax: 16/1 42 30 14 37.&lt;br /&gt;East Asian Studies program of the UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO has established the Central and Inner Asian Seminar. A program of speakers include: Paul Forage; Michael Gervers; Oscar Jacobs; Omeljan Pritsak; Morris Rossabi. For further information, contact: Prof. Wayne Schlepp, East Asian Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto M5S 1A5, Canada.&lt;br /&gt;Professor Warren Walker, Director of the Archive of Turkish Oral Narrative, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY, announces the availability of texts and tape recordings of several thousand samples of the genre. Contact: Archive of Turkish Oral Narrative, Library, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas 79409. Phone: 806/742-1922.&lt;br /&gt;A new Institute of Oriental Studies has been established in Tashkent. The first number of its journal, SARK SINAS has been issued. The editors of SARK SINAS are desirous of publishing papers relevant to the study of Central Asia in English, zbek and Russian. For submissions, contact: Prof. Orunbaev, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences, 700170 Tashkent, 170 Akademgorodok, Prospect M. Gorkovo&lt;br /&gt;20 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;81. According to a letter received from M. S. Osimi, Chairman of the Presidium of PAIVAND, the Tajik Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Compatriots, PAIVAND has been established as an initiative of the public of Tajikistan in 1989. Mr. Osimi writes: "The main aim of the Society is to help our compatriots living abroad and the representatives of other nationalities who have a common language, culture and history with us, realize their aspirations to establish relations with Tajikistan. Through us you will be able to satisfy your interest in the culture and history of Tajikistan. We will also render assistance in studying the Tajik language and in obtaining higher education in Tajikistan. Furthermore, we wish to promote trade and economic co-operation on a mutually profitable basis." Contact: 7 Dzerjinsky Street, Dushanbe 734025.&lt;br /&gt;An Institute of Turcology has been established in Chimkent-Kazakh SSR. Contact, Prof. Erden Zada-Uli Hajibekov, Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, Qurmangazi 29, 480021 Alma-Ata 21.&lt;br /&gt;The Directorate of the Encyclopedia of Islam is currently publishing a new Encyclopedia of Islam. Mehmet Ali Sari, Secretary General, writes: "The venture is supported by the Turkish Religious Foundation (T rkiye Diyanet Isleri Vakfi), and is intended to update the studies in the fields of Islamic sciences, culture and civilization. In its final form, the Encyclopedia is expected to be thirty volumes and will contain at least twenty-five thousand articles. The first three volumes are already available. The editors are interested in contacting scholars from around the world, and they welcome any contributions in Turkish and all major languages. All entries will be translated into Turkish at the editorial offices, and a modest honorarium will be paid. The editors are also prepared to enter into exchange agreements with scholarly journals." For further information, contact:&lt;br /&gt;21 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Encyclopedia of Islam, Baglarbasi, Kisikli Cad. No. 7 sk dar 81180 Istanbul. Tel 1 341 0792-95. Fax: 1 334 9588.&lt;br /&gt;Call for Proposals: The 24th National Convention of the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SLAVIC STUDIES, hosted by the Western Slavic Association, will be held November 19-22, 1992 at the Sheraton and Hyatt Regency hotels in Phoenix, Arizona. Proposals must be for complete panels; individual papers cannot be considered. A copy of the program guidelines and a panel proposal form may be obtained from: AAASS, 128 Encina Commons, Stanford U., Stanford, CA 94305-6029.; 415/723-9668. Deadline for all proposals: January 1, 1992.&lt;br /&gt;Second Annual NAVA'I LECTURE in Central Asian Studies will be held at the International Cultural Center Auditorium, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, Tuesday, November 26, 5:30 PM, in conjunction with the 25th Annual Meeting of the MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION. This year's meeting will be a dialogue. The participants are Yuri Bregel, Maria Subtelny, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh.&lt;br /&gt;BIBLIOGRAPHY&lt;br /&gt;A work's being listed in this section does not preclude subsequent review in the AACAR BULLETIN.&lt;br /&gt;BULLETIN OF THE ASIA INSTITUTE, formerly published in Shiraz-Iran, resumed publication in the US in 1987 with the New Series of annual volumes by the Iowa State University Press. Volumes are clothbound, fully illustrated. USA $50 + postage per volume. Contact: Julie Harris Levine, Editor, 3287 Bradway Blvd., Birmingham, MI 48010-1790. Volume 4 [(1990) 400 pp. 130 ills.] is a Festschrift for Professor Richard&lt;br /&gt;22 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Nelson Frye. Contents: R. N. Frye (Shahbazi). Mithra &amp; Ahura (Boyce). Coinage from Merv (Carter). Dragon &amp;amp; lunar nodes (Duchesne-Guillemin). Excavations at Chilburj (Gaibov/ Koshelenko/ Novikov). A Manichean kephalaion (Gnoli). Assyrian hand gestures (Goldman). Sasanian art &amp; the tomb of Feng Hetu (Harper). Excavations at Kafyr Kala (Litvinsky/Solov'ev). A Penjikent mural (Marshak/Raspopova). From the chahar- taq to the mihrab (Melikian-Chirvani). Coinage of a Central Asian rebel (Mochiri). Unpublished Muslim miniatures (Pugachenkova). Gandharan inscribed vessel (Salomon/Goldman). Togolok 21 in the Karakum (Sarianidi). Central Asian Buddhist monuments (Stavitsky). Gardens in Persia &amp;amp; Assyria (Stronach). Judeo-Persian Pirqe Abhoth (Asmussen). Caucaso-Iranica (Bailey). Glyptica Iranica (Bivar). Iranian gestures (Choksy). Haft Khwan &amp; Ferdowsy (Davidson). Kuhpaye, the old Vir (Eilers). Khotanese aksaras (Emmerick). Miscellaena Sasanidica (Gignoux). Parsi and Dari (Lazard) . Middle &amp;amp; modern Persian 'be' (Nawabi). Hyspasines (Schmitt). Viiamburas &amp; Kafirs (Schwartz). Early Persians' historiography (Shahbazi). Spurious epigraphy (Shaked). Fillet of nobility (Shaki). Mani in Sogdian fragments (Sims-Williams). A Haijiabad inscription (Skjaervo). Shapur's coronation (Sundermann). A Sasanian title (Tafazzoli). The Lantern of Spirit (Utas). Iranian Tati (Windfuhr). Volume 5 is under preparation.&lt;br /&gt;S. Salihov and H. Ismatullaev, RUSSIAN- ZBEK-TAJIK CONVERSATION BOOK (Tashkent: Fan, 1990)&lt;br /&gt;Hayrulla Ismatullaev, "Gaspirali Ismailbey ve Turkistan" ZBEK TILI VE EDEBIYATI (Tashkent) July- August 1990.&lt;br /&gt;The second printing of THE BOOK OF DEDE KORKUT, Warren S. Walker, Ahmet Edip Uysal and Faruk S mer (Translators) will be released by the University of Texas Press during 1991. The First&lt;br /&gt;23 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;edition was made by the University of Texas Press in 1972.&lt;br /&gt;TALES ALIVE IN TURKEY, Warren S. Walker and Ahmet Edip Uysal (Translators), originally published by Harvard University Press in 1966, has been reprinted by the Texas Tech University Press in 1990.&lt;br /&gt;A companion volume, MORE TALES ALIVE IN TURKEY is scheduled for release during 1991 by the Texas Tech University Press.&lt;br /&gt;Kaori Komatsu, "100c Yild n m M nasebeti ile 'Ertugrul Firkateyni' Faciasi" AJAMES (Tokyo) No. 5, 1990.&lt;br /&gt;Tuncer Baykara, ANADOLUNUN SEL UKLULAR DEVRINDEKI SOSYAL VE IKTISADI TARIHI ZERINE ARASTIRMALAR (Bornova, Izmir: Ege niversitesi Edebiyat Fak ltesi, 1991)&lt;br /&gt;R. Judson Mitchell, GETTING TO THE TOP IN THE USSR (Hoover Institution Press, 1990).&lt;br /&gt;John S. Major, MONGOLIA (J. P. Lippincott/Harper &amp;amp; Row, 1990) The Land and The People Series&lt;br /&gt;Mary Louise Clifford, AFGHANISTAN (J. P. Lippincott/Harper &amp; Row, 1990) The Land and The People Series&lt;br /&gt;Michael Zand, "Notes on the Culture of the Non- Ashkenazi Jewish Communities Under Soviet Rule" JEWISH CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN THE SOVIET UNION (Yaakov Ro'i and Avi Beker, Eds.) (New York University Press, 1991).&lt;br /&gt;idem, "Bukharan Jews" ENCYCLOPEDIA IRANICA (Ehsan Yarshater, Ed.) Vol IV, fasc. 5. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989).&lt;br /&gt;R. D. McChesney, WAQF IN CENTRAL ASIA: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1889. (Princeton University Press, 1991). Princeton Studies on the Near East.&lt;br /&gt;Gerhard Simon (K. Forster and O. Forster, Translators), NATIONALISM AND POLICY TOWARD THE NATIONALITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post- Stalinist Society. Westview, 1991). Westview Special Studies on the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe.&lt;br /&gt;THE RISE OF NATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION: American Foreign Policy &amp;amp; the Disintegration of the USSR, Michael Mandelbaum, Ed. (NY: Council on Foreign&lt;br /&gt;24 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Relations Press, 1991).&lt;br /&gt;Beatrice S. Bartlett, MONARCHS AND MINISTERS: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723-1820. (University of California Press, 1991).&lt;br /&gt;Hong Yung Lee, FROM REVOLUTIONARY CADRES TO PARTY TECHNOCRATS IN SOCIALIST CHINA. (University of California Press, 1991).&lt;br /&gt;AL ASIA RELATED ACADEMIC PROGRAMS AND COURSEWORK IN NORTH AMERICA&lt;br /&gt;Since the publication of the first issue of the AACAR BULLETIN, we have been receiving inquiries from a variety of sources. Quite a few of them pertain to the location and nature of academic degree programs and courses related to Central Asia. Until now, we have been responding with individual letters of suggestion. At the request of the Editor, Reuel Hanks (Kennesaw State) and Steven Sabol (Georgia) have kindly conducted and compiled the survey of the Central Asian related academic programs in North America. We are listing the first responses, in the alphabetical order of institutions.&lt;br /&gt;Those who have received the survey questionnaire over the summer, but not yet responded, may still do so by returning the completed forms to the address contained therein. Other updates may be sent directly to the Editor, in the format given below. The AACAR BULLETIN plans to issue regular supplements to this directory.&lt;br /&gt;1. INSTITUTION: Ball State UniversityDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of HistorySURVEY RESPONDENT: Daniel Goffman, Associate Professor of History&lt;br /&gt;25 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;ADDRESS/PHONE: Dept. of HistoryBall State UniversityMuncie, Indiana 47306(317)-285-8712&lt;br /&gt;2. INSTITUTION: Colorado State UniversityDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of HistorySURVEY RESPONDENT: William J. Griswold, Professor of HistoryADDRESS/PHONE: Dept. of HistoryColorado State UniversityFort Collins, Colorado 80523(303)-491-6334FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:William Griswold--Ottoman Empire&lt;br /&gt;3. INSTITUTION: Emory UniversityDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of HistorySURVEY RESPONDENT: Kermit E. McKenzie, Professor of HistoryADDRESS/PHONE: Dept. of HistoryEmory UniversityAtlanta, Georgia 30322(404)-373-8892CONTACT FOR ADMISSIONS: Graduate School of Arts and SciencesFACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Kermit E. McKenzie--Russian/Soviet History, History of Kazakhstan. (Professor McKenzie participated in Kazakh/American Research Project in Alma-Ata in June of 1991).FACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Kermit E. McKenzie--Study of Life and Career of Chokan&lt;br /&gt;26 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Valikhanov (1835-65), first Kazakh "Enlightener."DEGREES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:Graduate degrees may be earned in History and Political Science with thesis or dissertation focusing on a Central Asian topic.&lt;br /&gt;4. INSTITUTION: University of Illinois, Urbana-ChampaignDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of HistorySURVEY RESPONDENT: Keith Hitchins, Professor of HistoryADDRESS/PHONE: Dept. of HistoryUniversity of Illinois309 Gregory Hall810 South Wright StreetUrbana, Illinois 61801(217)-333-9891CONTACT FOR ADMISSIONS: Same as aboveFACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Keith Hitchins--Tajikistan, 19th and 20th centuries, social and cultural history; Central Asia, nationalism, literature of the 19th and 20th centuries.FACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Keith Hitchins--A History of the Tajiks (under contract with Hoover Press for Soviet Nationalities Series); A biography of Sadriddin Aini.&lt;br /&gt;COURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:History 497, Readings in the History of Central Asia.&lt;br /&gt;27 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;5. INSTITUTION: Indiana UniversityDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of Uralic and Altaic Studies.SURVEY RESPONDENT: Gustav Bayerle, Associate ProfessorADDRESS/PHONE: Goodbody HallBloomington, Indiana 47405(812)-855-2233CONTACT FOR ADMISSIONS: April YoungerFACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Ilhan Basg z--Turkistan, Turkic folklore, TurkishGustav Bayerle--Ottoman Empire, Ottoman TurkishChris Beckwith--Tibetan Empire, TibetanYuri Bregel--Central Asia, History, ChagataiLarry Clark--Turkic Studies, LinguisticsDevin DeWeese--Central Asia, Islam, UzbekGyorgy Kara--Mongol Studies, Philology, MongolianLarry Moses--Mongol Studies, History, MongolianNazif Shahrani--Central Asia, Middle East, Islam,AnthropologyTS. Ishdorj--Mongol Studies, MongolianDEGREES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:M.A and Ph. D. degrees with major fields in Turkish Studies, Uzbek Studies and Tibetan Studies.OTHER INFORMATION: The department's educational offerings are supplemented with the research opportunities of the Research Institute for Inner Asia Studies.Grants and Scholarships are available for departmental majors from the Inner Asian and Uralic National Resource Center and the Graduate Assistants in Areas of National Needs Program.&lt;br /&gt;28 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;6. INSTITUTION: Kenyon CollegeDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of HistorySURVEY RESPONDENT: Ruth W. Dunnell, Storer Assistant Professor of Asian HistoryADDRESS/PHONE: Dept. of HistoryKenyon CollegeGambier, Ohio 43022(614)-427-5316/5323FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Ruth W. Dunnell--Asian History.Other positions exist in East, South Asian History and Islam (religious studies).FACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Ruth W. Dunnell--Tangut/Xi Xia History and BuddhismDEGREES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA: Concentration in Asian Studies (not a degree, per se).COURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:The Mongol Empire in World HistoryIslam in China (History)Great Islamic Empires (History)Classical Islam (Religion)Asia in Comparative Perspective: Cross-cultural Interaction (senior seminar for the Asian Studies concentration)ESTABLISHED EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN INSTITUTIONS: Students of Russian language have opportunities to study in USSR, including Alma Ata.&lt;br /&gt;7. INSTITUTION: University of Massachusetts-AmherstDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of HistorySURVEY RESPONDENT: Audrey L. Altstadt, Assistant Professor of HistoryADDRESS/PHONE: 612 Herter HallUMASS-AmherstAmherst MA 01003&lt;br /&gt;29 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;(415)-545-1330FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Audrey L. Altstadt--History and Culture of AzerbaijanOther positions exist in East Asian History and Middle East; and Political Science.COURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:Topics in Soviet History (graduate and undergraduate)Soviet Nationalities (planned)FACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Audrey L. Altstadt--Stalin period purges.PUBLICATION PROGRAMS/BOOK SERIES OF INSTITUTION:AACAR BULLETIN of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian StudiesHeadquarters of AACAR, the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research, Inc.&lt;br /&gt;8. INSTITUTION: University of MinnesotaDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of Russian and East European StudiesSURVEY RESPONDENT: Iraj Bashiri, Associate ProfessorADDRESS/PHONE: 245 Elliott HallUniversity of MinnesotaMinneapolis, Minnesota 55455(612)-624-3314CONTACT FOR ADMISSIONS: U. of Minnesota Admissions270 Williamson HallFACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Iraj Bashiri--Tajikistan: language, literature and culture. Kirghizia: literature. Uzbekistan: language, culture.FACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Iraj Bashiri--Tajiki: Grammar and Texts.&lt;br /&gt;30 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;"Muslims and Communists: Conflict of Religion and Ideology in the works of the Kirghiz Writer, Chingiz Aitmatov.DEGREES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA: Ph. D., Iranian LinguisticsCOURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:Islam in the Soviet UnionSoviet Central Asian Culture SphereFiction: Iran and Soviet Central AsiaMedieval SagesIntroduction to the Culture of AfghanistanDirected ResearchESTABLISHED EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN INSTITUTIONS:In progress: Exchange with the University of Tajikistan&lt;br /&gt;9. INSTITUTION: University of New MexicoDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of Political ScienceSURVEY RESPONDENT: Gregory Gleason, Assistant ProfessorADDRESS/PHONE: Dept. of Political ScienceUniversity of New MexicoAlbuquerque, New Mexico 87131(505)-277-5104FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Gregory Gleason--Contemporary Central Asian PoliticsFACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Gregory Gleason--Agriculture and Water in Central Asia: Public PolicyESTABLISHED EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN INSTITUTIONS:Informal arrangement for exchange with Turkmen State University.&lt;br /&gt;31 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;10. INSTITUTION: The City College of New YorkDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of HistorySURVEY RESPONDENT: Henry R. Huttenbach, ProfessorADDRESS/PHONE: Convent Ave. at 138th StreetNew York, New York 10031(212)-650-7384FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Henry R. Huttenbach--Soviet Nationalities, Soviet Islam.Michael Rywkin--Soviet Nationalities, Central Asia.PUBLICATION PROGRAMS/BOOK SERIES OF INSTITUTION:Journal: Nationalities PapersHead Office of "Association for the Study of the Nationalities of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."&lt;br /&gt;11. INSTITUTION: University of OregonDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Center for Asian and Pacific StudiesSURVEY RESPONDENT: Ester Jacobson, ProfessorADDRESS/PHONE: University of OregonEugene, Oregon 97403(503)-346-1521/3677FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Scott DeLancey--TibetanEster Jacobson--Early Nomads of South Siberia and Mongolia, Scytho-Siberian Art-EurasiaFACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Ester Jacobson--Art and Archaeology, Bronze-Early Iron Age, South Siberia and Mongolia.COURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:Art 381-Nomadic Art of Eurasia&lt;br /&gt;32 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Graduate Seminars in Scytho-Siberian Art and Tibeto-Burmese Linguistics&lt;br /&gt;12. INSTITUTION: Institut quebecois de recherche sur la cultureDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Research InstituteSURVEY RESPONDENT: Denise Helly, Research DirectorADDRESS/PHONE: 290, Place d'YouvilleMontreal (Quebec), Canada873-7987 (514)FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Xinjiang--Kazakhs and Uygurs&lt;br /&gt;13. INSTITUTION: Rutgers University--NewarkDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of HistorySURVEY RESPONDENT: Peter B. Golden, ProfessorADDRESS/PHONE: Dept. of History, Rutgers UniversityConklin Hall175 University AvenueNewark, New Jersey 07102(201)-648-5410FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Peter B. Golden--History and Languages of Medieval EurasiaFACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:An Introduction to the History of the Turkic PeoplesCOURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:Peoples and Cultures of Central Asia&lt;br /&gt;14. INSTITUTION: Washington University, St. LouisDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM:Center for the Study of Islamic Societies and CivilizationsSURVEY RESPONDENT: Cornell H. Fleischer, Professor of&lt;br /&gt;33 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;History and Director of Center.ADDRESS/PHONE: Washington UniversitySt. Louis, Missouri 63130CONTACT FOR ADMISSIONS: Dept. of History; Dept. of Anthropology.FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Cornell Fleischer--Ottoman, Safavid, Moghul History; Islamic History.Isenbike Togan--Inner Asia, Pre and Post-Mongol History.Robert Canfield--Anthropology, Greater Central Asia.Lois Beck--Anthropology, Tribalism, IranAhmet Karamustafa--Asian and Near Eastern Languages, Islamic Thought.FACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Togan--Comparative State Formation in Turkestan and Anatolia, 13th-17th centuries.Karamustafa--Antinomian Dervish Groups in the Islamic World, 15th-16th centuries.Fleischer--Apocalypticism in the Islamic World and Europe, 15th -16th centuries.Caufield--Greater Central Asia in Crisis, Afghanistan.DEGREES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:AB, AM, and Ph. D. degrees may be earned in history and anthropology.COURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:Greater Central AsiaIslamic History; 622-1200, 1200-1800The Silk RouteTibet Between China and RussiaThe Mongol World EmpireWomen and the State in Asia&lt;br /&gt;15. INSTITUTION: University of Washington-Seattle&lt;br /&gt;34 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;DEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Jackson School of International StudiesSURVEY RESPONDENT: Shannon O'Hara, Office of the DirectorADDRESS/PHONE: Henry M. Jackson School of International StudiesThomson Hall DR-05University of WashingtonSeattle, Washington 98195(206)-543-4373CONTACT FOR ADMISSIONS: Same as AboveFACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:For a detailed listing of faculty and their research interests, contact the office listed above.DEGREES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:The Jackson School offers bachelors and graduate degrees in Middle East Studies, Chinese Studies, and Russian and Eastern European Studies. Languages taught include Persian(Farsi), Arabic. Turkish, and Uzbek, among others.COURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:Contact the Jackson School for a detailed listing of courses in each of the above concentrations which are pertinent to Central Asia.ESTABLISHED EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN INSTITUTIONS:Numerous opportunities for language study abroad exist, including in the Soviet Union, P.R.C., Pakistan and others.Contact the Foreign Study Office, 572 Schmitz Hall, at the&lt;br /&gt;35 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;address listed above.&lt;br /&gt;16. INSTITUTION: University of WisconsinDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Central Asian StudiesSURVEY RESPONDENT: Uli SchamilogluADDRESS/PHONE: Dept. of Slavic Studies720 Van HiseUniversity of WisconsinMadison, Wisconsin 53706(608)-262-3498CONTACT FOR ADMISSIONS: Kemal H. Karpat Dept. of History4121 Humanities BuildingUniversity of WisconsinMadison, Wisconsin 53706(608)-263-1800/1825FACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Uli Schamiloglu--The Golden Horde, 13th-14th centuriesOther faculty may be contacted directly.DEGREES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:Ph. D. may be earned in independent area when pursued through an academic department.COURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:A number of courses are offered, including several Central Asian languages. Some of these are available through intensive summer courses.&lt;br /&gt;17. INSTITUTION: University of WyomingDEPARTMENT/INSTITUTE/CENTER/PROGRAM: Dept. of AnthropologySURVEY RESPONDENT: Audrey C. Shalinsky, Professor of AnthropologyADDRESS/PHONE: PO Box 3431University StationLaramie, Wyoming 82071&lt;br /&gt;36 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;CONTACT FOR ADMISSIONS: Dept. of AnthropologyFACULTY AND SPECIALIZATIONS:Audrey Shalinsky-- Northern Afghanistan, Uzbeks, Gender and Ethnic Relations.FACULTY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:Shalinsky--Historical Ethnography of dispersed Uzbek population in Central Asia and Middle East.DEGREES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:MA in AnthropologyCOURSES RELATED TO CENTRAL ASIA:At graduate level, independent study courses on Central Asia on demand.&lt;br /&gt;BOOK REVIEWS&lt;br /&gt;Michael Rywkin, MOSCOW'S MUSLIM CHALLENGE: SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA (revised edition) (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990). 180 pp.&lt;br /&gt;If the history of past colonialism is any guide to the future, the Central Asia of tomorrow, whether united in a greater Turkestan or fragmented in an assemblage of "Soviet" republics, is apt to bear the lasting imprint of these last seven decades of Moscow's political control. In this newly revised edition of MOSCOW'S MUSLIM CHALLENGE, Michael Rywkin offers a comprehensive and systematic interpretation of those seventy odd years in the life of Central Asia. Beginning with a brief account of the earliest Russian influences in the sixteenth century, Rywkin&lt;br /&gt;37 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;provides a clear and accessible account of the dynamic interaction between the colonizing Slavs and the subjugated Central Asian populations that brings us abreast of the present day.&lt;br /&gt;The first chapters are chronologically arranged to provide a well rounded yet highly detailed historical perspective on the key issues in contemporary relations between the Slavic dominated center and Central Asia. Stressing the Russians' geopolitical objectives in the "Great Game" --the rivalry among the Great Powers over influence in Central Asia-- Rywkin assesses both the style and objectives of Tsarist administration in the area. The second chapter recounts the period immediately following the revolution. Rywkin concludes that the revolution in Central Asia was "initially a settlers' affair" (p. 31) but eventually garnered support from some of the indigenous population. Many Central Asians who accepted the Leninist idea of national autonomy, however, soon were disabused of any expectations about meaningful political independence. This disappointment combined with social tensions to produce the Basmachi revolt, a political movement Rywkin recounts in detail in chapter three. Chapter four is a historical treatment of the economic development of Central Asia stressing agriculture and socio-occupational segmentation along ethnic lines. The strongest chapter of the book, chapter five, is devoted to an analysis of the implications of demographic changes for the labor force. This analysis is followed by a treatment of the role of Islam in Central Asia which concludes that the combination of Islamic-based nationalism and demographic tensions will constitute "the most important threat to Moscow." (p. 90) Chapter six provides an overview of key cultural questions, emphasizing language, education, and the representation of the "historical past" by native historians.&lt;br /&gt;38 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Chapters eight, nine and ten are thematically arranged, addressing a variety of important issues of Central Asian politics. The issues include: political cooptation of the native elite; ethnic employment quotas; the strength of "national" (as opposed to "clan" or "supranational") allegiance; the political implications of the vocabulary of Marxist ideology; and the functional organization of institutions of political and economic management in Central Asia. There are no criticisms that might be levelled against this book that could not be levelled against virtually the entire body of Western of scholarship on Central Asia. Two are particularly important. First, this book, like the other major works in the field, stresses works either produced by Russians or produced by Central Asians whose main facility is with Russian. The danger of adopting Russian conceptual categories in comprehending Central Asia is that we run the risk of becoming captives of the Russian perspective.&lt;br /&gt;Ironically, this perspective encourages us to look at the Central Asians as subjects rather than actors. In the process, we are lead away from asking important questions about, for instance, the complicity of native Central Asians in the current economic and political crisis.&lt;br /&gt;Second, this book provides a comprehensive and critical assessment of what went wrong in Central Asia. Boris Rumer's recently published CENTRAL ASIA: A TRAGIC EXPERIMENT goes farther in this particular direction by providing more detail about the economic problems (although Rumer's book does not have the historical and thematic sweep of Rywkin's). But the two works arrive at essentially the same judgment regarding the diagnosis. What is less clear is what options are available for the future. Rywkin uses what is essentially a colonial model for interpreting Central Asian affairs. Unfortunately, the history of&lt;br /&gt;39 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;post-colonial political success in Africa and Asia is not one that can inspire any great confidence in future prospects. For every successful post-colonial transition, there are many examples of failures. One must of course admire the courage and enthusiasm of those who say "give us political independence and we will succeed." But Central Asia does not have the advanced technical skills of the Baltic countries. It does not have the ready transportation and communication avenues of the Mediterranean and Pacific Rim countries. And, very likely, it will not have the support of its former colonial era metropole. Under these circumstances, one cannot help but see the outlines of the Great Game again in the not too distant future of Central Asia. If for that reason alone, this work deserves to be read by anyone who would seek to understand the momentous transitions that await this part of the world.&lt;br /&gt;The book will serve admirably as an introductory college text at all levels.&lt;br /&gt;Gregory GleasonUniversity of New Mexico&lt;br /&gt;Piri Reis, KITAB-I BAHRIYE (Ankara: The Historical Research Foundation Istanbul Research Center, 1988). Volume 1. 463 Pp. [Orders from U. S.: KITAB-I BAHRIYE, POB 727, Annandale VA 22003.]&lt;br /&gt;Piri Reis (c.1465/70 - 1554) wrote the first draft of his "Book of Seafaring" in 1521. Later, he revised and expanded it. Through Damad Ibrahim Pasha, he presented to Sultan S leyman I in 1526, as a compendium of practical sailing directions for the known world.&lt;br /&gt;40 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Through this connection, the book was preserved for modern scholarship.&lt;br /&gt;Today, there are 29 known manuscript copies of the original. Most of them are in Istanbul, although 9 copies are in European libraries outside Turkey. The best and most complete of these manuscripts is the copy which Sultan Mahmud I bequeathed to the Ayasofya Library in 1730. The editors of this edition have used this manuscript to provide color facsimiles of each manuscript page. Facing each facsimile page, there are three versions of the text for that page printed side by side in columns: The first column contains a transliteration of the original Ottoman text; the second is a translation into modern Turkish and the third is an English translation. Under the general editorship of Ertugrul Zekai kte, Captain Mert Bayat, a member of the faculty at the Turkish NAval War College, prepared the English Translation and served as the general advisor on naval history and science. The English translation is based equally upon the Ottoman and Turkish texts, and the translator has rendered them into English with a style that he remembered with relish from boyhood reading of Marco Polo's TRAVELS and Xenophon's ANABASIS. In dealing with proper names in the text, he chose to transcribe them as Piri Reis used them, thus, for example, Alexander the Great becomes Iskender and Genoa is Ceneviz. The translator has employed a different type-face for these, and usually provides a footnote to give a modern, alternative spelling.&lt;br /&gt;Piri Reis is particularly well known for the maps which he drew in 1513 and 1528, showing discoveries in the Americas, the first of which is used as the illustration on the end-papers to this volume. Because of his cartographical skills and knowledge, one must make a special note of the reproduction here of his coastal and harbor charts within this manuscript. Some&lt;br /&gt;41 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;25 such charts are included here, to which the editors have added, on each facing page, a modern area map and enlargements of manuscript details as well as explanatory notes in both modern Turkish and English. For the most part, these explanations are very clear and helpful, but sometimes, as in the case of the material on Pp. 82a and 86a, the reader is baffled in trying to make a connection between the modern and the manuscript map. At the end of the volume, seven additional modern maps have been added to illustrate the general areas mentioned in the text.&lt;br /&gt;The editors have planned three subsequent volumes to complete the transcription and translation of the KITAB-I BAHRIYE. One warmly welcomes this major transcription and translation of the most important Turkish classic of maritime and naval history. The publication in this form must not only make the work better known, but lead to a broader scholarly understanding of its place and its importance. The editors have made a central contribution to the scholarly debate over Piri Reis and his accomplishments. They have given the scholarly world the material upon which judgements and further research can take place. Today, the name of Piri Reis is known to only a handful of historical specialists and his name is often forgotten in the general reference literature. This edition makes his work readily accessible and available for scholarly discussion. It is particularly important that it is coming available now that renewed interest in the age of discoveries is following along with the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Columbus's first voyage. All maritime historians must certainly look forward to the appearance of the remaining volumes of this edition, including the general index and bibliography. It must certainly be an acquisition for every library collecting in the area of maritime history and the&lt;br /&gt;42 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;expansion of Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries as well as for collections on Turkish history and culture.&lt;br /&gt;John B. Hattendorf, D. Phil.Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime HistoryNaval War CollegeNewport, Rhode Island&lt;br /&gt;Thomas Heberer, CHINA AND ITS NATIONAL MINORITIES: AUTONOMY OR ASSIMILATION (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989).&lt;br /&gt;The past decade has seen an increase in scholarly interest in China's national minority peoples, whose collective population today stands at some 90 million, still largely inhabiting the border regions of the Chinese state. As suggested by the title of Thomas Heberer's book, the presence of an ethnically diverse population presents the Chinese central government with a dilemma not easily resolved through government intervention; indeed, historically there have been but few choices of action open to any government intent on the integration of ethnic minorities; alternatives range from genocide or forced assimilation on one end of the scale, to autonomy and self-determination on the other. In China the last of these is not a policy option. Instead, the Communist party has chosen to offer its minority peoples a Chinese-designed system of regional autonomy which, on paper at least, offers them certain political and cultural freedoms, in keeping with historical differences between them and the Chinese majority. The system of autonomy does not, however, extend to any possibility of eventual self- determination, regardless of historical, linguistic, racial and/or religious differences or of individual minority group's political aspirations.&lt;br /&gt;43 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Chinese central government sensitivity to minority related issues has remained heightened over the past decade as a result of persistent attempts by some of the larger nationalities to gain ever greater recognition of their distinctive cultures, their rights to greater local control and, in several instances, to their right to discuss separate political futures. Issues surrounding China's national minorities are thus extremely important as well as increasingly sensitive today as the world faces a future which may see the further erosion of ethnic Russian political power over non-Russian peoples nd the possible emergence of truly autonomous republics on China's northwestern periphery. Books that can help to elucidate the issues involved and which can help the general public to understand present Chinese policies, in particular, are most welcome -- even, one could suggest, urgent -- given the potential for upheaval in Eurasia and the current international focus on minority rights, be they Kurd or Azerbaijani. While Heberer's book is a contribution to such literature, overall the book has a number of shortcomings that detract from its usefulness as an introduction to national minority issues in China. Derived from a longer study (available only in German and which includes a portion on China's Yi minority, not included in the present work) this brief survey (131 pp.) is very much a general work, offering sweeping conclusions about minority affairs and government policy. The conclusions reached suffer from oversimplification and over-generalization, partly the result of trying to do too much in too small a volume. The very first chapter sets the tone of what is to follow. Chapter One guides the reader quickly through some of the basic concepts of both western and Chinese views on minorities and minority rights, offers brief treatment of the problems of definition, cultural, political and historical differences east and west, and&lt;br /&gt;44 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;then presents a discussion of nations and nationalities, all in the space of 18 pages. While some interesting questions regarding minority legal status in the world at large and in China in particular are raised, the brevity of the discussion and the over- simplification needed to fit all this material into the discussion result in a superficial and cursory treatment of extremely complex issues that are not easily presented -- let alone discussed -- in such an abbreviated format. The same breathless treatment is evident in each of the nine chapters, and constitutes one of the chief weaknesses of the book.&lt;br /&gt;The problem can be illustrated by two examples, Chapter 7 and 8. Chapter 7 concerns religious policy and consists of 13 pages of general background on religion in China, the main point of which is that China has always been areligious, leading to the author's belief that government control over religion in China is thus logical (page 117). As this book is dealing with minorities, may of whom remain adherents of some of the world's great religions, one would expect some discussion of these religions and their role in the borderlands, in particular, but in the three pages actually concerned with minorities and religion, this of course cannot be done. While one may well agree with the author's conclusion that there is little real religious freedom in China for either the Han Chinese or for minorities, the discussion that leads one to that point is inadequate, and in some respects even misleading. Chapter 8 concerns the "Tibet Question." Information again is summary in nature, beginning with an encapsulated history of the region in little over two pages. The author sues his historical survey to arrive at the statement that Tibet basically has been Chinese territory since the Yuan dynasty (page 118). While this conclusion may be considered correct by some authorities and certainly by&lt;br /&gt;45 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;the Chinese government, his statement does little to help us understand the issues of religion, ethnicity, and continued loyalty to the Dalai Lama within Tibet itself or to comprehend where China's current Tibetan policy is headed.&lt;br /&gt;Besides the problems of over-generalization, the book's sources also raise questions about the author's basis for analysis and discussion. In some instances, the author has relied solely on PRC sources as authority for his statements (e.g. the majority of migrants to Xinjiang and Heilongjiang were there by their own initiative, page 94); other facts are asserted but no source is offered at all (e.g. page 90, that infectious diseases and alcoholism are decimating such small minorities as the Oroqen). On the other hand, some revealing PRC documents on the subject of assimilation now available in a number of PRC publications dealing with minority affairs are not included in the bibliography, an oversight which must lead one to question the amount of background brought to bear on this pivotal point, at least as suggested in the book's title. The author clearly is knowledgeable about the Yi, but he also relies too heavily on them as an example of minority policy in action, attempting, to extrapolate from their experience an overview of minority policy throughout China. This, too, is problematic.&lt;br /&gt;Despite the criticism offered above, there are several good sections of the book, including a reasonable introduction to the birth control question in China as it pertains to minorities and the movement of Han Chinese into what were once predominantly minority lands. This issue of domestic migration is certainly an important one, and, as the author states, this movement is clearly a violation of the policy of regional autonomy (page 97). Indeed, this policy has already so undermined the whole basis of the regional&lt;br /&gt;46 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;autonomy system in some regions that it is no longer a question of curtailing such migration but of reversing it if autonomy is to have any meaning at all in China. A short introductory work such as this always requires hard decisions on what information to include and what to leave out. Here, it is not only the choice of material that is questionable, but also the misleading conclusions that result from oversimplification. If one seeks a discussion of assimilation or autonomy issues in China, or information on which to base an informed opinion on China's minority affairs, this book should be used with some caution. One would still do well to read June Dreyer's 1976 book, China's Forty Millions, and to wait for an authoritative update of that invaluable earlier study.&lt;br /&gt;Linda BensonHistory DepartmentOakland University&lt;br /&gt;Natalie Kononenko Moyle, THE TURKISH MINSTREL TALE TRADITION (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Harvard Dissertations in Folklore and Oral Tradition, A Garland Series, Edited by Albert B. Lord, 1990). Pp. 267. (152 pages of text plus appendices and bibliographies.)&lt;br /&gt;One must welcome the publication of this study of the Turkish minstrel tale in a visible series which can not help but call attention to a little known yet quite accessible oral tradition of great intrinsic interest. One must regret, however, that the work is exactly what the series title states it to be: a doctoral dissertation which has undergone no revision. But for the addition of a brief introduction update, the&lt;br /&gt;47 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;omission of some diagrammatic details from Appendix B, the exclusion of one frank footnote at page 141 and the conspicuous excision of fifteen pages of analysis at page 137, the work remains virtually identical to the manuscript submitted to The Ad Hoc Committee for a Doctoral Degree in Slavic and Turkic Languages, Literatures and Folklore at Harvard University in 1975. This is unfortunate for Moyle's study deserved and certainly could have benefited from the insights and corrections of scholars more thoroughly conversant with the minstrel tale tradition than a young graduate student could possibly hope to be.&lt;br /&gt;It is also unfortunate that this young researcher was not directed towards the intensive research activities then taking place at the Faculty of Literature at Atat rk University in Erzurum which began publishing in the early 1970s an important series of completed collections and analyses of minstrel tales which should not have been disregarded. These include the following: [I] Muhan Bali's 1973 study of variants of the minstrel tale, Emrah of Ercis and Selvi Khan, [ERCIS'LI EMRAH ILE SELVI HAN HIK YESI: VARYANTLARIN TESBITI VE HALK HIK YECILIGI BAKIMINDAN NEMI. Atat rk niversitesi Yayinlari No: 213, Edebiyat Fak ltesi Yayin No: 47, Arastirma No: 38, Ankara, 1973]; [II] Fikret T rkmen's 1974 comparative study of one of the best known and most widely distributed of minstrel tales, Ashik Garip, [ASIK GARIP HIK YESI ZERINDE MUKAYESELI BIR ARASTIRMA, Atat rk niversitesi Yayin No. 357, Edebiyat Fak ltesi Yayin No. 70, Arastirma Yayin No. 59, Ankara, 1974]; [III] The 587 page transcription of the K roglu cycle of tales recorded from Beh et Mahir by Mehmet Kaplan, Mehmet Alkalin and Muhan Bali, [K ROGLU DESTANI. Anlatan: Beh et Mahir. Derleyenler: Mehmet Kaplan, Mehmet Akalin, Muhan Bali. Atat rk niversitesi Yayinlari No. 314, Edebiyat Fak ltesi Yayin No. 63,&lt;br /&gt;48 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Arastirma Serisi No. 52, Ankara, 1973]; and [IV] Ensar Aslan's study of the life, poems and tales of one of the most outstanding minstrel poets of the turn of the century, Ashik Senlik of Kars (1850-1914) which although not published until 1975 had been completed by September of 1973. [ ILDIRLI ASIK SENLIK: HAYATI, SIIRLERI VE HIK YLERI (INCELEME-METIN-S ZL K) Atat rk niversitesi Yayinlari No. 359, Edebiyat Fak ltesi Yayinlari No. 72, Arastirma Serisi No. 61]. There was no call for the dismal picture Moyle paints in her original Introduction of the state of research on oral narratives in Turkey and her statement, "One cannot name a single scholarly edition of minstrel tales." is factually incorrect.&lt;br /&gt;One would have preferred that the Introduction provide a specific description of Moyle's own fieldwork and a discussion of methodological issues. For it is not at all clear from the subsequent five chapters that any substantive fieldwork was undertaken in the provinces of Erzurum or Kars where minstrel tale performances actually take place, and it would appear that Moyle was deprived of observing minstrel poets of any real stature in performance in their own contexts. Thus, much of Moyle's discussion seems unnecessarily speculative even if well-grounded in a meticulous reading of secondary sources. The carefully constructed descriptions and arguments presented in the first four chapters, which treat the structure and content of the minstrel tale, the story-telling situation, the life of a minstrel, and the manner of learning the art, draw most heavily upon the scholarship and fieldwork of Pertev Naili Boratav, Zarifov and Zhirmunskii, and Ilhan Basg z, most particularly upon work of the latter whose recordings made in the 1950s from three minstrel poets, Sabit M dam , Dursun Cevlan , and Latif Yilmaz, provide the only original source material used by Moyle in the&lt;br /&gt;49 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;analytic portions of her work. One of the appendices, D, does present three items recorded by Moyle in 1972 in Ankara and Aksaray from someone named Molla Mustafa Ak a. However, it is Ak a's mediocrity as a singer- poet which Moyle discusses in the footnote deleted from page 141, and the only other singer with whom Moyle seems to have interacted, one Ali Yildirim of Aksaray, is mentioned only in passing as an example of the ability of ordinary people to compose folk verse orally.&lt;br /&gt;Moyle's dependence upon the field work of Basg z becomes especially problematic in the case of her extensive and non-critical use of an interactive interview between folklorist and poet as the spontaneous "autobiography" or objective "biography" of Ashik M dam who is then cast as a kind of prototypical minstrel poet throughout the work but especially in Chapters III and IV. Furthermore, despite the use of footnotes and the clear labelling of one of the appendices, the manner in which Basgoz's work has been appropriated into Moyle's discourse makes it hard to believe upon occasion that it was not Moyle who was the investigative presence. An example of this tendency can be found early on in Chapter I, pages 29 and 30, including footnote number 17.&lt;br /&gt;A further problem which arises with this use of Basg z's material does not manifest itself so pervasively, since most of the examples of sung poetry and rhythmic prose used to illustrate points regarding narrative structure and poetic form remain untranslated. A full translation of the transcription of Basgoz's 1956 interview with M dam is, however, provided as the first half of Appendix A. It is a translation heavily peppered with errors and misunderstandings, some of less consequence than others, but all serving to erode the reader's confidence in the self-assured authorial voice of the&lt;br /&gt;50 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;body of the dissertation. For example, M dam 's reference to the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928, "Yirmi sekizde, tabii, harf inkilabinda," (p.195), is rendered as "In 1928 because of the War of Independence," (p.168) and his statement regarding the historical obscurity of many minstrel tales, "Bir ok hik yeler tarihen namal m." (p. 195) is translated in reverse, as it were, "Most minstrel tales are historical." (p. 167). As most of these errors do not surface in the dissertation itself, they will not be pointed out here.&lt;br /&gt;There are, however, three instances of this kind of divergence from what M dam actually says in Turkish which do carry over directly into the argument of the dissertation in a manner that requires a few words of comment. In the first of these, a confusion on the part of the translator is deflected onto the poet. Moyle asserts that M dam 's chronological account of the early stage of his career is "rather disconnected, with the change from the old Islamic lunar calendar to the modern Gregorian one which occurred around this time contributing considerably to the confusion. If M dam 's dates are correct, he first acquired a real saz in 1934, when he was twenty..." (pp. 90-91) But M dam 's dates are consistent and the confusion was not on M dam 's part. He states at the opening of the interview that he was born in 1334: "Dogum tarihimiz bin y z otuz d rt." (p. 186) The first sentence of the English translation, however, is: "I was born in 1330 (1914 A.D.)." (p.155) The error would, in fact, appear to be twofold for, if the conversion tables I have on hand are correct, 1330 H. corresponds to 1911- 1912 A.D. Further on, M dam states that it was in 1934 that he began playing the saz. He then repeats both the year of his birth, 1334, and the year he began playing the saz, 1934, in order to avoid any possible confusion arising from the use of two calendars: "&lt;br /&gt;51 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Yanlis olmasin. Bin y z otuz d rt dogumum. Dokuz y z otuz d rtte sazi elime aldim." (p.186) But here again the translator gets the date wrong and even goes so far as to provide an indication in Latin that the translation correctly reproduces an error on the part of M dami! : "That is (let there be no mistake) I was born in 1934 (sic). In 1934 I first picked up the saz." (p.156) It is difficult to chalk this kind of error up to simple carelessness when in the subsequent two sentences the name of a place to which the poet went is placed in the English sentence as if it were a name for his saz and the word "village" is taken for "villager."&lt;br /&gt;The explanation for what would appear to be a casual disregard for accuracy becomes more clear when one considers the second instance of a direct transfer of translation errors into the body of the dissertation. Like the first, it reflects both a basic unfamiliarity with Turkish idiom and the existence of implicit assumptions regarding the level of sophistication and mental acumen of the poet. An additional factor enters in, however, in the form of an inclination to interpret what is said, and even to supply what is not said, according to the needs of the argument being made. In Chapter IV, "Learning the Art," Moyle's vantage point is that provided by her readings of Zarifov and Zhirmunskii on the system of apprenticeship among the Uzbeks. Anxious to press parallels on the basis of what can be gleaned from Basg z's interview, she has M dam say, "Yes, I served my apprenticeship with him because he seemed like the most learned man in the world to me. If what the people want is not in your shop, you might as well close up that shop." (p.157) when fact, M dam has said nothing at all about serving as an apprentice, but rather, "Yes, we observed from this that, if you like, be the wisest person in the world, if you can't find&lt;br /&gt;52 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;the goods the customer wants in your shop, you might as well close up your shop." (p.188) (Evet, biz de bundan m l h za ettik ki, istersen, all me-i cihan ol m sterinin istedigi mali d kk ninda bulamazsan, sen de d kk nini kapat." ) (p.188) At no point does M dam utter the words, "I served my apprenticeship," nor does he, in fact, ever use the actual term for apprentice, irak, in speaking of his three-year association with an experienced poet-storyteller, Yakupoglu Tevfik Usta, from whom he learned thirteen stories. And, of course, the phrase, "be the wisest person in the world" refers back in its potentiality to M dam himself.&lt;br /&gt;This divergence from the Turkish is heightened when transferred into the dissertation itself as further words are put into M dam 's mouth which serve both to inflate the importance he attributes to his meeting with Yakupoglu and to imply that a master- apprentice relationship has been explicitly stated. Moyle says: "The master minstrel recognized M dami's raw talent and offered to take him as an apprentice." (p. 94) The basis for this statement is the following invitation extended by Yakupoglu: "I've been begging God for a companion like you. Let's set out on the road together." ("Ben, senin gibi bir arkadas Allahtan diliyordum. Seninle bir geziye dogru ikalim.) (p. 188) Moyle continues in her enhancement of the material:&lt;br /&gt;For M dam this was a dazzling opportunity. His ambition to be a minstrel, held in the face of all the slights to which he had been subjected, made this offer seem like "the answer to all my prayers." At that time, he says, Yakupoglu Tevfik Usta seemed to him, "like the most learned man in the world." (p.94)&lt;br /&gt;53 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Nowhere, however, does M dam use anything remotely resembling the phrase, "the answer to all my prayers." Moyle's inspiration for this may have been Yakupoglu's statement, "I've been begging God for a friend like you." As noted above, the statement that M dam looked up to Yakupoglu as "the wisest man in the world" rests upon a translation error abetted by a preconceived notion of M dam 's fundamental na vete. Parallels with the Uzbek system of apprenticeship may, indeed, exist, but they have not been demonstrated here. What has been demonstrated is a lack of regard for accuracy and the freedom to exercise it with impunity when a relatively powerless dissertator is writing in an academic context in which investigator and investigated are conceived as being worlds apart. This impunity becomes particularly glaring in the third and final example of a translation error which surfaces in the dissertation itself. In this case, an attitude of condescension towards the poet, perhaps fostered by the dissertator's mentors, is matched by exceedingly low expectations regarding the poetry itself. For how else could one explain acceptance of the following translation of two lines in which a poet expresses his conflicting emotions as he admonishes his own obstinate heart to give up on the beloved while yet urging that his heart be left free to suffer the consequences of this love:&lt;br /&gt;The inconstant one did not take off her glove&lt;br /&gt;When she tried to take it off, my heart was a saz. (p. 142)&lt;br /&gt;(Dedim, hercaiden el ek ekmediDegme, eksin cezasidir g nl m m) (p. 191)&lt;br /&gt;One might assume that the translation given actually belongs to another poem except for the fact&lt;br /&gt;54 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;that the reference to the removal of gloves could have been inspired by the words "el" meaning "hand" and " ekmek" meaning "to pull," the idiom, "bir seyden el ekmek," meaning to relinquish, withdraw or give up on something. There are no easily discernible grounds for the use of the phrase, "my heart was a saz." Clearly, it would not have taken much of an interest in poetry or knowledge of Turkish to realize that something was seriously amiss here. Even if the translated lines had made good sense, the removal of gloves should have rung untrue, even for the non-expert, as being as foreign to the world of Turkish love poetry, courtly or folk, as they are to traditional Turkish indoor attire.&lt;br /&gt;These are all flaws that should not have escaped the attention of Moyle's dissertation advisors in 1975. A doctoral dissertation a decade and a half old should be either corrected and revised by the scholar at his or her current level of maturity and expertise or simply made available through University Microfilms so that both the price and the expectations of the reader might be of a different order of magnitude.&lt;br /&gt;This is not to say that Moyle's voice from the past is not without some merit and relevance for today. Indeed, having entered the time warp her dissertation presents, one can see a young scholar who has had the courage to challenge what was at the time axiomatic for adherents of the powerful and attractive oral-formulaic theory, namely, that oral composition and the idea of a fixed text are incompatible and mutually exclusive. In this Moyle has succeeded. Chapter V, "The Songs of the Minstrel Tale," demonstrates through a comparison of sung poems from two tales from two different minstrels and of sung poems from two performances by the same minstrel that the poetry inset in the prose narrative of the tales is, as minstrel poets say it is, memorized. In other words, Moyle has shown that in the Turkish tradition, memorization and the idea of a fixed&lt;br /&gt;55 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;text can and do exist side by side with the ability to compose orally. While this may seem to be belaboring the obvious for those familiar with the Turkish tradition, in the context of the still simmering debate about the composition of the Homeric poems it is an important contribution and one which has ramifications for the broader discussions manifest in such recent works as Jack Goody's THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE ORAL AND THE WRITTEN.&lt;br /&gt;Sarah Moment AtisUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison&lt;br /&gt;Otis Hays, Jr., HOME FROM SIBERIA: THE SECRET ODYSSEY OF INTERNED AMERICAN AIRMEN IN WORLD WAR II. (Texas A &amp;amp; M University Press, 1990). xiv + 232 Pp. Appendices, bibliography, index.&lt;br /&gt;An event as historically important and wide-spread as the Second World War is bound to give rise to a vast number of interesting incidents and human interest stories. This diary-like book is one of these --the internment of almost 300 American airmen in the Soviet Union. It is not the only publication about these men of the US Army Air Corps and the US Navy who crash- landed in the Soviet Far East after conducting bombing raids on Northern Japan. The bibliography lists 25 items pertinent to the topic, including three books and several articles that deal with it alone, including the two newspaper articles of late 1944 that leaked the essence of the story and caused certain American Air- crews on the way home to be returned to internment in Soviet Central Asia. Stalin's government did not desire its neutrality pact with Japan to be compromised and accordingly wanted it to appear that Americans who had&lt;br /&gt;56 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;attacked Japan were not being allowed to return to active service in the war.&lt;br /&gt;The Soviets even fired at all incoming American aircraft, much to the surprise and alarm of their crews, who had been briefed about possible emergency landings on the Kamchatka Peninsula but not about the actual nature of their reception over Soviet territory, in order to play the Soviet game of neutrality to the fullest. Whether the pursuing Japanese pilots were fooled is unlikely since almost no hits were scored. Yet it must have been a terrifying experience for a crew of a damaged plane, perhaps with wounded on board, pursued by Zeros, to run into flak from their only hope of landing and refuge. But refuge turned into captivity, physically trying, long-drawn-out and boring, without benefit of regular contact or communication with the American embassy, much less with relatives and friends at home. In the few letters crewmen managed to send home they could say only they had been interned in a "neutral country."&lt;br /&gt;Internment seems to have been one long culture shock and conflict. Ordinary young American males, desirous of returning to their country and getting back into the war quickly ran up against that extremely slow-moving and incommunicative object, Soviet bureaucracy, made even more difficult to budge by Stalinism and the exigencies of war. Promises of deportation in three days would turn into waits of three weeks and then become three months and more. Yet it seems clear the internees' "keepers," the Soviet military, treated them as best they could. More than one internee said they received the same rations as did the Soviet military. Sometimes they were given Lend- Lease food and clothing. Hardest to bear, perhaps, was surgery without anaesthetic. Several died from wounds or disease. After being held in Kamchatka, where most landed, sometimes by plane but usually by train,&lt;br /&gt;57 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;through either Magadan or Khabarovsk to Novosibirsk and then southward through Alma-Ata to the camp near Vrevskaya, near Tashkent, in Uzbekistan. Some tried to escape but were rounded up and returned to the camp. There may have been reasons for the Americans' internment-captivity other than the general Soviet proclivity toward secrecy for its own sake. A few remarks made by some of the American internees suggest the possibility, but only that, of the Soviet Union preparing for war with Japan prior to the agreement reached at Yalta to enter the war in the Pacific three months after the defeat of Germany.&lt;br /&gt;An important fact that emerges clearly from the book is that the future strategic capability of the USSR was greatly enhanced by the arrival on Soviet territory of these 37 aircrews comprising 291 men (223 army and 58 navy). The USSR acquired several examples of at least four types of American bombers (B17, B24, B29 plus one or more navy types). Some planes were hardly damaged. Was a Norden bombsight also acquired? Release came not individually or by aircrew, but by groups of aircrews on five occasions, between May 11, 1943 and August 24, 1945, usually by truck convoy at night across mountains and desert into Iran with NKVD in charge of the operation. Once out of the USSR, the men came under the control of American bureaucracy at its most secretive. All released before the war ended had to sign secrecy pledges, sometimes more than once, promising they would never divulge that they had been interned in the Soviet Union. Not until 1988 did Congress pass special legislation that entitled those still alive to benefits due prisoners of war, a status that many of the airmen felt applied to them. Only three of the airmen ever visited the Soviet Union again. A suggestion by one of the navy fliers for a reunion in Tashkent never got off the ground.&lt;br /&gt;58 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;HOME FROM SIBERIA is an inherently interesting and at times moving account of people, American and Soviet, attempting to survive under difficult wartime conditions made even more trying by the desire of two governments to make certain these men's existence did not affect policy.&lt;br /&gt;Karl W. RyavecUniversity of Massachusetts-Amherst&lt;br /&gt;Muriel Atkin, THE SUBTLEST BATTLE: ISLAM IN SOVIET TAJIKISTAN. (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989) viii + 66 pp., footnotes/bibliography, paper.&lt;br /&gt;This slim volume is the first book length account, in English, of "the status of Islam" (p.3) in Tajikistan. Based on Soviet and Western researchers work on Islam, both as a system of religious beliefs and practices and as a political force under Soviet rule, this publication of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia appears to be part of an ongoing debate related to the United States policy concerns in the region. The central aim of this study seems to be to debunk the widely held view of most Western experts on the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s, that Islam and Muslims pose a threat to the stability of the Soviet state. Such an assertion, if true, could have significant policy implications. Muriel Atkin, however, argues against the notion that Islam presents a powerful dissident force against Soviet rule in Muslim Central Asia. In view of the rapid changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union since the publication of the book in 1989, her position on this point appears to have been borne out, at least for the moment.&lt;br /&gt;59 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Atkin's argument in support of her position is three fold: First, methodologically, she says, the assumptions regarding rising Muslim militancy in the USSR since the 1970s are based, for the most part, on partial and highly abstracted and generalized information. Most of the data utilized in support of the prevailing assumptions, she asserts, come from the north and northeastern Caucasus and Turkmenistan in Central Asia, a relatively small area, and "may not be representative" of the Soviet Muslim population as a whole (p. 3). Furthermore, available information from these regions is primarily on sufism, a presumed "vital form" of Islam as well as "the most politically militant" expression of the religion (p. 2). Second, Atkin contends that there is no substantiated evidence indicating either any real upsurge of Islamic militancy in the Soviet Union, or unusual Soviet concerns over potential danger to the Communist system from Muslims or Islamic movements. Western writers had predicted these events because of the presumed impact of Islamist movements world-wide since the 1970s, and the more immediate influences of the successful Islamic revolution in Iran and Islamist armed resistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan, just across the southern frontiers of the USSR. Such assumptions on the part of Western researchers, she argues, may have been primarily a function of the heightened awareness in the West about Islamist movements, and a projection of their own fears, rather than an indication of any meaningful change in the nature of relations between Soviet Muslims and the Soviet state. Finally, by turning her attention to a single republic, Tajikistan, the only titular republic in Muslim Soviet Central Asia sharing a common language (Tajik/ Persian/Dari) with neighboring Iran and borders with Afghanistan, Atkin characterizes relationships extant between Muslims and the atheistic Soviet State in Tajikistan as "THE&lt;br /&gt;60 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;SUBTLEST BATTLE," the title of her book. In this ongoing battle, Soviet policies towards religion in general and Islam in particular have remained consistently hostile, aimed at the eventual total destruction of Islamic beliefs, institutional forms and practices. In this endeavor, Soviets have pursued a varied but pragmatic course in fighting their battles against Islam and Muslims, most notably by creating an "official Islam" in the form of Muslim Religious Boards, in order to co-opt, politically emasculate, and use Islamic symbols, ideals and human resources towards the furtherance of Soviet domestic and international policies, as deemed necessary. Cognizant of Soviet intent and the presence of a variety of institutional structures to undermine Islamic beliefs and practices, Muslims in Tajikistan have fought, and to a large extent won, their own defensive battles in preserving important components of the Islamic traditions as part and parcel of their Tajik "national tradition" (p.31). Thus, presumably, long standing battles of Communist atheism and Islam in Tajikistan, subtle or not, continue without clear winners or losers as yet. Atkin also asserts that the developments in Iran and Afghanistan have had little or no detectable political impact upon the Tajik Muslims' relations with the Soviet State. This reviewer finds her general argument persuasive given the kinds of data she is working with. The true value of this booklet, described by Adam M. Garfinkle, the series editor at FPRI, as "a careful, scholarly, and important case-study of Islam in the Soviet Union" (p.vii), lies less in what it reveals about the "status of Islam" in Tajikistan than in what it tells us about the sadly underdeveloped (conceptual, methodological and analytical) state of Western and Soviet approaches to the study of Islam and Muslims in the Soviet Union. Principally, the approach taken in this book, a study of Islam in the Soviet Union from a&lt;br /&gt;61 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;distance, is the same as the approach of other Western scholars it criticizes--i.e., it relies primarily on Soviet publications in Russian, and in this case a number of Tajik authors who are working primarily to promote the cause of atheism, the clearly articulated anti-Islamic policies of the Soviet state. It seems that our understanding of Islam and Muslims is limited to the views of those whose very job and livelihood within the Soviet System have been contingent upon the representation of Islam and Muslims as a danger to the Soviet state. In other words, we in the West, and elsewhere, have been exposed to continuous, well orchestrated monologues and diatribes that portray Islam and Muslims as either dangerous or threatening. We have yet to hear the voice of a single Soviet Muslim, of any age or sex--whether defined by the Soviets as a "true believer"/ "fanatic", "religiously Muslim", "culturally Muslim", "sufi" or "an un-official mullah"--other than those working as propagandists for atheism, speak for him/her self. Much to her credit, Muriel Atkin is aware of the limitations of the data she is using, but the fact remains that she continues to pose the same old questions, employ the same old worn out concepts and categories, even if she reaches a slightly different conclusion about "the political significance and strength of Islam in Tajikistan" (p.27) than those propounded by other Soviet experts. The problems of restricted access to field research among Muslims in the Soviet Union is to blame for some of the shortcomings of the current state of Central Asian studies, but not for all of them.&lt;br /&gt;Undoubtedly, much to the chagrin of some researchers on Soviet Islam, the Soviet system appears to be unravelling without any help from the alleged Islamic threat to it. These rapidly changing political and ideological conditions, however, promise unprecedented opportunities for first hand study of the&lt;br /&gt;62 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;status of Islam and Muslims in Central Asia, and the rigorous application of the available conceptual and analytical tools of Western social sciences for a better and more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of Muslim societies under Soviet rule. This effort may have to begin with a critical and comparative examination of relationships between power and production of knowledge of, and about, Islam in the Soviet Union. It must also address not only the questions of how, why and in what forms (institutionalized and private, secret and public, folk and modern, rural and urban, "official" and "un- official", etc.) Islamic beliefs and practices have persisted AGAINST and IN OPPOSITION OR REACTION TO other forces, as it is often depicted by outside observers, but also present Muslim adherents' own REASONS FOR COMMITMENT to Islamic beliefs and practices under very trying circumstances. In other words, it is not sufficient to explain the persistence of Islamic beliefs, and the absence of a more strident Muslim opposition to the Soviet system simply as a function of "manifest deficiencies in Soviet efforts" to promote atheism, especially in the countryside "where most Central Asian Muslims live" (p.52-53). The only real link between ideals and ideologies (religious or otherwise) and actions (political or otherwise) are human individuals, in this instance Muslims (believers, un-official mullahs, shamans, etc.) who live and make decisions in particular social, historical, economic and political contexts--i.e. in a rapidly changing Soviet state and society--and we must begin to focus our scholarly attentions on the thoughts and activities of Muslims themselves, especially in view of the heightened Western policy concerns in the region. We need to discern not only what it means to be a Muslim in Soviet contexts but also what difference, if any, being a Muslim makes in the behavior of individuals in&lt;br /&gt;63 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;particular social situations in their daily lives. Muriel Atkin's THE SUBTLEST BATTLE: ISLAM IN TAJIKISTAN sheds some light onto the tortuous and challenging research path ahead. Are the rest of us ready to join the battle?&lt;br /&gt;M. Nazif ShahraniIndiana University, Bloomington&lt;br /&gt;Frank J. Miller, FOLKLORE FOR STALIN: RUSSIAN FOLKLORE AND PSEUDOFOLKLORE OF THE STALIN ERA. Studies of the Harriman Institute. (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990). 192 pp.&lt;br /&gt;This volume presents a history of the way politics affected the collection, study, publication, and even creation of folklore during the time of Stalin. The origins of "Soviet folklore" and the main contributors to its development (Maxim Gorky and the folklorist Iurii Sokolov, pp. 7-8) are covered in the first chapter. The second deals with the new type of epic termed "novina," the third concerns the adaptation of folk tales to new Soviet content, and the fourth covers the fate of "pseudofolklore" after the death of Stalin in 1953. Three appendices contain English synopses of "novina" and Soviet tales, and complete translations of selected pieces of "Soviet folklore." The volume opens with a foreword by William E. Harkins and concludes with standard notes, bibliography, and index.&lt;br /&gt;Since many traditional folklore genres were still viable in the 1920s and 1930s among the Russian population in the Soviet Union it is not surprising that folklore was eventually subjected to political control and was exploited for propaganda purposes. A new type of "Soviet folklore" was developed, and was supposed to reflect the ideals and achievements of a&lt;br /&gt;64 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;new Soviet society. Suitable performers were sought out, advisers were sent to help them reshape traditional folklore genres, and the resulting texts were adjusted to the standard language and to "correct" political ideas. In opposition to the folk name "starina" for oral epics, a new genre called "novina" was created and was devoted to people in the "Soviet pantheon," the chief ones being Lenin, Stalin, Chkalov, Chapaev, Kirov, and Voroshilov (p. 14). A classic clash between "form and content" ensued since the poetic language and motifs of the epic were mixed with literary expressions and political jargon. Thus Krupskaia is referred to as a "pretty maid" ("krasnaia devitsa," p. 50) and Lenin is called the "red sun" ("krasnoe solnyshko," p. 46), a phrase customarily reserved for Prince Vladimir of Kiev. A. V. Morozova's poem "Of the Miracle Stairway," which she composed about the subway after her visit to Moscow and which was published in "Pravda" in 1935, is a representative example of the "novina" (pp. 152-54).&lt;br /&gt;In the preface, the author states that his book "is a study of the artificial folklore based on the traditional genres: the epic song (the 'bylina'), the lament for the dead, the lyric song, and the folktale" (p. xiii). He makes a distinction between "western definitions of folklore as the oral cultural tradition of a specific group of people" and folklore defined in the Soviet Union since the l930s as the "oral poetic creations of the broad folk masses" (p. 4). "Soviet folklore" is different because most contributors were literate, many wrote out their new creations, and some even read these works before audiences. In the fourth chapter the author offers an overall definition, saying that "the term Soviet folklore had come to signify works by folk performers and folklorists in praise of the Soviet people, their life, their government, and their leaders, particularly Stalin" (p. 95).&lt;br /&gt;65 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;Folklorists as early as the late 1940s but especially after 1953 criticized the very idea of "Soviet folklore" and most came to believe that no such thing ever existed. Since this episode in Russian folklore scholars have largely ignored "Soviet folklore." A few points of clarification need to be mentioned. First, one has to distinguish between "Russian folklore" and "Soviet folklore" because good collections and studies of Russian folklore were published in this period. Second, it is not easy to form a universal definition of folklore because as life changes so folklore also changes. One may admire the oral literature collected over the last two centuries in Russian folklore, but should one take this kind of "classic folklore" as an immutable standard? Third, folklore has often been exploited for other purposes, the most obvious one today being tourism in many countries. "Soviet folklore" may represent one of the most blatant instances of such exploitation. Fourth, in Russian an interaction has taken place between written literature and oral literature since Kievan times, in particular around the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of he nineteenth century when poets such as Pushkin, Lermontov, and Koltsov wrote folklore stylizations. In some cases, such literary works were later collected from folk performers, thus showing that no clear boundary exists between the two kinds of literature. Fifth, one may question the statement that Marfa Kriukova, who coined the word "novina" and was one of its main creators, "was a folk performer par excellence" (p. 51). Her ability to turn almost anything she read into an epic places her in Astaxova's category of "improvisers" (p. 50), but such performers might more aptly be described as revealing how the decline of the Russian oral epic was well advanced before "Soviet folklore" came into existence and as showing how individual originality was replacing&lt;br /&gt;66 AACAR BULLETIN Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, '91)&lt;br /&gt;communal tradition. Her unprecedented repertory of 129 songs consequently should be regarded with some skepticism. Most of these points show how difficult it is to make a precise distinction between "authentic folklore" and "pseudofolklore."&lt;br /&gt;Frank Miller has provided a well documented study about how politics influenced the collection and investigation of folklore under Stalin. This book fills a gap in the history of the study of Russian folklore, and should be useful both to folklorists and to those who study the history of this period from various viewpoints.&lt;br /&gt;James BaileyUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/20075286-113519672951304818?l=aacarbulletin.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/20075286/posts/default/113519672951304818'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/20075286/posts/default/113519672951304818'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://aacarbulletin.blogspot.com/2005/12/vol-iv-no-2.html' title='Vol IV No. 2'/><author><name>AACAR Bulletin</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12319161662375419427</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20075286.post-113519664205114837</id><published>2005-12-21T12:23:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-12-21T12:24:02.090-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Vol IV No. 1</title><content type='html'>BULLETINOF THEASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN RESEARCHVOLUME 4, NUMBER 1&lt;br /&gt;ISSN: 0898-6827AACAR BULLETINof the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research,Inc.Editor: H. B. PAKSOY Vol. IV No. 1, Spring 1991&lt;br /&gt;EDITORIAL ADDRESS: BOX 2321 AMHERST, MA 01004&lt;br /&gt;Executive Council: Thomas Allsen (Trenton State College) (Ex- Officio; Secretary of the AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board); Audrey L. Altstadt (U of Massachusetts-Amherst); Peter Golden (Rutgers U); H. B. Paksoy (U of Massachusetts-Amherst &amp; Harvard U-CMES) (Ex-Officio; Editor, AACAR BULLETIN); Azade- Ayse Rorlich (U of Southern California); Uli Schamiloglu (U of Wisconsin-Madison); Maria Subtelny (U of Toronto)&lt;br /&gt;IN THIS ISSUE&lt;br /&gt;-- HELSINKI WATCH Report: "Conflict in the Soviet Union--The Untold Story of the Clashes in Kazakhstan."-- US COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE- Congress of the United States) Report: "Azerbaijan Elections."-- SUMMARY of Discussions at the Conference "The Aral Sea Crisis: Environmental Issues in Central Asia" held at INDIANA UNIVERSITY, Bloomington, Indiana, July 14-18, 1990-- AN ADDRESS BY SHEIK-UL-ISLAM AL-HAJ ALLAHSH K R PASHAZADE(Chairman of the Moslem Religious Board for the Transcaucasus; People's Deputy of the USSR), to the Fourth International Conference on Central Asia, held at the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, September 27-30, 1990-- Iraj Bashiri, NEITHER TAJIK, NOR UZBEK: RUSSIAN-- Audrey L. Altstadt, BAKU 1991: ONE YEAR AFTER BLACK JANUARY-- News of the Profession-- Book Reviews&lt;br /&gt;HELSINKI WATCH REPORT(Helsinki Watch is a member of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. The following is reprinted from the Helsinki Watch releases)&lt;br /&gt;17 October 1990&lt;br /&gt;Mikhail Sergeevich GorbachevPresident of the Soviet UnionThe KremlinMoscow, USSR&lt;br /&gt;Dear President Gorbachev:&lt;br /&gt;Helsinki Watch appeals to you, as head of the Soviet government, to end the long standing official policy of denying&lt;br /&gt;access to foreigners, including journalists, to most of the territory of the Soviet Union. This policy seems to us to be out of step with the reform program you have initiated in Soviet life.&lt;br /&gt;We are also concerned about the veil of officially imposed secrecy that has shrouded recent instances of unrest in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Foreign journalists have been denied access to those areas for several months (Alma-Ata, Sukhumi, Ferghana, Baku, Dushanbe, Osh, etc.) for several months after the violent incidents have ended. By the time these areas are open to journalists, it is hard to arrive at an accurate picture of the events that occurred. Journalists traditionally travel to places of unrest; surely they can judge the safety of a situation without government interference.&lt;br /&gt;Local attempts --both official and unofficial-- to investigate incidents of violence have frequently been stymied by governmental interference at various levels. We hope that Soviet officials at all levels will now allow these investigations to proceed and will permit the publication of the results. Efforts at obfuscation do not serve the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;Restrictions on freedom of internal movement, on journalists' access, and on investigations of local unrest by independent, non-governmental organizations also fly in the face of Soviet commitments under the Helsinki process. After all, the main aim of the Helsinki process is to promote openness not only between states but also between citizens and their governments.&lt;br /&gt;In an effort to bridge the gaps in public knowledge about the disorders in Alma-Ata in December 1986, Helsinki Watch sent a mission to Kazakhstan in May 1990. We interviewed participants in the demonstrations and produced a report, CONFLICT IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE CLASHES IN KAZAKHSTAN, We enclose a copy of this report and a Russian- language summary. Since our report is the first in-depth study of the Alma-Ata events of December 1986, we hope you will find it of interest.&lt;br /&gt;We are also sending this report to President Nazarbaev, and to the Soviet and Kazakhstan press with the hope that they will publish our findings, thus taking a positive step in the interests of true glasnost.&lt;br /&gt;Sincerely (Jeri Laber, Executive Director).&lt;br /&gt;The following is excerpted from the above referenced report, 22-23:&lt;br /&gt;4 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;Beatings:&lt;br /&gt;-- Beatings were probably the most frequent form of attack, primarily by the militia and soldiers, but also by demonstrators. One protestor described her efforts to save a young demonstrator from a severe beating:&lt;br /&gt;I was badly beaten. I was warned by a soldier: "Leave on the orders of Moscow." I tried to help a young man who was being held by his hair; he was beaten and bleeding. So I took the soldier by the hair. It was three soldiers to one young man. Then they took my arm and pulled behind me. I started to scream and one soldier put my hat in my mouth. I was then taken away and later released. I saw many young women who were beaten, with blood on their hair and from their noses.&lt;br /&gt;-- The beatings sometimes led to severe injuries or even death:&lt;br /&gt;I saw a guy who was carried away by the students. A medical student measured his pulse. It was unclear if he was alive or dead or if he had been badly beaten. (Erlan Dekelbayev)&lt;br /&gt;Initiation of Violence:&lt;br /&gt;-- Witnesses gave Helsinki Watch conflicting reports on which side had initiated violence. Several sources indicated the armed forces reacted with force (hitting people with metal rods or sappers' spades, or beatings) to demonstrators throwing rocks (at the militia/military, at the tribunal , or state property such as fire engines or cars). A Man said the violence began when Kazakh protestors threw stones at the tribunal:&lt;br /&gt;"Kazakhs began breaking off parts of the building and throwing stones at the tribunal. Then, fire trucks were summoned. One car was overturned, a second car escaped. The first car was burned and pushed toward the soldiers." Participant gave a somewhat different version of events, saying that violence began after demonstrators threw rocks at fire engines -- after they had been drenched with cold water on a winter night:&lt;br /&gt;"About 8 pm that evening, fire engines were brought in to dampen the crowds. The demonstrators threw rocks at the fire engines. Also about 8 pm, at the two far ends of the square, two big military cars were blown up at the same time." Early on, the KGB student border guards started using sappers' shovels. A witness said his sources told him: "They then summoned students from the KGB border guard academy who carried short spades. These students fought with demonstrators. Authorities said they didn't hurt anyone with shovels, they just pushed people away. The kazakh say people were hit."&lt;br /&gt;Copies of the 100 Pp. Report may be obtained by writing: Helsinki Watch, 485 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10017; or,&lt;br /&gt;5 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;Helsinki Watch, 1522 K Street, NW, Suite 910, Washington DC 20005.&lt;br /&gt;The U.S. COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE; also referred to as the "US Helsinki Commission") by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing the provisions of the Helsinki human rights accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is made up of nine U.S. Senators, nine U.S. Representatives and one official each from the U.S. Departments of State, Commerce and Defense. The publications of the CSCE may be obtained by writing: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Congress of the United States, 237 House Office Building Annex 2, Washington, DC 20515.&lt;br /&gt;The following are excerpted from the "REPORT ON THE SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN," prepared by the Staff of the U.S. Commission on CSCE, 25 October 1990. A copy of the full report is available from the above address.&lt;br /&gt;-- On September 30, 1990, the first multi-party elections to the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan took place. There was never any doubt, given the circumstances of the election, that the communists would gain control of the legislature; the question was whether non-communist groups, many of whom had joined the "Democratic Azerbaijan" coalition, would win any seats. Though the final figures are not yet in, non-communist forces led by the Azerbaijan Popular Front have for the first time won some representation in parliament.&lt;br /&gt;-- The elections took place in a state of emergency, which has been in effect since January 1990, when the Soviet military entered Baku in force. Non-Communist groups argued that holding free and fair elections under such conditions was impossible and claimed that the authorities maintained the state of emergency in order to facilitate rigging the election's outcome.&lt;br /&gt;-- Colonel Valery Buniatov, the military commandant of Baku [who replaced Lt. General V. S. Dubiniak], closed the city from September 26 to October 2 to non-residents in an attempt to keep out election observers invited by non-communist groups. Soviet troops met would-be election monitors, including members of the Moscow and Leningrad city soviets, at the airport and sent them home. Nevertheless, Helsinki Commission staff and a representative of the US Embassy in Moscow were permitted to go to Baku. They encountered no difficulties in meeting with Communist Party and government officials, as well as with representatives of non-communist organizations.&lt;br /&gt;-- (From P.12) AFP spokesmen and many others dismissed out of hand the notion that free elections could be held in a state of emergency, when the highest authority in the land reposed&lt;br /&gt;6 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;not in the elected representatives of the people but rather in a Soviet military commandant whose frequent public pronouncements stressed the primacy of order and warned of "extremist plots." The 1:00 AM - 5:00 AM curfew did not really impede campaigning but candidates complained about the commandant's refusal to permit election rallies and meetings and their lack of access to the media, despite the election law's provisions.&lt;br /&gt;Opposition candidates also pointed to the presence of Soviet troops in the city and the overall atmosphere of intimidation, especially after the events of January 1990, as unconducive to the free expression of views. Unofficial groups did not always get permission to publish their newspapers, which were in any case subject to strict military censorship. The APF could not publish its weekly AZADLYG (Freedom) from January until May. After it resumed publication, according to Popular Front Representatives, some editions appeared with large sections crossed out or deleted. The APF also protested Colonel Buniatov's insistence that he approve the texts of pre- election statements of all candidates and that these statements not "insult" the CPA and President Mutalibov.&lt;br /&gt;SUMMARY of Discussions at the Conference&lt;br /&gt;"The Aral Sea Crisis: Environmental Issues in Central Asia"INDIANA UNIVERSITY, Bloomington, Indiana, July 14-18, 1990&lt;br /&gt;Discussions at the conference revealed a great variety of opinions concerning the nature of the environmental crisis affecting Soviet Central Asia, its origin and possible solutions. It was impossible to reach "final" conclusions on the subjects discussed, or adopt "unanimous" resolutions concerning recommended actions, unless such as resolution (like the proposed letter to Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Bush) remains purely formal and symbolic. The organizers of the conference believe that solutions for the problems discussed should be worked out by the five republics of Soviet Central Asia themselves; they cannot be dictated to them by anyone else. However, we believe at the same time that our discussions helped clarify the problem and may help in choosing the course of future action. Therefore we have tried to summarize below some ideas brought up by the participants in the conference, which seem to us especially important and on which there was a broad consensus. We would like to emphasize that we do not seek to propose, let alone impose, any solutions of our own, and what follows below is only a faithful summary of opinions expressed in formal and informal discussions during the&lt;br /&gt;7 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;conference. It is up to appropriate bodies in the Soviet Union to take this summary into consideration.&lt;br /&gt;A. THE CAUSES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN CENTRAL ASIA&lt;br /&gt;The following primary causes can be indicated: the "command economy" and central planning, which not only proved to be bankrupt in the entire Soviet Union (and elsewhere in the world), but, more specifically, ignored the needs of Central Asia and sacrificed them in the name of some "higher" priorities; in particular, this was expressed in an inadequate investment by the central government in the Central Asian economy (both agriculture and industry), and in health care and education, and in measures dictated from Moscow with total disregard of their environmental and human costs in Central Asia (like the enforcement of cotton monoculture and the use of defoliants). The totalitarian political regime made impossible any correction of these policies based on independent study and public opinion.&lt;br /&gt;One can hope that with the great changes that are taking place now in the Soviet Union the grave environmental situation in Central Asia can be corrected and the damage caused by the previous fallacious (and sometimes even criminal) policy can be repaired. It will require major efforts on the part of both governmental bodies and an informed public, and the economic cost of these efforts will be very high; however, the lack of action or a further delay in taking action may result in an ecological and economic catastrophe of an even greater scale.&lt;br /&gt;B. POSSIBLE GENERAL COURSE OF ACTION&lt;br /&gt;1. The study of various aspects of the critical environmental situation in Central Asia has already continued in the Soviet Union for quite a while. Given the urgency of the cause, decision making cannot be delayed indefinitely under the pretext that "insufficient date" have been collected. An authoritative body should give its basic recommendations already NOW, that is, in the fall of 1990. For the situation with the Aral Sea, it should be, most probably, the Committee which will be convened in Nukus in early October. A similar committee may be URGENTLY formed to study other aspects and areas of ecological crisis in Central Asia and to give its recommendations.&lt;br /&gt;2. The five republics of Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan, Kazakhstan) should form a center coordinating their environmental and economic policies, whose decisions should be binding for their respective governments. Without such coordination one can hardly expect that any measures taken by a single republic unilaterally (especially in a case like the Aral Sea problem, which concerns all five republics) can bring success. This&lt;br /&gt;8 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;center should have immediate authority (a) to overrule all- union and republican agencies, many of which have impeded even the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to environmentally stricken areas and (b) to deal DIRECTLY with agencies, organizations and corporations outside the USSR which may offer technological and organizational assistance in addressing Central Asia's environmental problems.&lt;br /&gt;3. The central government is expected to assist the Central Asian republics in solving their environmental problems, and not merely with expertise and technical help: after all, it was the policy of the central government which created the present catastrophic situation in Central Asia, and it should be expected that the central government will bear a major portion of the expenses to correct this situation. However, the branches and agencies of the central government, which are directly responsible for the fallacious policies (like Minvodkhoz, SANIIRI, etc.) and which, therefore, have a vested interest in "face saving" measures, should be prevented from imposing their solutions, and their role should remain purely consultative.&lt;br /&gt;4. One should not place much hope on applying to other countries (USA, Japan, Western Europe) or international economic agencies for immediate financial help in order to deal with the Central Asian environmental problems; so far experience shows that these countries and agencies are reluctant to provide financial help as long as the Soviet Union has not introduced a COMPREHENSIVE AND WORKING system of market economy (i. e. a capitalist economy -- one should call things by their proper names), that is, until "perestroika" bears real fruit. Without this precondition such assistance would be, according to western ideas, "throwing good money after bad."&lt;br /&gt;C. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS: IMMEDIATE MEASURES&lt;br /&gt;1. The most urgent measures concern the improvement of health conditions in Central Asia, including:&lt;br /&gt;(a) Introducing local water purification systems.&lt;br /&gt;(b) Building sewage disposal systems and water supply systems, first of all in the regions most severely affected by ecological crises (Karakalpak, Khorezm regions), providing especially hospitals, schools and kindergartens with clean water and disposal systems.&lt;br /&gt;(c) Providing increased medical help (emergency hospitals, pharmacies, supplies of medicines) to the entire population of Central Asia, but especially to the population of the regions that are in the most critical environmental situation.&lt;br /&gt;(d) Upgrading or introducing prenatal care, improved gynecological and pediatric clinics, monitoring of genetic problems, etc.&lt;br /&gt;9 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;(e) Proclaiming --and observing-- an immediate and total ban on the use of defoliants and introducing strict control on the use of pesticides.&lt;br /&gt;(f) Closing the nuclear testing facility near Semipalatinsk.&lt;br /&gt;2. Other immediate measures concern the economy insomuch as it has a direct effect upon the environmental situation:&lt;br /&gt;(a) Abolition of cotton monoculture through an immediate termination of the system of mandatory state orders ("goszakaz") for agricultural products and establishing the right of farmers to choose what crops they cultivate; this should be combined with a mandatory reduction of cotton cultivation (especially in the areas close to population centers); cotton should be replaced by other crops, traditional in Central Asia, which require less water for irrigation.&lt;br /&gt;(b) Termination of rice cultivation in most regions of Central Asia, where it was introduced in the 1960s and later.&lt;br /&gt;(c) Introduction of user fees for irrigational water in major river basins (Amu-Darya, Syr-Darya, Zarafshan, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;(d) Termination of reclamation of new lands for agriculture based on irrigation, and termination of the cultivation of all saline lands, which produce crops below allowable standards.&lt;br /&gt;(e) Closing of industrial enterprises producing large amount of hazardous waste and located in major population centers (permanently, or temporarily --until the construction of appropriate filtering, treatment, etc. systems.).&lt;br /&gt;3. Establishment of an inter-republican Central Asian agency with wide administrative authority to control the implementation of ecological measures agreed upon among five Central Asian republics.&lt;br /&gt;D. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS: LONG TERM MEASURES&lt;br /&gt;1. Improvement of irrigation systems, especially covering the bed of ALL active canals with synthetic or other lining (priority should be for the Karakum canal, which is the most wasteful irrigation canal in the world).&lt;br /&gt;2. Introduction of modern systems of purification of drainage water.&lt;br /&gt;3. Introduction of a system of strict control over the use of water, with differentiated user fees and severe fines for waste of water.&lt;br /&gt;4. Reconstruction of the system of water reservoirs in Central Asia, possibly with a great reduction of the number of these reservoirs.&lt;br /&gt;10 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;5. Renewal and restoration of stock-breeding, based on private ownership of herds and pastures and improved use of dry and irrigated pasture lands.&lt;br /&gt;6. Increased investment in the development of the infrastructure, especially roads and communication systems, including the communication of Central Asia with outside world.&lt;br /&gt;7. Increased investment in the construction of small industrial enterprises utilizing local raw material and human resources.&lt;br /&gt;8. Increased investment in new housing in Central Asia.&lt;br /&gt;Professor Randall Baker Professor Yuri Bregel&lt;br /&gt;Sheik-ul-Islam al-Haj Allahsh k r Pashazade,Chairman of the Moslem Religious Board for the Transcaucasus;People's Deputy of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;[The following is extracted from the presentation made by the Sheik-ul-Islam at the Fourth International Conference on Central Asia, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON (September 27-30, 1990). A copy of the English translation was provided by Mr. Pashazade.]&lt;br /&gt;The tradition of Islam was already thirteen centuries old by the year 1920, a turning point for my land, when the invasion of the Red Army resulted in the overthrow of the legitimate government of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic and proclamation of Soviet power.&lt;br /&gt;....We have to recognize that the idea of socialism, its promising slogans and declarations proved attractive for the masses of Azerbaijan. Primarily because they responded to their aspirations for social justice, a free and dignified life. Naturally, their hearts could not but respond to such declarations in the first post-revolutionary years as, for instance, the Soviet government's Appeal "To All Toilers of Russia and the East." It stated, among other things: "Henceforth, your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural traditions shall be declared free and inviolate. Arrange your national life freely and without hindrance. You have a right to this. Know that your rights, just like the rights of all peoples of Russia are protected by the entire might of the revolution and its organs..."&lt;br /&gt;11 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;What could be more convincing than those words signed by Lenin himself? A religion free of supervision, pressure and suspicion of power, and government free of anti-religious sanctions whose tolerance of religion promoted the unity of citizens of a multinational state. This could have been the ideal of society, the aim of its future development. But the tragedy of historical reality was that neither during that turning point nor in subsequent years could Communist power shed its ideological dogmas and thus assess objectively the sentiments of believers, their aspirations for a new life, the ideals of equality and justice.&lt;br /&gt;In noting this, however, we should not fall into the trap of one-sidedness or lose sight of ambivalent positions of religious authorities. True, there were cases of open resistance of the clergy, including Moslems in Azerbaijan, to Soviet power and its principles of organizing a new society. But obviously, it was primarily ideological, political and practical considerations rather than the above-mentioned factors that determined the state's negative attitude toward religion and believers. Let us recall that in 1922 Lenin invoked economic need to justify appropriation of multimillion- ruble-worth of valuables that belonged to churches and monasteries, demanding the harshest penalty for resisting clerics.&lt;br /&gt;So, on the one hand, there were declarations of religious tolerance, freedom of conscience, allegedly protected by law, and on the other, the rights of believers and the clergy were cynically trampled upon: they were subjected to violence and became outcasts in society.&lt;br /&gt;Looking back at the events in those years we see: the more the government consolidated its position the more obvious its attitude toward religion became, inexorably bringing closer an open confrontation aimed at totally annihilating religion. A specific feature of Azerbaijan was that, unlike the country's central regions, there the Islamic clergy still retained their solid positions in the 1920s and continued to exert a substantial influence on the population. Any underestimation of that reality could not but aggravate the difficult situation of Soviet power, which determined its tactic of a temporary compromise. The influence of some local figures brought up in the spirit and traditions of the Moslem environment such as Nariman Narimanov, had also a certain role to play.&lt;br /&gt;But the process of destruction could not bypass Azerbaijan. Moreover, it was particularly devastating here, as if it sought to make up for the time lost. The waqf lands whose income was used for religious needs were confiscated, sheriat courts were prohibited and religious educational establishments were shutdown.&lt;br /&gt;In addition to "standard" accusations levelled against all Soviet people, Azerbaijan Moslems were charged with Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. The charges were made even against those who&lt;br /&gt;12 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;resisted the transition from Arabic characters used for more than a millennium to Latin.&lt;br /&gt;The cruel repressions against the clergy and believers were determined by the very slogan of the anti-religion movement: "The struggle against religion is the struggle for socialism!"&lt;br /&gt;The blind fanaticism knew no limits: clerics and ordinary believers were repressed or shot, prayer buildings of the Moslem and other confessions were barbarically destroyed. Apart from the famous Bibi-Heibat mosque, a grandiose Russian Orthodox church, a Polish Roman Catholic church and other religious buildings that were valuable cultural monuments were torn down in Baku. The number of mosques in Azerbaijan declined sharply.&lt;br /&gt;The religious structures lay in ruins before World War II. The space cleared of the annihilated religions was to be filled with the cult of Stalin, his deification. It was only the war that made the dictator change his religious policy. This was no reverence of repentance, but a forced necessity prompted, among other reasons, by the desire to please the war allies: the United States and Great Britain. 1943-1944 saw the appearance of four Moslem Religious Boards which covered the entire territory of the Soviet Union. Among them is the Board for the Transcaucasus of which I have been the head for the last decade.&lt;br /&gt;Certainly, religion was totally dependent on the government which exercised unremitting control over activities of communities. It is an eloquent fact that heads of the Council for Religious Affairs were appointed from among the members of the NKVD, a punitive organization whose very name causes older people shudder.&lt;br /&gt;Khrushchev's thaw which has a beneficial effect on society's life, did not, however, put an end to the old attitude toward religion and believers. Little was changed in subsequent years, albeit the wave of violence was abated. Until recently Moslems were excluded from social life, restricted by the walls of mosques that were in fact turned into reservations. Links to the external world and contacts with co-religionists abroad were allowed only within the framework of "the struggle against imperialism, for the triumph of peace throughout the world."&lt;br /&gt;We fought for years to have a medrese opened in Baku to train clerics. But to no avail. It was only the holding of the representative international Islamic conference "Moslems in the Struggle for Peace" in Azerbaijan that helped to get things moving. For something had to be shown to the foreign guests to prevent any doubts they might have about the freedom of conscience in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;Yes, we should be grateful to the world public for even today much is being done with an eye on the external effect. Yes, major changes have taken place in the life of believers in recent years. Slowly and with difficulty new&lt;br /&gt;13 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;shoots sprout in relations between the state and religion. But it seems to me that the most important thing is the understanding and recognition of the fact that unscrupulous atheisation has had the most pernicious effect on society's morality.&lt;br /&gt;The Islamic clergy has warmly welcomed the policy of perestrioka calling upon believers to use all means at their disposal to support the renewal of society and the efforts aimed at its democratization. For their part, Moslems are entitled to expect that the state will shed its suspicion of them and their faith and will see them as loyal citizens. For those who think that the Moslem religion prescribes enmity of Christians are mistaken, since the Holy Quran states: "...And nearest among them in Love to the Believers are those who say 'we are Christians'" (Quran, 5-82).&lt;br /&gt;The recently heightened interest in religion, primarily from the cognitive perspective, is characteristic of the entire Soviet Union, all confessions; and Azerbaijan and Islam are no exception. This is also true of the opening of prayer houses, spiritual educational establishments, the expansion of publishing activity (though Azerbaijan lags considerably behind other republics in this respect).&lt;br /&gt;Naturally, these beneficial changes are perceived by our Moslems as a result of democratization of Soviet society, legitimate realization of the freedom of conscience recorded in the Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;It is regretted that the revival of religious life which is natural for the entire country is seen as a threat of "Islamic fundamentalism" in our case. I see no root-cause of this in the persistence of anti-Moslem stereotypes which artificially model a phenomenon out of individual facts, for certain political purposes.&lt;br /&gt;By calling for reason, peace and good neighborliness in the midst of the hard interethnic conflict, both peoples, Moslems proved their unfailing commitment to the sacred ideals of Islam. We acted on the conviction that both Moslems and Christians believed in one Creator. And they must realize that the commitment to religious ideals admits no veneration or the fanning up of interethnic enmity. That it is the duty of preachers of all religions to prevent and overcome ethnic strife. But, to our profound regret, the calls of Moslems to unite the efforts of the two religions were unheeded. Yet, in spite of the very difficult situation, in our region and the country as a whole, we still hope for the better. We believe that what unites and bids us together as members of one human family is immeasurably more profound, solid and strong than that which separates us.&lt;br /&gt;Let us not spare our efforts in the name of sacred ideals of Good, Justice and Brotherhood. May the Most High help us in our endeavors.&lt;br /&gt;14 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;NEITHER TAJIK, NOR UZBEK: RUSSIANby Iraj Bashiri [Acting Chair, Department of Russian and East European Studies, University of Minnesota]&lt;br /&gt;In one of the sessions of the Fourth International Conference on Central Asia at the University of Wisconsin- Madison (September 27-30, 1990), it was suggested that we might have underestimated the intensity and the importance of the inter-ethnic rivalries and struggles current in the Moslem republics of the Soviet Union. What follows is an affirmation and illustration of that remark.&lt;br /&gt;I arrived in Dushanbe on April 19, 1990 as a delegate to the International Symposium and Music Festival of East Peoples devoted to the 1400th anniversary of Borbad. I found Dushanbe to be a delightful city surrounded by the snow-topped elevations of Hisar. The authorities and the inhabitants were equally charming. I was to participate in the proceedings of the Symposium for the next ten days; I hoped to visit Samarkand and the Noble Bukhara before returning to Minneapolis. When at the Tajikistan hotel the authorities collected the passports as they handed the keys, all hopes for visiting other places were dashed. Upon expressing my concern to my friend and guide, however, I discovered that a trip to Samarkand had been scheduled as part of the program of the Symposium. This trip would be realized we were told, if the authorities in Samarkand kept their promise.&lt;br /&gt;Meanwhile, I had realized that a trip to Bukhara was absolutely out of the question. Three things seemed to creep into my conversations with the Tajiks and with my colleagues familiar with the Soviet scene. One was the Tajiks' fear of the Uzbeks. The UZbeks, the Tajiks said, would gladly take over Dushanbe just as wrested Samarkand and Bukhara from them. The other was the Tajik's contention that both Samarkand and Bukhara, contrary to the Uzbeks' claims, are Tajik-speaking urban centers. In order to prevent the world from recognizing these cities as Tajik centers, the Tajiks claimed, the Uzbeks have restricted access to them. The Uzbeks, of course, deny this. Finally, a major stumbling block to a trip to Bukhara was, I was told, that the monuments of Bukhara, unlike those of Samarkand, were still not renovated to the scale of those of Samarkand and thus were not ready to be presented to an international body.&lt;br /&gt;Fortunately, the Samarkandis came through and on the 27th, those who had been allowed to make the trip assembled in the lobby of the hotel. Buses were ready to take all to the airport. But 8:00 gave way to 9:00 and 10:00 and still no movement. It was rumored that the Samarkandis had, at the last moment, reneged on their promise to allow their neighbors' guests a visit to their republic. While these rumors were still&lt;br /&gt;15 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;circulating, however, we were asked to board the buses and soon after we headed for the airport.&lt;br /&gt;On the plane, before take-off, the authorities checked every name and eventually asked the only two Afghans in the group to disembark. This we, the members of the Symposium, did not allow.&lt;br /&gt;In Samarkand, the visitors were met by the usual offering of bread and flowers. A troop of musicians and dancers entertained the visitors. The guests danced and talked to the welcoming party for about ten minutes before heading for the buses waiting to take us to the monuments.&lt;br /&gt;At the gate of the airport, the buses were stopped. After a few minutes, the drivers and group leaders went to the office at the gate to find out the reason for the delay. The Tajik and Uzbek authorities, they said when they returned, were deciding which language, Tajik or Uzbek, should be the main language for describing Samarkand to the guests. The Uzbeks felt, we were told, that the language of the Republic of Uzbekistan should be used. They offered to provide translators for Tajik. The Tajiks were adamant that since all guests knew Tajik there was no need for Uzbek at all. Meanwhile the clock was ticking towards 5:00 p.m. when the party was scheduled to return to the airport for take-off for Dushanbe.&lt;br /&gt;This haggling went on for a while longer before the "elder brother," to use Stalin's interpretation, stepped in and resolved the problem. Both the Tajiks and the Uzbeks quickly pulled their horns in. Russian, it was decided, should be the language used to describe the sights and the monuments. The group leaders would then translate the Russian into Tajik or Uzbek as needed.&lt;br /&gt;Once the dispute was over, the buses speeded through Samarkand and stopped in front of the Opera and Ballet Theater where the guests were entertained with the Tajik composer F. Bakhor's "Maqam-i Ishq" and the rest of the visit proceeded smoothly from there.&lt;br /&gt;The seemingly simple incident at the gate, however, played a major role in bringing home to me the depth of the inter- ethnic tensions not only between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks but among the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens. I noted thereafter that in most speeches in Dushanbe there were distinct references to the recovery of the Tajik speaking cities of Bukhara and Samarkand. Indeed, the integrity of the Tajik language and efforts at keeping it safe from Russian, placed me in a tough spot in a bookstore in Dushanbe. When speaking Tajik, apparently I used ruble instead of sym [s m]. A tajik youth standing next to me protested vehemently. You should not use Russian equivalents, my guide explained. Either speak Russian or Tajik. Do not mix languages!&lt;br /&gt;Language, of course, is a system of symbols. The use of these symbols invokes a different reaction by different people. But there were other symbols. While helping me buy several postcards at the hotel, my guide got into an argument with the&lt;br /&gt;16 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;hotel clerk who was a Russian. After we were alone I asked about the incident, he told me that the clerk was angry with him because he wore a beard. Further discussion made it clear that he was identified with a group of Dushanbe intellectuals who were anti-Russian and who wore beards as a sign of their protest.&lt;br /&gt;BAKU 1991: ONE YEAR AFTER BLACK JANUARYby Audrey L. Altstadt&lt;br /&gt;The use of Soviet armed forces in Baku last January solved none of the long-standing problems which plagued that republic -- economic disadvantage, ecological damage, political struggle, the threat to the NKAO or fighting along the border. Nor did it root out support for the democratic movement. Intervention allowed the communist party apparatus in Azerbaijan (AzCP) to reassert itself, but it was the power "from the barrel of a gun" not of public support. "They can kill us, but cannot make us bend..." wrote one newspaper.1 Before the arrival of the Soviet Armed forces last January, the (AzCP) was in the throes of a crisis. The AzCP (like CPs in many other republics) had always had to perform a "balancing act" between the demands of Moscow and those of the population of the republic. CP power depended on Moscow, but a party organization that lost all popular support and confidence would be useless as an instrument of central policies. As long as there was no organized "voice" to express popular will, the AzCP had little difficulty in dealing with isolated opposition and could retain its "balance." The growth of informal groups, the most influential of which was the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF), changed that. The growth of the APF coincided with the tenure of Moscow appointee A. Vezirov as First Secretary. Under Vezirov, the AzCP had leaned too far to Moscow's side, ignoring both the popular will on vital issues of the day and refusing to recognize the "informal" groups who articulated it. By the end of 1989, the party had apparently lost authority in the popular mind and had lost control of several towns --Jalilabad, Lenkoran-- and several points of the republican borders.&lt;br /&gt;Indeed, this loss of control appears to have been the main reason for Moscow's use of troops in Baku. Within the party, too, a split was evident. A stunning speech by party Secretary Hasan Hasanov was published in APF organs in early January 1990.2 Hasanov revealed that many decisions concerning the NKAO carried out by Moscow ostensibly after consultation with the AzCP had actually come as a surprise to Baku. Thus it appeared that while the party had been toeing Moscow's line, Moscow was ignoring the AzCP. The AzCP was not only not defending Azerbaijan's interests, its sovereignty and its territory, it was not even able to represent them in any&lt;br /&gt;17 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;meaningful way. With the military presence and the imposition of martial law, the AzCP struggled to regain its authority. As is usual in such crises, the First Secretary was immediately sacked and blamed for everything. His successor was a local engineer, Ayaz Niyazioglu Mutalibov. During February and March, the party waged a campaign to restore confidence in itself both internally and among the public. Apparently, the party realized it had to embrace popular demands to reestablish credibility and enforce its claim to leadership. The new AzCP platform, produced in May, was essentially the old APF platform couched at times in standard party rhetoric.3 The platform and Mutalibov's first speech as republican President4 called for economic and political solidarity, guarantees of territorial integrity, and security of borders. Among other points adopted from the opposition was the call for more equitable prices of commodities produced by Azerbaijan and reforming education to foster "greater national consciousness." The NKAO and Nakhjivan were affirmed as inalienable parts of Azerbaijan. In keeping with their autonomous positions, their rights to determine their own "economic and social development and cultural construction" was assured. But the party pledged "to carry out a decisive and uncompromising battle against any attempts at creation of unconstitutional organs of power..." in those regions. This was still the communist party program, and it affirmed its commitment to a "Leninist conception of socialism" and the development of a materialist world view. It claimed political leadership for the AzCP as guarantor of perestroika. Mutalibov welcomed "political pluralism" and pledged the AzCP to contend in elections with other parties using democratic methods, he warned that "unruliness" would not be permitted. We are all tired of extremism, he said. We can not separate democracy from law and order. The rhetoric and positions of the AzCP did not substantially change after May. It reflected that the party had been forced to abandon its traditional posture and adopt the demands of its opponents. It was a defeat for AzCP. The APF and other opposition groups meanwhile continued under the State of Emergency to protest Moscow's actions of January 1990: the use of troops; the failure of the Soviet government first to declare a state of emergency or establish a curfew which could have reduced civilian casualties; the use of live ammunition and heavy artillery against civilians; and for the resulting deaths of 200 or more civilians (ranging in age from under 12 to over 70 years of age) and the injury of hundreds, perhaps thousands. A report of July by "Shield," a group of military experts from the USSR military procurator's office in Moscow supported APF statements.5 "Shield" agreed that either Soviet "special forces" or the KGB had blown up the television-radio power station a few hours before the entry of troops, and that the populace was notified of a curfew only on the morning of 20 January after troops had control of Baku. The "Shield" report rejected the military's claims of "returning fire," noting&lt;br /&gt;18 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;there was no evidence that those manning barricades on roads leading into Baku had been armed. The report listed vehicle numbers of three ambulances crushed by tanks. "Shield" listed 120 civilian dead and more than 700 wounded, in contrast to the local military authorities' claim of 83 dead, including 14 military personnel. "Shield" concluded that the army had been used against the local population, not an external threat. The Baku press and the many meetings at the University and Academy of Sciences led, by the time of the September elections, to a new APF platform, the basis for a broad election bloc called "Democratic Azerbaijan." If the AzCP platform had usurped many of APF's original planks, the new APF platform reflected a significant evolution on fundamental issues. Furthermore, in the new platform, the Popular Front no longer defined itself with respect to the communist party or the old order, reflecting both political maturity and its decisive opposition to the regime in Moscow and the entire Soviet system. The first item of the program stated that the Red Army had occupied the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic on 28 April 1920 and that the creation of the Azerbaijan soviet government had been an illegal act. The platform further stated that relations between Azerbaijan and the Union must be changed in accord with Azerbaijan's constitution; provisions contrary to the interests of economic, political and cultural interests of the Azerbaijani people are to be eliminated; reciprocal agreements will be rejected if they restrict the people's "right to choose its own path;" the republic will maintain separate foreign policy and diplomacy. Regarding Domestic Policy the platform states the willingness to fight for sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all citizens; the need for self-defense and internal security is affirmed; the platform argues the need for the development of a concept of independence [dovlet mustegilik] and creation of an independent state; the state, legal system and information structures should be "de-party-cized" and the civil society should be "de-ideologized;" freedom of speech, conscience and religion should be guaranteed; passport regime should be dismantled; the right to cultural development of all citizens regardless of their nationality should be protected; to protect the security of territory, NKAO should be dissolved. Development of a free market is called for and creation of conditions favoring foreign investment, foreign trade, tourism. The platform suggests reconsideration of the existing social welfare system and states the work of mothers raising children is equal to other social labor. Human rights are to be guaranteed and "democratic government (majority government)" is to be fought for; in litigation, the accused are to be presumed innocent; acts not prohibited by law are to be regarded as legal. Under the section on "culture and education," the exiting apparatus is to be destroyed and replaced; national-cultural wealth illegally taken from the republic is to be returned, the alphabet is to be "reformed" and religious buildings seized or&lt;br /&gt;19 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;damaged by state or party are to be restored. Finally, on ecological issues, the current Council of Ministers committee for environmental protection is to be dissolved and a comparable commission is to be created under the parliament [sic]; environmental protection measures are to be strengthened.6 It was perhaps clear that the proponents of this program stood for nothing less than the complete destruction of the Soviet system in Azerbaijan, and could therefore not be permitted to win any substantial representation. In the elections of 30 September amid widespread charges of impropriety, falsification, intimidation (two APF candidates were murdered days before the election) and outright fraud, the AzCP candidates won most seats and the APF about 26 of 350 seats. In several districts, run-offs were held two weeks later, on 14 October, but APF candidates did apparently not do much better. Aside from denouncing the illegal practices of the AzCP, there was little the APF could do. It continues to discuss the broad spectrum of issues that concerns the republic. The major issue (apart from ending the State of Emergency) that now confronts the political forces in Azerbaijan is the union treaty. Any treaty which is written by the center not the republics, proclaimed one commentary,7 will remain unsatisfactory. Power for protecting territorial integrity was given to the center in 1922 and how has Moscow fulfilled it --by giving bits of Azerbaijan to its neighbors over the last 70 years. (97,000 sq km in 1922, but 86,600 sq km today). Economic criticism8 has included the same statement that power must be given by the republics to the center (not the reserve), that the proposed union agreement relies too heavily on organs of coercion for implementation, and that it will not develop infrastructure in the republics "freezing" them at current relative levels (detrimental to Azerbaijan). The latest word from Baku is that if some guarantees of "territorial integrity" are included, Mutalibov is prepared to accepted the treaty as now written. The APF will not. Az Azerbaijan commemorates "Black January," there are few signs of hope in the Union. They see a replay of Baku's horrors in Lithuania and Latvia and hear plans for soldiers to patrol cities with the police. When Moscow is "liberal," Azerbaijan may still be crushed. When Moscow begins to talk about control, Azerbaijan begins to talk about 1937.&lt;br /&gt;Notes:&lt;br /&gt;1. Azerbaijan (organ of the Karabagha Khalg Yardimi Komitesi), 24 February 1990.2. Reported in the APF organ Azadlik 14 January 1990.3. Bakinskii Rabochii (BR) 22 May 1990, pp. 1-2.4. Edebiyyat ve Injesenet 25 May 1990, pp. 1-2. Mutalibov in speech noted that party program had been accepted by CC that morning.&lt;br /&gt;20 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;5. The commission "Shchit" ("Shield") examined evidence during 12-22 July 1990; its report was printed in Moskovskie novosti 12 August and reprinted in BR 17 August, p.3 with the title "Ianvar' v Baku." References are from BR.6. Azadlik 8 September 19907. Azerbaijan, 4 May 1990 by Tofik Gandilov (Moscow).8. Azadlik 22 November 1990, "Ittifag programy bize ne vad edir?" by Saleh Mammadov, doctor of economics.&lt;br /&gt;NEWS OF THE PROFESSION&lt;br /&gt;During Spring 1990 AACAR By-Laws were drafted, and submitted to the membership at the end of June for comments. By September the By-Laws were accepted. Under its provisions, AACAR members were invited to submit candidates for the Executive Council elections. The Nominations Committee [Profs. John C. Street (U Wisconsin-Madison) (Chairman), Brian Spooner (U Pennsylvania) and Robert Jones (U Massachusetts-Amherst)] compiled the slate of fourteen names for five Executive Council positions from the responses received. After consultations with those nominated, to secure consent, the Ballot was prepared and mailed by Prof. John C. Street [incurring considerable personal cost, for which AACAR is grateful]. The Ballots were returned to the members of the AACAR Elections Committee [Profs. Iraj Bashiri (U Minnesota) (Chairman), Devin DeWeese (Indiana U) and Uli Schamiloglu (U Wisconsin-Madison)] by the date specified. Prof. Bashiri announced the winners: Audrey L. Altstadt (U of Massachusetts-Amherst); Peter Golden (Rutgers U); Azade-Ayse Rorlich (U of Southern California); Uli Schamiloglu (U of Wisconsin-Madison); Maria Subtelny (U of Toronto). The Ex- Officio Members (who were ineligible at this time for election to additional office, as stipulated by the By-Laws) of the EC are: Thomas Allsen (Trenton State College) (Secretary of the AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board); H. B. Paksoy (U of Massachusetts-Amherst &amp; Harvard U-CMES) (Editor, AACAR BULLETIN). Executive Council held its first meeting via conference call and elected AACAR Officers from among its members as required: Uli Schamiloglu (Treasurer) Azade-Ayse Rorlich (Secretary), Audrey L. Altstadt (President).&lt;br /&gt;Muriel Atkin (George Washington U) has joined Thomas Allsen (Trenton State College), Peter Golden (Rutgers U), Thomas Noonan (U of Minnesota) and Omeljan Pritsak (Harvard U) as a member of the AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board. The AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board invites the submission of high quality manuscripts in the field of Central Asian Studies for publication. AACAR has negotiated contracts with a number of publishing houses for the purpose. Contact:&lt;br /&gt;21 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;Prof. Thomas Allsen, Secretary of the AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board, History Department, Trenton State College, Trenton, NJ 08650.&lt;br /&gt;Dr. Jeffery J. Roberts, Chairman of AACAR Panels Committee, request that AACAR membership contact him with proposals for AACAR panels. As each area studies organization, such as AAASS, AAS, MESA, require that proposals be made early, it is particularly important to act immediately for the 1992 round. Please forward your suggestions to Dr. Jeffery J. Roberts, AACAR Panels, Middle East Studies Center, Ohio State University, 308 Dulles Hall, 230 W. 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR Executive Council voted to hold the AACAR Membership Meeting in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies annual convention, 22-25 November 1991 in Miami. The AACAR Meeting will be restricted to members in good standing. AACAR Members are requested to make reservations directly with the providers of convention facilities: Intercontinental &amp;amp; Hyatt Hotels, Miami, Florida; and register for the AAASS Convention.&lt;br /&gt;The 34th Meeting of the PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ALTAISTIC CONFERENCE (PIAC) will convene in Berlin-Germany, July 21 (arrival date) - 26 (departure date), 1991. The second circular giving details on accommodation, registration fee, transportation, visa requirements, etc, will be sent in February to all who request it from Prof. Denis Sinor, Secretary General, PIAC, Indiana University, 101 Goodbody Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405. Telefax: 812-855-7500.&lt;br /&gt;Ingeborg Baldauf, Bert G. Fragner, Klaus Kreiser and Semih Tezcan announce that ESCAS IV, 4th EUROPEAN SEMINAR ON CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES will be held at BAMBERG UNIVERSITY, Institute of Oriental Studies, from 8 to 12 October 1991. Six panels are envisioned, each covering a half-day session. There will be no parallel sessions. The number of papers in each panel may vary from four to six. Papers are expected to be short so as to allow maximum time for discussions. The final decision about panels, speakers and discussants will be announced in the second circular. Contact the above organizers at: ESCAS IV, Institut f r Orientalistik, Universitat Bamberg, Postfach 1549, D-8600 Bamberg, Germany.&lt;br /&gt;Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies (RIFIAS), INDIANA UNIVERSITY announces Rockefeller Foundation Residency Fellowships aimed at exploring indigenous primary sources on the history and civilization of Inner Asia. The Fellowship program is intended to support the study of indigenous Inner Asian sources by specialists who are equipped with the necessary philological and disciplinary skills. The RIFIAS&lt;br /&gt;22 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;library, in addition to its general collections, and current journal subscriptions, also houses several special collections. The Tibetan collection, housed separately, consists of several hundred volumes of Tibetan texts reprinted in India, as well as 350 original Tibetan blockprints. The most recently developed special collection, the Central Asian Archives, comprises (1) a collection of microfilms and photocopies (obtained primarily from Soviet libraries) of out-of-print publications dealing with Central Asia (2) a collection of microfilms of Persian, Turkic and Arabic manuscripts containing historical, biographical and geographic works on Islamic Central Asia. This collection currently comprises nearly 750 microfilms of manuscripts and over 800 microfilms and photocopies of published works. Details may be obtained from Professor Yuri Bregel, Director, RIFIAS, Indiana University, Goodbody Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405. Phone: 812/855-1605.&lt;br /&gt;The UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON announces the establishment of an annual summer workshop in Central Asian Studies consisting of the following courses for 1991:&lt;br /&gt;Central Asian 503, Civilization of Central Asia (3 cr.) - Intensive 3-week course May 28-June 16. (Prerequisite: Junior Standing).&lt;br /&gt;Pending funding, the following course will also be offered on the Madison campus:&lt;br /&gt;First Year Kazakh I-II (8 cr. undergraduate/6 cr. graduate) - intensive 8-week course June 17-August 11. (No prerequisites).&lt;br /&gt;Fellowship support may be available through a Social Science research Council "Grant for Summer Language Institutes for Soviet Languages Other than Russian." The University of Wisconsin-Madison will also offer other summer courses in Central Asian Studies, pending funding, including Intensive Kazan Tatar, Third Year Uzbek, Russian language. Other subjects may also be available. TO APPLY FOR ADMISSION AND FELLOWSHIPS: Summer Sessions Office, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706. Estimated summer 1991 tuition and fees for 6-9 cr. for undergraduate and special students is $530 for residents and 1736 for non residents. Estimated summer tuition and fees for 4-7 cr. for graduate students is $728 for residents and $2236 for non-residents. For the 8-week summer session estimated room is $431 double ($565 single) in Elizabeth Waters Hall and estimated board is $400. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Prof. Uli Schamiloglu, Department of Slavic Languages, 720 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drive, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706. Phone: 608/262-3498.&lt;br /&gt;The Soviet Cultural Studies Group, Department of Anthropology, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY announces a symposium for students and&lt;br /&gt;23 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;interested scholars planning or conducting research on, in or related to the Soviet Union. The aim of the symposium is to allow scholars with an interest the cultural study of the Soviet Union to present their work, share ideas, develop areas of cooperation and keep up to date on latest changes and developments. Working sessions being considered include: (1) Coordinating Research Efforts: examining ways to foster cooperation and sharing of information among researchers working in different areas. Strategies for complementary data collection, textual standardization for ease in sharing, consistency in translation, communication in the field and after. (2) Issues in Nationalities Research: culture and discourses of ethnic/national identity; uses of history in nation building; culture creation in literature and art; the ethnographer as implicated observer. (3) Cultural study of Complex States: understanding and keeping up with Soviet "policy"; the bureaucratic legacy; the use and abuse of models under revolutionary circumstances. Inquiries and ideas for workshops should be sent to: Soviet Cultural Studies Group, Department of Anthropology, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. E-mail: dk2@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu. The Symposium, sponsored by the Nationality and Siberian Studies Program of the Harriman Institute for the Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, will be held: Friday April 19, 1990, at the 501 Schermerhorn Hall, Columbia University.&lt;br /&gt;Suitland Reference Branch of the NATIONAL ARCHIVES has custody of the US Department of State's Foreign Service Posts records, covering the period from the mid 1930s to the mid 1950s. The Branch also has custody of the records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies for the 1948-1961 period. Contact: Dr. Greg Bradsher, Suitland Reference Branch (NNRR), NATIONAL ARCHIVES, Washington, DC 20409.&lt;br /&gt;Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies at the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN announces two Rockefeller Foundation Residency Fellowships in the Humanities for 1991-1992, for the study of Middle Eastern literatures. The program is designed to enable writers and scholars of Middle Eastern literature to produce English translations and commentaries. For application package, contact Ernest N. McCarus, Director, Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, The University of Michigan, 144 Lane Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1290. Fax: 313-936-2948. KAZAKH/AMERICAN RESEARCH PROJECT is sponsoring a Travel and Research trip to Kazakhstan, May 20-June 30, 1991. For details, please contact Dr. Jeannine Davis-Kimball, Director, 2424 Spaulding Avenue, Berkeley, CA 94703. Phone: 415-549-3708.&lt;br /&gt;Since 1984 THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA FOLKLORE NEWSLETTER has been informing scholars about developments, conferences, publications and ongoing fieldwork relating to folklore of the&lt;br /&gt;24 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;Middle East and South Asia. Volume 7, No. 2 has recently been issued. The Newsletter is published at the Center for Comparative Studies in the Humanities at the OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY and appears tri-annually. Subscriptions: $6 for US residents; $10 for institutions and foreign subscribers. Contact: THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA FOLKLORE NEWSLETTER, Center for Comparative Studies in the Humanities, 306 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210.&lt;br /&gt;CITIZEN EXCHANGE COUNCIL announces two joint programs, both involving visits to Moscow, Samarkand, Tashkent, Leningrad: (1) In association with the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS. This program includes a three day conference hosted by the English language department of Samarkand State University; (2) In association with the FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY, Connecticut. Contact: Stephany Dickey, Citizen Exchange Council, 12 W. 31st Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY, 10001. Phone: 212-643-1985.&lt;br /&gt;UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, Program in Comparative Literature publishes ALUMNI NEWSLETTER. Spring-Summer 1990 issue is available from: 2070 Foreign Language Building, 707 South Mathews, Urbana, IL 68101.&lt;br /&gt;EASTERN ART REPORT is published by the Centre for Near East, Asia and Africa Research (NEAR), covering the arts of Near &amp; Middle East, South &amp;amp; Southeast Asia, China &amp; Japan. Subscription infromation from: Eastern Art Report, P O Box 571, 172 Castelnau, London SW13 9DH, UK.&lt;br /&gt;BIBLIOGRAPHY-- The following items were kindly provided by Prof. Geng Shimin of Beijing: Ji Xianlin, "Translation from the Tokharian Maitreyasamitinataka-- Two leaves (1.3, 1.9) of the Xingjiang Museum Version," Collection of Papers on the Studies of Dunhuang-Turfan Manuscripts. Vol. 2. Beijing, 1985.&lt;br /&gt;Idem, "Translation from the Tokharian Maitreyasamitinataka-- the 39th Leaf of the Xingjiang Museum Version," Tocharian and Indo-European Studies. Vol. 1, Reykjavik.&lt;br /&gt;Idem, "Translation from the Tokharian Maitreyasamitinataka-- the two leaves (1.15, 1.16) of the Xingjiang Museum Version," Studia Indo-Germanica et Slavica. Festgabe f r W. Thomas zum 65. Geburtstag. M nchen, 1988.&lt;br /&gt;Idem, "Translation from the Tokharian Maitreyasamitinataka-- the two leaves (1.2, 1.4) of the Xingjiang Museum Version," Studies of Dunhuang LAnguages and Literatures. Beijing, 1988.&lt;br /&gt;Idem, "Tokharian A and the Dvatrimsadvaralaksana," Languages of Nationalities. 1982. No. 4.&lt;br /&gt;Idem, "On the Maitreyasamitininataka in Tokharian A of the Xingjiang Museum," Cultural Relics. 1983. No. 1.&lt;br /&gt;Idem, "Maitreya and Mile," Social Sciences of China. 1990, No. 1.&lt;br /&gt;Geng Shimin und Hans-Joachim Klimkeit, Das Zusammentreffen mit Maitreya--Die erst f nf Kapitel der Hami-Version des Maitrisimit, Teil I: Text, bersetzung und Kommentar, Teil II: Faksimilies und Indices.&lt;br /&gt;25 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;Wiesbaden, 1988.&lt;br /&gt;Idem, "Fragmentary Manuscripts of Abhidharmanasasatra, Avatamsaka-Sutra," Languages of Nationalities, 1985, No, 1.; Bulletin of the Central Institute for Nationalities. 1987, No, 1.; Central Asiatic Journal. 1989, Vol. 33.&lt;br /&gt;Geng Shimin, H. J. Klimkleit, P. Laut, "Manis Wettkampf mit dem Prinzen." Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. Bd. 137, 1987.&lt;br /&gt;Idem, "Die Geschichte der Prinzen--Weitere neue manichaisch-t rkische Fragmente aus Turfan." ZDMG. Bd. 139, 1989.&lt;br /&gt;Jiang Zhongxin, "On the Remains of the Sanskrit Saddharmapundarika kept in the Museum of L snun (Port Arthur)," Researches on the Unearthed Manuscripts. Beijing, 1985.&lt;br /&gt;Idem, "On the Transition of Suffix -am into -o in the Kashgar Version of the Sanskrit Saddharmapundarika." Studies on Southasia. 1986, No. 2.&lt;br /&gt;BOOK REVIEWS&lt;br /&gt;Azade-Ayse Rorlich THE VOLGA TATARS: A PROFILE IN NATIONAL RESISTANCE. (Hoover Institution Press, 1986). XVI + 288 Pp. Appendix, glossary.&lt;br /&gt;In the current era of rapid change within the Soviet Union any volume that sheds light on the traditions and culture of one of the non-Russian peoples of that country and elucidates its historical political roles and aspirations is important. This is especially true for Azade-Ayse Rorlich's THE VOLGA TATARS. The Volga Tatars are, perhaps, not as well known to the Western world as some other Turkic peoples of the USSR. But, as Rorlich informs us, it was precisely this people, which now occupies the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, that often took the lead in formulating and articulating, disseminating and implementing cultural and political programs not only for themselves, but for the extended Moslem population in the Russian empire and later the Soviet Union. To learn about the Volga Tatars is then to become better informed about a minority population contained in the various incarnations of the Russian state, about Russian policy toward it, and, importantly, something about the responses of that population to those policies, i.e., how it survived and developed within an alien political and cultural context.&lt;br /&gt;In presenting their story, Rorlich divides the history of the Volga Tatars into three main sections. The first deals with the formation of a Kazan principality in the aftermath of the 13th-century Mongol invasion of the mid-Volga region, its transformation into the Kazan Khanate, and the conquest of the latter by the Russian state of Muscovy in 1552. Her coverage of this early period is relatively brief; it is also the weakest&lt;br /&gt;26 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;portion of the book. The information presented is largely derivative of other literature and, unfortunately, Rorlich reproduces some of the findings drawn from that literature in a confused and/or misleading manner.&lt;br /&gt;But the author is on firmer ground and is much more authoritative in the remainder of the book. Her account there rests on her own research and analysis of an impressive array of sources, including primary materials in Russian, Turkish and Tatar languages, as well as secondary sources published in Western languages as well. Her linguistic skills alone enable Rorlich to provide unusual, if not unique, insights to an English-reading audience. It is on this foundation that she explores the Volga Tatars' development under the cultural influences and political pressures resulting from Russian political dominance during the Russian imperial period (section II) and the Soviet era (section III).&lt;br /&gt;Sections II and III are organized primarily around major policy initiatives undertaken by the Russians and, secondarily, the Tatar responses to them. In conjunction with this schema Russian policy becomes the chief determinant of the events and time periods emphasized. There are resultant gaps in the narrative, between the time of the Russian conquest of 1552 and the era of Catherine the Great (late 18th century), for one example, and between 1932 and the post World War II era, for another. Questions do arise about the experience and development of Volga Tatar society during those periods of stability, between the historical pressure points, when the society was able to develop on its own momentum rather than reacting to external forces.&lt;br /&gt;But by presenting her account in this fashion, Rorlich also offers important lessons to students of the history of Russia and the USSR as well as those of Moslem society. In designing their responses to Russian policy the Volga Tatars drew upon Islamic traditions and cultural factors intrinsic to a community that transcended political boundaries and spanned (in the 18th-19th centuries) the Ottoman Empire and Central Asia as well as territories politically within the Russian Empire. Volga Tatar society was also complex, and Rorlich demonstrates how diverse elements within it reacted to Russian influences differently, some adopting, others adapting, and yet others wholly rejecting aspects of Russian culture. In the process, some Tatars became estranged from their Moslem heritage, while others reinforced their commitment to it. Tatar society engaged in its own debates and internal conflicts as it attempted to cope with the challenges presented by the policies of their Russian rulers.&lt;br /&gt;The result, however, was that by the 19th century the Tatars were developing their own reform movements and contributing to the transformation of the traditional Moslem community into a modern, secular society. These movements constitute the core of Rorlich's study. In section II she examines their different stages, principles, and leaders from&lt;br /&gt;27 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;the early 19th century to 1917. Her narrative spans a broad spectrum, ranging from religious reformers, whose concerns to revitalize Islam and make it more accessible to a broader Moslem public led them to challenge the scholastic religious authorities entrenched in theological capitals of Central Asia, to figures who represent various facets of the secular, political reform movement that was active by the 1905-1917 period. In the process she discusses programs and policies relating to an array of topics such as language, alphabets, education, and the press, and reveals how they defined and reflected broader social and political concerns.&lt;br /&gt;The reform movements thus also contributed to a dynamic process within the larger Islamic community, as it juggled pressures of conservative religious scholastics with those emanating from proponents of pan-Turkism on the one hand and, on the other, from an exclusive nationalism that distinguished Volga TAtars from Russians and also from other Turks and Moslems. The dilemmas of the reformers of this period were complicated by their simultaneous and sometimes contradictory yearnings for the preservation of their unique national and/or religious identity as well as for secular knowledge and material progress, which logically encouraged the mastery and use of Russian language and emulation of Russian institutions, such as schools and cultural media.&lt;br /&gt;The continuing evolution of Volga Tatar political movements during the revolutions of 1917 and the Soviet era is the subject of section III. In it Rorlich focuses on one of the most significant, from the perspective of creative cultural adaptation, Volga Tatar achievements --the Tatar national communist movement. Led by Mirsaid Sultangaliev and based on a perceived "compatibility of some of the basic fundamental precepts of MArxism and Islam" (p. 148), this movement sought a "Moslem road to communism" during the unsettled years following the Bolshevik revolution. Although its demand for autonomous political organs became incompatible with the centralized structures created by the Soviet authorities, who eventually crushed it, the movement reflected an attempt to merge foreign or Russian communist principles with indigenous traditions and provides an illustration of how the Volga Tatars were able to adapt an alien political ideology and creatively graft it to at least one branch of the reform movements that had emerged from their own multi-faceted society. It thus constitutes strong evidence for Rorlich's basic message: The Volga Tatars have been and remain a dynamic, resilient people with the capacity to adapt to and develop in changing conditions while retaining essential qualities, perspectives, values, and characteristics unique to their own culture, history, and traditions.&lt;br /&gt;THE VOLGA TATARS is somewhat flawed by editorial carelessness (the birthdate of Abu-Nasr al-Kursavi, for example, is identified as 1776 and 1726 on page 49). But such inconsistencies in detail do not detract from the overall value of this study. On the contrary, Rorlich has not only brought to&lt;br /&gt;28 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;light the history and accomplishments of the Volga Tatars in particular; she has also sensitively focused attention on more universal social dilemmas arising from competition between pressures to preserve national identity and to assimilate, tendencies to modernize and to maintain national traditions, temptations to seek independence and remain within larger political units, i. e., dilemmas with which many minority peoples have grappled in the past and which continue to challenge multinational societies in the modern world.&lt;br /&gt;Janet MartinUniversity of Miami-Coral Gables&lt;br /&gt;ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE RED ARMY: ASSET OR LIABILITY?Alexander R. Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush (Eds.) (Westview Press, 1988).&lt;br /&gt;This is an excellent introduction to the political and military issues surrounding the use of non-Russian ethnic groups in the Soviet military. It is also very timely, considering the current ferment in the non-Russian republics and the attempt by the military leadership to enforce the draft laws by force, if necessary. The different chapters in the book cover the historical background of Soviet policies toward the different ethnic groups in the military, current demographic trends and their possible effects on Soviet military policy and performance, and inter-ethnic relations in today's Red Army, a discussion that was based on extensive interviews with Soviet emigres. The basic theme of the book is that throughout the Soviet period, different regimes have employed non-Russian minorities for varying purposes in the military and that different nationalities were employed in different ways, based on the leadership's view of the political reliability and racial characteristics of each particular group. The nationalities of Central Asia have consistently been considered the least politically reliable and militarily capable of all, and thus have consistently received the lowest positions and the worst treatment.&lt;br /&gt;Part one of this book, written by Susan L. Curran and Dmitry Ponomareff, deals with the historical background of the use of non-Russian nationalities in the military from the time of Ivan IV through the post-World War II period. The authors show the similarities in the attitude toward and treatment of different nationalities during the imperial and Soviet periods and point out that during the tsarist period, it was the Central Asian nationality groups who were considered to be the least politically reliable. The authors also discuss the ways that the Soviets utilized non-Russian nationalities during the Civil War in their campaign to recapture the non-Russian territories and during World WAr II, when the large scale use&lt;br /&gt;29 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)&lt;br /&gt;of non-Russian troops alleviated military manpower shortages but also raised further doubts about the loyalty of non-Russian troops. Part two, written by Alexander R. Alexiev, is a companion study of German policies toward non-Russian nationalities in the occupied territories during World War II. Alexiev points out how widespread was the willingness of the nationalities to support the Germans and how short-sighted German policies led to the erosion of this support.&lt;br /&gt;Part three is the most interesting section of the book. Written by the book's co-editors, this chapter is a discussion of the results of their interviews with Soviet emigres concerning the role and treatment of the non-Russian nationalities in the military and the inter-ethnic relations among the different groups. As a result of these interviews the authors have concluded that there probably continues to be a policy of strictly controlling the ethnic composition of combat units to ensure the dominance of Slavic elements and that non- Slavic troops are most heavily concentrated in non-combat units, such as construction battalions. It is also unsurprising that the Soviet officer corps is heavily Russian. Based on perceived reliability, intelligence, and language ability, there is an apparent hierarchy of ethnic groups in the military with the Russians, Ukrainians, and the Belorussians at the top and the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia at the bottom. The authors also discuss the prevalence of tensions among different ethnic groups in military units, with the most frequent conflict occurring between Russian and non-Russian troops. The occurrence of conflict between non-Russian nationalities is apparently much lower. Based on the data they collected, the authors have concluded that there is potential for a lessening of Soviet military capability, given the reliability problems and inter-ethnic tensions and the growing percentage of non-Russian troops due to Soviet demographic trends. However, Gorbachev's stated goal of reducing the Soviet military establishment may help alleviate this problem, by allowing for the continued dominance of Slavic groups within a smaller force structure.&lt;br /&gt;The last two chapters deal with demographic trends among the draft-age population and with the use of Muslim soldiers in Afghanistan. This book is well-written and documented throughout and should be read by anyone interested in Soviet nationality policies or with Soviet military policy and capabilities.&lt;br /&gt;Philip BayerSRI International&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/20075286-113519664205114837?l=aacarbulletin.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/20075286/posts/default/113519664205114837'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/20075286/posts/default/113519664205114837'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://aacarbulletin.blogspot.com/2005/12/vol-iv-no-1.html' title='Vol IV No. 1'/><author><name>AACAR Bulletin</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12319161662375419427</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20075286.post-113519659766882588</id><published>2005-12-21T12:22:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-12-21T12:23:17.703-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Vol III No.2</title><content type='html'>BULLETINOF THEASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN RESEARCHVOLUME 3, NUMBER 2&lt;br /&gt;ISSN: 0898-6827A A C A R B U L L E T I Nof the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research, Inc.Editor: H. B. PAKSOY Vol. III No. 2, Fall 1990&lt;br /&gt;IN THIS ISSUE&lt;br /&gt;James Critchlow CENTRAL ASIAN MANUSCRIPTS IMPERILEDAyaz Malikov THE QUESTION OF THE TURK: THE WAY OUT OF THE CRISISTwo Supplements to This IssueNews of the ProfessionBibliographies, Edited and Translated Volumes, Book Reviews&lt;br /&gt;2 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;CENTRAL ASIAN MANUSCRIPTS IMPERILEDJim Critchlow [Fellow of Russian Research Center, HarvardUniversity]&lt;br /&gt;An Uzbek scholar has warned that valuable historical manuscripts now held in Uzbekistan are being endangered by wear and neglect. The manuscripts, which survived the mass destruction of documents which took place during the 1920s and 30s, include "incomparable" literary works, historical chronicles and reminiscences, and works of philology. Writing in Yash Leninchi*, which in the perestroika period has become a vehicle for expression of "Uzbek national interests," the scholar, Candidate of Philological Sciences Qaium Karimov, says that all but a few of the manuscripts, most of which belong to "ancient times," have never been reproduced or analyzed by specialists, native or foreign. The writer notes that one reason for inattention to the manuscript collection is the fact that there is now a dearth of scholars who can read the Arabic script. He also criticizes the Uzbek scientific establishment for failures of organization.&lt;br /&gt;His article is not specific about the extent, titles, and exact locations of the holdings. He also gives no indication of whether foreign scholars could obtain access.&lt;br /&gt;3 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;Very old documents are known to have existed in the past in Bukhara and other ancient cities of Soviet Central Asia. A manuscript of the Koran, one of only six copies of the Koran authorized by Caliph Othman in the seventh century, was recently transferred from a secular museum to the Muslim Religious Board in Tashkent.&lt;br /&gt;*Issue of Feb. 21, 1990. YASH LENINCHI is the newspaper of the Uzbek Komsomol.&lt;br /&gt;THE QUESTION OF THE TURK: THE WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS Ayaz Malikov [Candidate of Physics and Mathematical Sciences and, Member of the Administration of the Tatar Society Center] [This essay is abridged from the newspaper AZERBAIJAN, 24 March 1990. (Edited by Sabir Rustemhanli. Editorial Board: Ziya Buniatov, Bahtiyar Vahabzade, Bayram Bayramov, Kasim Kasimzade, Ahmet Elbrus (Assistant Editor), Aliyar Seferli, Ismail Shihli, Yasar Aliev, Nadir Jabbarov, Rustem Behrudi, Jumsut Nuriyev, Feride Memedova, Firudin Jelilov, Firudin Abbasov, Elmira Akhundova, Sherif Kerimli.) Tiraj 200,000. Published since October 1989. The bold face statements are as in the original. The author, Ayaz Malikov, is suggesting that promises made to the nationalities since 1917 be kept and fulfilled by the Soviet state. If not, then the nationalities ought not be barred from pursuing their realization. As in the past, some have been quick to see in this cultural demand a political menace, the old bogeyman 'Pan-Turkism.' As it is well known by now, 'Pan-Turkism' or 'Pan-Turanianism' was created not in the Turk domains, but in Europe, by Europeans, to aid the European Balance of Power Struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries. The literature on this issue is nascent but documented, including works and motives of the 'creator' of the notion, and its propagation methods into the Turk lands.&lt;br /&gt;"The entire English-speaking world," said one Azerbaijan Turk scholar, "forms a cultural whole and is not regarded as a threat to the rest of the world merely on the basis of that cultural unity. When Turks in Azerbaijan look to Dede Korkut or the Orkhon stelae, this is not any different than Americans reading Shakespeare."&lt;br /&gt;As a final reminder, in no Turk dialect is there a distinction between "Turkic" and "Turkish." This was introduced for purely political reasons into Russian and the Western languages.]&lt;br /&gt;We all, of the more than 30 Turk nationalities of the country, at this critical juncture of our history, must look into the past and the present in order to find a path to our future. We must of course, understand, that no one will do this&lt;br /&gt;4 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;for us. Or if they do, it will only produce, as we have seen in the past, the results which we now reap.&lt;br /&gt;We, Turks, have past through a long historical path, from the states of the ancient Khans of the Ordos, of the Altai and Sayan and to the present time. Behind us is more than 2000 years of political history, full of attainments, loss and tragedy. More than once along this path, we have faced the threat of disappearance, but our forbears always found the strength and the confidence in themselves and the hope to return again with new strength to the world arena as active members of the world community of nations. With its own face, and with its own goals. We must realize that we stand at one such critical moment in our history.&lt;br /&gt;In the recent historical past, at the beginning of the 20th century, Tatars freely read books, journals and newspapers published in Azerbaijan; and Tatar newspapers and books proliferated throughout Central Asia, Caucasia and Siberia. And now, when the French speaking peoples launch a satellite to guarantee TV programs for France, the French of Canada and the rest of the world, when in 1992 the Turkish Republic plans to launch a satellite for telecommunications in its native language for three million Turks abroad, we inexorably remain behind the rest of the world.&lt;br /&gt;Designating our path to development, we must proceed from the reality of the existing world and of our position. The total number of members of Turk groups and nationalities of the country is now close to 50 million, that is, equal to the population of France, and every Turk nation has an average of 2.5 million people. The smallest groups, such as the Khakass, the Nogai, the Balkar number about 70 thousand, and the largest -the Kazakhs, the Azerbaijanis and the Tatars- number seven to nine million each. The Uzbeks are close to 20 million. The remaining Turks live in China, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkish Republic, Syria, Iraq.&lt;br /&gt;We must work out own strategy of development. Our first step should be the publication in our languages of all the basic world classics. But some nations, especially those few in number who do not have the status of a Union Republic, do not have the means to resolve this issue, and it is necessary to recognize this. What can be done? It is necessary, in my view, to create a single bank of translation of world literature in Turk languages. All translations from any language of the world in one of the Turk languages would be placed in this bank and then it would be easy to make the shift to any other Turk dialect. Besides this, it is necessary as quickly as possible to publish all ancient Turk literature in Runic and in Brahmin and in all other alphabets used at any time by all ancient Turks. Our children do not even know that before the Arabic alphabet we had our own system of writing. All the ancient Turk legacy of our peoples must be published as quickly as possible. The cultural organization for coordinating such activity could be the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the&lt;br /&gt;5 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan SSR. It could unite all the forces of our peoples, [and] intellectuals in the fastest resolution of this issue. Publication could be cooperative. This guarantees the ability to cooperate, and reduces bureaucratic red-tape. The publication of the ancient Turk heritage for the small Turk peoples could be undertaken by the larger ones: the Azerbaijanis have the power to guarantee a material basis for publications in Balkar and Karachay; the Kazakhs could publish in Altaian and Khakass; the Tatars, in Nogay. The other peoples have the means themselves to publish this literature. Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan could help the Gagauz, since the language of the Gagauz is Oghuz.&lt;br /&gt;Our peoples do not know their own history. The history of the Russians is taught in schools beginning with ancient Slavs, the history of the Germans, from the ancient Germans, the history of the French, from the ancient Celts and the Gauls. In the same way, our children must begin their studies with the history of the ancient Turks. The existing TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THE USSR is a variation on the History of Russia, while the history of the other peoples serves only as background decoration on which the history of Russia is played out.&lt;br /&gt;The publication of a textbook THE HISTORY OF THE TURKS should also be undertaken by the Oriental Institute in Baku. This calls for the mobilization of all the intellectual forces of the country in the field of Turcology. This textbook must be published immediately and included in the curriculum of all the school of all Turk regions of the country.&lt;br /&gt;The journal SOVETSKAIA TIURKOLOGIIA must realize that it is the sole journal in the country dedicated to the study of the Turk people and has a responsibility before all the Turk peoples. At present this journal is especially for academicians. Sometimes the impression is created that if our language were to become dead, it would be better for this journal-- it would not be distracted from "pure art" by waves of the human life. The journal SOVETSKAIA TIURKOLOGIIA must address problems not only of a purely academic nature, but also concerning the teaching of our languages in the various regions of the country. It should publish statistical data about our children who do not know their own language and analyze the reasons for this. The journal SOVETSKAIA TIURKOLOGIIA must recognize the difference between itself and the journal SHUMEROLOGIIA or ASSIROLOGIIA. It has the business of dealing with living languages of living peoples with their own problems.&lt;br /&gt;Unification of the alphabet is necessary and should be undertaken immediately. It must be introduced in such a way so that differences in spelling of the same word in various Turk languages is completely liquidated and in other cases, kept to a minimum. It would be even better, if we all proceed to Latinization. This is especially important considering that many Turks live abroad. Our goal must be the achievement of&lt;br /&gt;6 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;understanding by Tatars and other Turk readers of books and newspapers published in Baku, Tashkent or Kazan as it was before the [1917] revolution. Is it not strange? At the beginning of the century the intelligentsia of our peoples actively tried to see into the life of another Turkic people and into its literature, by reading its literature in the original. Nowadays you cannot find one such representative of the intelligentsia. The tradition of Alimjan Ibrahimov, Uzeyir Hajibeyov, Boraganskii and Sakin Seyfullin, Sheyhzade Babich are completely gone.&lt;br /&gt;It is necessary to expose once for all the false thesis that the knowledge of any Turk language is just the knowledge of one local language. Any Turk language opens the door to the other Turk languages, that is, every Turk language is simultaneously a local language and the language of international communication between close Turk peoples and this should be taught correctly. It is necessary to have the knowledge of this fact among our society in order to liquidate the traces of a policy of weakening and destrution that has been pursued for decades. As a result of the pressure [of this past official policy] we do not have sufficient numbers of Turcologists from our own people. There is not one Tatar or Baskurt Turcologist from the younger generation. There are Turcologist from other nationalities, but not from among the Tatars or the Baskurt. The young have been inoculated with disrespect for their own language.&lt;br /&gt;It is necessary to introduce a single coordinated cultural policy and it is necessary not to be afraid of the accusation of "Pan-Turkism!" By that accusation, we will discern those heirs who are guilty in our current deplorable condition. When you begin to read literature in one or another Turk literature, you will be amazed at the lack of coordination in the terminology. It is necessary to create a terminological commission with the goal of creating new terminology in all spheres of activity. All films issued by Turk language studios should be dubbed promptly to guarantee their distribution in the republic. Goods in the field of culture are also goods and it is necessary that the terms of their sale guarantee the profitability of their production. On the one hand there is a market of seven million Azerbaijanis for the "Azerbaijanfilm" studios and on the other, there are in all 50 million Turks in the country. It is the same for books whether artistic or in other fields of activity. Every successful book should immediately be offered for sale in all the Turkish areas of the country. Why do the books of Chinggis Aytmatov and Chinggis Huseyinov not immediately come out in our languages at the same time they come out in Russian?&lt;br /&gt;Of the 50 million Turk population of the country, 12 million live in republics and oblasts which have "autonomous" status. Obviously, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kirghizistan must use their authority and influence in the higher organs of power in the country in the&lt;br /&gt;7 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;defense of the interests of the other Turk peoples. Within the limits of the law, the constitution of the country, customs and morals, we must demonstrate support for each other. We must proceed from the idea, that the Turk peoples of the country have the same rights in all areas of life as other peoples, and that the depravation or limitation of these rights is illegal and immoral and contrary to nature. In the final analysis, we must be represented also in the United Nations organization, but this is a problem for the distant future, when we have greater integration and when our stature in the world have grown. The main issue is to escape from provincialism in the perception of the world and its activities. It is necessary to understand, finally, that in the world there are no divinely ordained centers and damned provinces, that all this is the work of human hands. To retain a feeling of provincialism is one of the means of braking the development of one or another nation, that is a method of war against it.&lt;br /&gt;According to the newspaper AIF, Soviet internal propaganda is conducted in eighty languages for 2257 hours per week or 322 hours per day. At the same time, the Turk people of our country are deprived of radio stations and transmission on short-wave which are given to them according to international and the intra-union electronic communications agreements. These radio stations and hours are allotted for propaganda abroad. Many Turk peoples are disbursed throughout the country but the radio stations of their republics on medium and long waves hardly reach the whole territory in the republic itself. Is this not derision? This is wasting the means of our peoples and impairing their rights. With our resources and our time they built radio stations and broadcast abroad in Swahili, Greek and other languages, and we Turks suffer from the national and cultural underdevelopment. It follows, obviously, that to decide the question of the removal of the radio stations and broadcast hours for propaganda abroad and to transfer them to the Turk people, who have been deprived of the means of communication throughout the whole country is a necessary minimum. As for Tatars and Azerbaijanis or Bashkurts and others who have gone out to the oil fields of Siberia and other places, it is necessary to protect their right to hear radio in the native language and not just Voice of America, Radio Liberty and BBC.&lt;br /&gt;This is a narrow but very important question. It is necessary also to create an all-union system of television in all the basic languages of the country for the whole territory of the USSR. This includes, of course, Turkish. This is necessary for the guarantee of development of the culture of our nation. But right now, this is guaranteed only to the Russian nation.&lt;br /&gt;It is necessary to adopt an all-union law on the extra- territorial cultural autonomy of nations. Let us look at an example. Suppose tomorrow in Kazakhstan, Siberia or Uzbekistan&lt;br /&gt;8 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;a huge construction project begins, for which thousands of workers arrive from Russia --Russians-- but also thousands of Azerbaijanis and thousands of Uzbeks. Will there be comparable guarantees of the education of the children for the members of these nations in their native language in Kazakhstan? The answer is simple! Only Russian schools will be built, but not Azerbaijani or Uzbek schools. Perhaps there will be Kazakh schools, if the project is in Kazakhstan. Where is the equality of nations called for in the constitution and in our propaganda? From this, emerges the necessity of adopting an all-union law guaranteeing to children of all nationalities of the country education in the native language independent of the place of residence on the territory of the country. Failing this the government should return to the parents the money which was designated by the budget for the education of their children.&lt;br /&gt;The number of Russians in Naberezhnye Chelny and the number of Tatars in Moscow is approximately equal, but could you compare the number of schools in Tatar language in Moscow to the number of Russian language schools in Chelny? Fifteen percent of the native population of the Cheliabinsk oblast constitute more than half million Tatars and Bashkurts deprived of all possibility of national development. There is not one school, not one child care center, not one professional instructional institution in the native language. The people are deprived of radio, television and press in the native language. There is no national theater. But just over a hundred years ago, Cheliabinsk was a large commercial Tatar-Bashkurt aul [city]. The question is not that Russian children have excessive rights. They have natural rights, and these rights must be further developed and realized. But the children of other nationalities must have exactly the same rights. Up to the present time, the entire experience of the Tatars and Bashkurt to realize their own rights has encountered opposition and accusations of nationalism --an experience from the 1930s when that was necessary to excuse the terror (in this case spiritual) toward other nations. It is necessary to adopt an all-union law on national communities and their rights, and the rights of the Russian community on the territory of the country can be the standard, being close to international norms and the decisions of Helsinki and Vienna. In striving towards all these goals we should be guided by the rights of nations, strengthened by all-union and international legal acts, the declarations of rights of the peoples of Russia, Acts on Decolonization and other documents having force on the territory of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;Everyone who suffers for his people and its future will inevitably be interested in its history in order to understand why his nation departed from the rest of the peoples of the world. Why are the rights of the Tatars Azerbaijanis or Uzbeks not the same as those of the Swedes, the Czechs and Turks [of the Turkish Republic]? Why does his people remain "second&lt;br /&gt;9 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;class," remain dependent subject in international life and is not included among the other peoples of the planet? Then he comes to see the same reason applied to all the other Turk peoples! That the Turk peoples in the USSR and China and Afghanistan, and Iran have similar problems. Finding a designated path out of the crisis requires first of all the consciousness of the crisis. It is impossible to cure a disease without realizing that it exists. If we unite, than there is no doubt we will find a way out of the position which has been created. We need unity and confidence.&lt;br /&gt;We must be aware that no one but ourselves will solve this problem for us. But it requires energy and effort, reliance on confidence and success. And this we must find in the more than two thousand years of history of the Turks. Our ancestors also fell into crisis and found a way out!&lt;br /&gt;Harekette Bereket! [Activity is fruitful.]&lt;br /&gt;TWO SUPPLEMENTS TO THIS ISSUE AVAILABLE&lt;br /&gt;Three separate readers of the AACAR BULLETIN kindly supplied us with copies of a questionnaire circulated by the CENTER ON STUDY OF ETHNIC RELATIONS, ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR. It is entitled "Contemporary Interethnic Relations in the USSR and the First Congress of the People's Deputies of the USSR." We are photomechanically duplicating the entire package, consisting of seventeen pages, plus cover letter, for our readers.&lt;br /&gt;As one reads the questions it contains, one is impressed by their nature. It appears that the format and vocabulary employed in the questions are specifically suited for portraying the recent events in the USSR according to the meticulously cultivated image of the USSR in the Western media and public.&lt;br /&gt;KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA and SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN, in their 4 April 1990 issues contain a strongly worded protest from the head of the republican veterans' council about the content of an eight page newspaper (17 X 10 in.) named TURKESTAN. Compiled by one Almaz Estekov, TURKESTAN was printed in Estonia during January 1990 (in Russian) and sold in Alma-Ata, reportedly for at least one ruble per copy (USSR newspapers usually sell for 5-15 kopeks). It contains articles, with accompanying photographs, on: the Red Army's bloody occupation of Baku in January 1990; Red Army units in the Baltic Republics; Ferghana incidents; Tajikistan conflicts; a contribution by the Crimean Tatar Mustafa Jemilev; a chronology of activities by the Nevada-Semipalatinsk environmentalist group headed by celebrated Kazakh author Oljay Suleymanov.&lt;br /&gt;It appears that the main grievance of the republican veterans' council is connected with Estekov's contribution pertaining to the 1986 Alma-Ata incidents. He is criticized for&lt;br /&gt;10 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;portraying the 1986 events as "the organized destruction by the state, Party and the brazenly chauvinistic part of the indigenous population." These include stories of attacks on demonstrators by troops armed with shovels, victims being dumped in the steppe. The letter from the veterans' council also attacks Estekov's statement that at least 185 were killed in the disturbances. This, of course goes against the official claim that there were only three dead. The said letter demands that legal action be taken against Estekov.&lt;br /&gt;Due to the costs involved, we were able to photomechanically reproduce only alimited quantity of TURKESTAN. Members of AACAR who paid their 1990 dues will automatically receive a copy. Other readers who wish to receive one are asked to send $10 (tax deductible) to AACAR (Prof. Audrey L. Altstadt, address on page one) accompanied by a minimum 9X12 sized, self addressed envelope bearing 85c worth of stamps for US mail. First come, first served. We regret the inconvenience.&lt;br /&gt;NEWS OF THE PROFESSION&lt;br /&gt;AACAR extends warm collegial welcome to two new Institutional Members: Department of History, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS- AMHERST; Middle East Studies Center, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY. Center for Middle Eastern Studies, HARVARD UNIVERSITY held a workshop on "Middle East Labor and Working Class History: Concepts and Approaches" 12-13 April 1990. Participants included: Donald QUATAERT; Sherry VATTER; Zachary LOKMAN; Assef BAYAT; Ellis GOLDBERG; Feroz AHMAD; Salim NASR; Eric DAVIS; Marsha POSUSNEY; Joel BEININ; Edmund BURKE, III; Dipesh CHAKRABARTY.&lt;br /&gt;Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, in collaboration with the School of Continuing Studies of INDIANA UNIVERSITY, organized a conference on "Aral Sea Crisis: Environmental Issues in Central Asia," July 14-19 1990, with the attendance of Soviet and US participants.&lt;br /&gt;The Middle East Documentation Center of the UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO has issued a new 44 page catalogue, representing their expanding holdings of both the Ottoman Microforms Project and the Chicago Persian Microforms Project. For further details, contact: Laurie ABBOTT, 5828 S. University Avenue, 210 Pick Hall, Chicago, IL 60637. 312/702-8425.&lt;br /&gt;A Center for Translations of Uzbek Literature has been established at the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON-SEATTLE. The Department also arranged a Summer Course in Uzbek, 18 June-17 August 1990, taught by Prof. Ilse CIRTAUTAS, aided by native speakers of&lt;br /&gt;11 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;Uzbek, exchange students from Tashkent. The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations maintains exchange programs with the Tashkent State University as well as with the People's Republic of China. There are also two student organizations active at the University: The Uzbek Circle, and the Student Association for Inner Asian Studies. The celebrated Uzbek poet, Erkin VAHIDOV, read and discussed his poetry in related functions. Contact: 229-B Denny Hall, DH-20, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195.&lt;br /&gt;THE SARMATION REVIEW, edited by Ewa M. THOMPSON (RICE UNIVERSITY), is a publication of the Houston Circle of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America (PIASA). It deals with Polish and Eastern European affairs and their implications for the United States, published three times a year. Contact: P. O. Box 79119, Houston, TX 77279-9119. * The Middle East &amp; South Asia FOLKLORE NEWSLETTER, edited by Sabra J. WEBBER and Frank C. SPAULDING is published at the Center for Comparative Studies in the Humanities, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY. Contact: 306 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210-1311 * Volume 24 of the JOURNAL OF ASIAN HISTORY, edited by Denis SINOR, has been published. Contact: Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden. * ARIT (The American Research Institute in Turkey) NEWSLETTER, edited by Prof. Linda DARLING, is available. Contact: ARIT, c/o University Museum, 33rd and Spruce Streets, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6324. Tel: 215/898-3474. * The inaugural issue of the JOURNAL OF SOVIET NATIONALITIES, edited by Jerry F. HOUGH, has been published. The journal is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Contact: Center on East-West Trade, Investment, and Communications, 2114 Campus Dr., Duke University, Durham, NC 27706. * CAHIERS D'ETUDES SUR LA MEDITERRANEE ORIENTALE ET LE MONDE TURCO-IRANIEN, edited by Semih VANER, published at the Centre d' tudes et de recherches internationales des Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques et du Centre National des Lettres, No. 10, 1990 is available. Contact: CEMOTI/CERI, 4 rue de Chevreuse, 75006 Paris. * Center of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON) Newsletter (including news and activities of the Modern Turkish Studies Programme and the Central Asian Studies Association) is available. Contact: the editors, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Sq., London, WC1H OXG. * NATIONALITIES PAPERS, edited by Henry R. HUTTENBACH, is continuing its new publication schedule. Contact: Department of History, CCNY, 138th &amp;amp; Convent, NY NY 10031. * THE SOCIETY FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES is continuing to publish CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS CHRONICLE (formerly Central Asian Newsletter), edited by Marie BROXUP, Simon CRISP and Caroline GRAY, and the CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY, edited by Marie BROXUP. Contact: 92 Lots Road, Unit 8, London SW10 4BQ. * Issue No. 3 (July 1990) of BUG NK&lt;br /&gt;12 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;T RKISTAN (TURKISTAN TODAY), a bi-lingual newsletter edited by Dr. Timur KOCAOGLU, is available. Contact: Editor, H rwath Str. 37, 8 M nchen 40 West Germany. * CRIMEAN REVIEW, edited by M. Batu ALTAN, Vol. V, No. 1 (1990) is issued. Contact: P O Box 307, Essex Station, Boston, MA 02112.&lt;br /&gt;PUBLICATIONS: Devin DeWEESE, "The Eclipse of the Kubraviyah in Central Asia" in IRANIAN STUDIES, Vol. XXI, No. 1-2, 1988. * Hakan KIRIMLI, "Soviet Educational and Cultural Policies Toward the Crimean Tatars in Exile (1944-1987), CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1989 * Hisao KOMATSU, THE EVOLUTION OF GROUP IDENTITY AMONG BUKHARAN INTELLECTUALS IN 1911-1928: AN OVERVIEW (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1989) * Paul HENZE "Son Imparatorluk" in YENI FORUM, Haziran 1990. * Philip LOZINSKI, "The transfer of Nithraic iconography from Central Asia to Rome" WORLD ART: THEMES OF UNITY IN DIVERSITY, Irving LANVIN, Ed. (University Park, PA. 1989). Copies are available from Dr. LOZINSKI, who is interested in communicating with those working on the problems of Siberia, and can be reached at: P O Box 3097, Westport, MA 02790. * ASPECTS OF ALTAIC CIVILIZATION III: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference (1987), Denis SINOR, Ed. (Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1990) Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series, Volume 145.&lt;br /&gt;ORIENTAL RESEARCH PARTNERS [Box 158, Newtonville, MA 02160] has issued Catalogues 38 and 39. ORP also published several new books since our previous issue. * ISIS Books Ltd. [Semsibey Sokak 10/2, Beylerbeyi-Istanbul 81210, Turkey. Telephones (90-1) 321 38 51 &amp; 321 66 00] issued catalogues 1989/4 and 1990/1. * BEYOGLU KITAP ILIK LTD. [Galip Dede Caddesi 141/5, T nel-Istanbul 80020, Turkey. Telephones: (90-1) 145 49 98 &amp;amp; 149 06 72] issued a new catalogue, "Periodicals &amp; Series" prepared by Ayhan AKTAR and Necdet ISLI. * OXUS ORIENTAL BOOKS [121 Astonville Street, London SW18 5AQ; Fax: 081-877 1173] issued: The Communist Empires (Catalogue Thirteen); Asian Travel, History Memoirs (Catalogue Fourteen). For copies, Contact J. M. S. SLATER Esq., the proprietor. Please also note the new dialing code. * YAK and YETI BOOKS [P. O Box 5736, Rockville, MD 20855] issued Catalogue 20: "The Himalayan Region, Central Asia and Tibet." * ASIAN RARE BOOKS, 175 W. 93 Street (16-D), New York NY 10025 www.erols.com/arbs * MIDDLE EAST BIBLIOGRAPHIC SERVICES [2272 Colorado Boulevard - Suite 1183, Los Angeles, CA 90041] has issued Special Sales List 40. Please also note the new address. * CAMEL BOOK Company, specializing in used.&lt;br /&gt;13 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;rare &amp; out-of-print books, issued catalog No. 7, IRAN, TURKEY AND AFGHANISTAN. Contact: P O Box 1936, Cathedral Station, NY NY 10025. * WORLDWIDE ANTIQUARIAN specializing in books on travel concerning Middle East, Africa and Asia has recently issued several new catalogs. Contact: P O Box 391, Cambridge, MA 02141.&lt;br /&gt;BIBLIOGRAPHIES BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES IN JAPAN (1879 - March 1987) (Tokyo: The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1988) Second Printing 1989. 717 Pp. + xv.&lt;br /&gt;This Bibliography covers 15067 items published by Japanese scholars during the indicated period, contains a Foreword by KITAMURA HaJime, Director of the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies; and Preface by UMEMURA Hiroshi, Project Leader, both in English. It is indicated that "This volume concentrates mainly on the regions included in the vicinities of Eastern and Western Turkistan and Mongolia." (p.xi). "Scholarly books and journal articles, along with book reviews and Japanese translations of foreign books and articles, dominate the titles included." (p.xii). In the Explanatory Notes, it is stated that, the volume also covers ..."materials published directly by Japanese scholars overseas. While focusing principally on Eastern and Western Turkistan and Mongolia, this volume also includes titles on the area lying between Siberia to the north, north and west China, Tibet, the Himalayas, northwest India, and Afghanistan to the south, Northeastern Asia to the east, and the southern Russian steppe to the west. There are research themes which do reach beyond the boundaries of Central Asia proper, due to migrations of ethnic groups and important changes in the course of Eurasian continental history." (p.xv). The volume is arranged by "the names of authors, editors, and translators, or institutions responsible for the writing...in Japanese phonetic order..." though English translations to the Japanese originals, including author and title, are also given.&lt;br /&gt;Copies may be ordered from: The Toyo Bunko, Honkomagome 2- chome, 28-21, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113.&lt;br /&gt;BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES IN JAPAN (1879 - March 1987) INDEX AND ERRATA (Tokyo: The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1989) 259 Pp. + xvii.&lt;br /&gt;"This volume is divided into index and errata sections. The index section is comprised of the following three parts: (1) five main indexes, (2) four cross-reference indexes and (3) a Chinese character author index." (p.viii).&lt;br /&gt;The Contents page list the five main indexes as follows: "1. Bibliographies: Japanese phonetic order 2. Chinese&lt;br /&gt;14 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;Dynastic Names: Chronological order 3. Personal Names: Alphabetical order 4. Geographical Names 5. General: Japanese phonetic order." The Cross Reference Indexes are: "1. Romanized Cross Reference 2. Japanese Cross Reference 3. Sub-entry Cross Reference Index: Japanese phonetic order 4. Sub-entry Cross Reference Index: Roman Alphabetical order." (p.xvii). The purpose of this volume is indicated as "...to search for books, journal articles and other materials compiled in the original bibliography by means of a set of keywords." (p. xii). Copies may be ordered from the above address.&lt;br /&gt;ASIAN STUDIES IN JAPAN, 1973-1983 (The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, Tokyo): Part II-6 JAPANESE STUDIES ON LINGUISTICS OF ASIAN LANGUAGES (1973-1983) by UMEDA Hiroyuki (1987) 60 Pp.; Part II-16 JAPANESE STUDIES ON INNER ASIAN HISTORY (1973-1983) by UMEMURA Hiroshi (1987) 22 Pp.; Part II- 17 JAPANESE STUDIES ON MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY INNER ASIA (1973-1983) by NAKAMI Tatsuo (1988) 18 Pp.; Part II-26 JAPANESE STUDIES ON WEST ASIAN AND NORTH AFRICAN HISTORY (PRE-OTTOMAN PERIOD) 1973-1983) by HANADA Nariaki (1987) 21 Pp.; Part II-27 JAPANESE STUDIES ON WEST ASIAN AND NORTH AFRICAN HISTORY (OTTOMAN PERIOD) (1973-1983) by KOYAMA Koichiro (1985) 13 Pp.; Part II-28 JAPANESE STUDIES ON MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY WEST ASIAN AND NORTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1973-1983) by HACHIOSHI Makoto (1987) 16 Pp.&lt;br /&gt;(From the inside front cover of each booklet): "Note to Readers: ASIAN STUDIES IN JAPAN, 1973-1983 is published by the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, in forty-nine booklets, for the purpose of reporting Japanese scholarship on Asian studies during the period 1973-1983. This is a continuation of ORIENTAL STUDIES IN JAPAN: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT, 1963-1972 which the Centre published in forty-six booklets during the last decade. "In each booklet, the author describes research trends in Japan during 1973-1983 in a summarized fashion, and the text is appended with a select bibliography which lists representative research works appearing in book from or in scholarly journals in Japan during the period. The list does not intend to be comprehensive but aims to cover important works published by Japanese scholars both in and outside Japan and also research published by non-Japanese scholars in the Japanese language." In the US, copies may be ordered from: Kinokuniya Bookstores of America, West Building of Japanese Cultural and Trade Center, 1581, Webster Street, San Francisco, CA 94115. Other enquiries may be directed at: The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, c/o The Toyo Bunko, Honkomagome 2- chome, 28-21, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113.&lt;br /&gt;15 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;L'ASIE CENTRALE PR ISLAMIQUE: Bibliographie critique 1977-1986, Franz Grenet et collaborateurs (T h ran-Paris: Institut Fran ais de Recherche en Iran, 1988) Abstracta Iranica, volume hors s rie 3. 140 Pp. + 3 indexes.&lt;br /&gt;Published in collaboration with the Direction G n rale des Relations Culturelles Scientifiques et Techniques, this volume begins with a preface by Bernard Hourcade, Directeur des ABSTARCTA IRANICA, and Introduction by Franz Grenet, both in French. The same material is also repeated in Russian. The main body of the work, in addition to the List of Abbreviations and Collaborators, is organized according to the alphabetical order of authors per issue of ABSTRACTA IRANICA between the indicated dates. A short, one to two paragraph (in French), description of each contribution accompanies the entries.&lt;br /&gt;First index is devoted to authors, editors and translators. Second index contains proper names, and the third, topics.&lt;br /&gt;Copies may be ordered from: Editions PEETERS, B. P. 41 - B 3000 Leuven, Belgium.&lt;br /&gt;EDITED AND TRANSLATED VOLUMES&lt;br /&gt;Shir Muhammad Mirab Munis and Muhammad Riza Mirab Agahi FIRDAWS AL-IQBAL: HISTORY OF KHOREZM, Yuri Bregel, Ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988). 1201 Pp., in the original Chaghatay (in the Arabic script) + Index in the original language and script. English Introduction by Yuri Bregel.&lt;br /&gt;The following is extracted from Yuri Bregel's 58 Pp. INTRODUCTION (without the footnotes)&lt;br /&gt;....The first known historical work written in Khorezm in Chaghatay was TARIKH-I DOST SULTAN composed in 1550 by temish Haji. The only complete manuscript of the work has been preserved in the library of the late Zeki Velidi Togan. It seems that the TARIKH-I DOST SULTAN had no circulation in Khorezm: Abu'l-Ghazi Khan, who wrote a century later, knew nothing about his predecessor. Furthermore, temish Haji's work apparently contains only the history of the Ulus of Jochi and does not concern the later history of Khorezm. Thus, the historiography of Khiva proper begins with Abu'l-Ghazi's SHAJARA-I TURK (completed after the death of the author by another person in 1076/1665). This work is too well-known to need any discussion here, though a new edition of the text published in 1871 by Baron J. P. Desmaisons and especially a new European translation of it would be desirable. ....The prime importance of Agahi (as well as of Munis) for modern scholarship lies in his original historical&lt;br /&gt;16 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;writings. The first of them was the continuation of the FIRDAWS AL-IQBAL which had remained unfinished since the interruption of the work by Munis in 1234/1819. Agahi received an order from Allah-Quli Khan to complete this work in 1255/1839-40. He finished it apparently shortly after this, because later the same khan ordered him to write a history of his own reign; this order could have been given not later than 1258/1842 (the year of Allah-Quli Khan's death). The history of Allah-Quli Khan (including also the first two years of the reign of his successor Rahim-Quli Khan) entitled RIYAZ AL-DAWLA was finished in 1260/1844. After this he wrote, in consecutive order: the history of Rahim-Quli Khan (1258-1262/1843-1846) entitled ZUBDAT AL-TAVARIKH, the history of Muhammad Amin Khan (1262- 1271/1846-1855), 'Abdallah Khan (1271/1855) and Qutlugh Murad Khan (1271-1272/1855-1856) entitled JAMI AL-VAQI'AT-I SULTAI, the history of Sayid Muhammad Khan (1271-1281/1856-1864) entitled GULSHAN-I DAWLAT, and the history of the first eight years of the reign of Said Muhammad Rahim Khan II (1281- 1289/1864-1872) entitled SHAHID-I IQBAL. Altogether these works constitute an uninterrupted chronicle of the Khanate of Khiva under the Qongrat dynasty till the Russian conquest. FIRDAWS AL-IQBAL was at the beginning of this chain of histories; it is the largest of all of them, and it undoubtedly determined the character of the subsequent writing.&lt;br /&gt;....After the death of Munis his work remain untouched until 1255/1839-40, when Muhammad Rahim's son and successor Allah-Quli Khan ordered Agahi to resume and finish the work of his uncle; in carrying out this task he enjoyed the special encouragement of Rahim-Quli T re, and son and heir of Allah- Quli Khan.It is not quite clear what was the state of Munis' manuscript when Agahi resumed the work after an interval of twenty years.&lt;br /&gt;....The structure of the FIRDAWS AL-IQBAL is that of a dynastic history (or rather a combination of regional and dynastic history), and it bears some typical features of this branch of Persian historiography with which Munis was well acquainted. No individual work, however, can be pointed out as a sole model for the FIRDAWS AL-IQBAL, though the author was probably influenced most of all by the SHAJARA-I TURK of Abu'l Ghazi and perhaps by the RAWZAT AL-SAFA of Mir Khand.&lt;br /&gt;....The readers of the work were not expected to be numerous. Munis and Agahi speak about "the nobles (akabir) who will read this compendium. This can probably be taken as a conventional flattery intended for the reader, but in any case there is no doubt that the number of educated people who could read this work in the Khanate of Khiva was very limited. There is a striking difference between the proclaimed approach of to their respective works stated by Munis and his predecessor Abu'l-Ghazi. The latter wanted to write "so that all the people, nobles and commoners, understand"; and his Turkish, as he claimed, was so plain that even a five year old child could understand it. Munis, on the contrary, received a royal order&lt;br /&gt;17 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;to adorn his work with all possible stylistic embellishments, poetical and prosaic, so as to stir excitement at the literary gatherings of the sultans. The difference in style was due partly to the difference in the position of the two authors: one was a king writing his own history, while the other was an official and a poet writing a history of his royal patron. ....The first Western scholar who learned about the existence of these works was a Russian orientalist A. L. Kuhn, who accompanied, together with several other Russian scholars, the Russian military expedition against Khiva in 1873 which resulted in the capturing of Khiva and establishing of the Russian protectorate over the Khanate. In the Khan's palace the Russians found a great number of archival documents and about 300 manuscripts; they were all confiscated....Some of the publications confiscated in Khiva by the Russians in 1873 were transferred in 1874 to the Imperial Public Library in Petersburg, but others were kept by Kuhn in his private possession; these included the manuscripts of the works by Munis and Agahi....&lt;br /&gt;[From P. 54, Note 304 of the Introduction] The MS C is slightly damaged by water from which several marginal notes at the beginning of the MS especially suffered. Many pages of E are also damaged by water, but it does not appreciably affect the legibility of the text. The cause of this damage is probably to be explained by a story told by Palvan (Pahlavan) Mirza-bashi, the secretary of the khan of Khiva, to a Russian official and orientalist N. P. Ostroumov in 1891. According to this secretary, "Kun [Kuhn] took away from Khiva about fifteen hundred different manuscripts, but when he transported them across [the Amu-Darya] in a boat, most of the manuscripts got wet, and he requested about 150 mullas from a madrasa to dry the wet copies." (Cited from Oustroumov's diary in Lunin, SREDNYAYA AZIYA, 345, n. 523).&lt;br /&gt;Ugo Marazzi MADAY QARA: AN ALTAY EPIC POEM. Translation from the Altay, Introduction and Notes. (Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale Dipartimento di Studi Asiatici, 1986). 146 Pp. + Bibliography, Appendix. The following is extracted from Ugo Marazzi's INTRODUCTION (without the footnotes)&lt;br /&gt;In the rich epic literature of oral tradition of the Turkic South-Siberian area, the Altay epic holds a considerable position in all respects. The Altay epic tradition is outstanding for its archaic and shamanic character, which is shared on the Mongolian side with the Buriat epic. Mongolian influence, which was nonetheless exerted on the Altay epic at the time of the domination of South Siberia by the Oyrats, has not altered the essence of its character. Of the different components singled out as constituting the Altay epic (and&lt;br /&gt;18 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;Turkic South-Siberian in general), the original one appears to be by far the most prevalent.&lt;br /&gt;Exemplary of such an archaic character of the Altay epic tradition is the poem MADAY QARA, the longest and the most interesting of those known so far from the whole Turkic South- Siberian area. In it the heroic plot, having several common features with the different Turkic and Mongolian epics, develops according to a structural conception borrowed from the shamanic initiation experience. The mythical background of the poem is constituted by the cosmogonic theme of the "heavenly hunt," it serves to explain from an aetiological point of view the origin of two of the most important constellations (Orion and the Great Bear), as well as the origin of the alternation between day and night while confirming the role that the bear/double of man and first shaman plays in the primordial organization of time and the establishing of a periodic order as well as in the introduction of a vital rhythm into the original chaos.&lt;br /&gt;The myth of the heavenly hunt, in the Tungus variant, which appears to be the clearest, tells of how Mangi, first shaman as well as forger and simple hunter besides being bear, chases after Xoglen, the reindeer/elk that has taken away the daylight and condemned the world to darkness. Mangi's skis leave a wide white trail in the heavenly vault; the Milky Way. He catches the thief and lands him a blow that puts an end to his running; he takes possession of the day and brings it back to earth. From then on every evening Xoglen steals the day and Mangi gets it back and brings it back to the earth.&lt;br /&gt;....In Turkic South-Siberian epic literature the prevailing figure is that of the solitary hero who is destined as a rule to avenge his father who has been offended or taken prisoner or killed. After facing numerous trials, which clearly reflect the initiation experience, and after fighting his enemies from this world and the underworld, in the end thanks to his magical skills the hero has the upper hand and affirms the superiority of the cultural order over the disruptive powers of the underworld. The magical skills of the hero are concretely expressed in the help ensured to him by his horse/winged double, by his companions/helping spirits. Substantially the hero's deeds are none other than the transposition on an epic level of the shaman's exploits. The story of the hero K g day Margan develops precisely according to such an epic model, though enriched with archaic motifs, elements and original myths....&lt;br /&gt;BOOK REVIEWS&lt;br /&gt;Marion Debout, Denise Eeckaute-Bardery, Vincent Fourniau, Eds., ROUTES D'ASIE, MARCHANDS ET VOYAGEURS XVE-XVIII SI CLE, Actes du Colloque organis par la Biblioth que Interuniversitaire des&lt;br /&gt;19 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;Langues Orientales, Paris, 11-12 d cembre 1986. (Edition ISIS, Istanbul; Paris, 1988).&lt;br /&gt;This volume contains the papers presented at the colloquim accompanying an exhibit at the Biblioth que des Langues Orientales showing travel books about the Orient, and artifacts connected with trade and travel, many from the library's holdings. The content of the contributions collected here reflects this; most are based on European travel accounts, which range from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century, with the emphasis on the seventeenth and eighteenth.&lt;br /&gt;The volume opens with a brief description of the library's holdings, followed by a short introductory essay on Asian trade routes. The papers are organized into three sections, each one introduced by a few pages of general description. The first, "The Western Approaches," deals with the northwestern regions; the western portion of the Mongol empire and its successor states. Here we find a discussion of the Mongol empire and its legacy -- a description of the role of interpreters in Mongol relations with the west by C. Kappler, the "jam," by L. Bazin. Two other papers deal with a later period: that by C. Poujol on Russian travellers to Central Asia in the 18th century, and one by V. Fourniau on the routes utilized in the Uzbek conquest of Central Asia. The second section of the book is entitled "The Oriental Frontiers," and contains three articles, one by L. Boulnois decribing routes and traffic in the Himalayas -- religious, military and trade-- one by J. Legrand about the mission to China led by Ivan Petlin in 1618-19, and one by L. Bernot which describes exchanges in agriculture and technology between China and Southeast Asia. The final section, "The Chinese Routes" contains an article by F. Blanchon, on routes and legends concerning travel in Sichuan, and two descriptions of western travel accounts, one by J. Meyer on the mission of Van Braam from Canton to Peking in 1794-5, and one by M. Caillet, on the Chinese voyages of the surgeon Jean-Baptiste Bernard in 1751-5, dealing largeley with the region of Canton. At the end of the volume we find a brief resume of the discussion about the papers, a catalogue of the exhibit, and as an appendix, an article by S. Nguyen Dac on the impact of Chinese civilization on Vietnam.&lt;br /&gt;The articles in this collection range from the very general, based largely on secondary literature, to detailed and focused discussions of one particular source. Most deal primarily with European merchants or travellers, and are based on western travel accounts. Russian literature is well represented, both in primary and in secondary sources, but with the exception of Blanchon's article on Sechuan, primary sources in Middle Eastern or East Asian languages are very little cited. Another common trait of these papers is their concentration on the concrete; we learn many deyails about routes, objects of trade and diplomatic exchanges, some minor and fascinating, others important. There is however very little&lt;br /&gt;20 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;discussion of the social or economic results of these exchanges, or of the dynamics of the system from which they sprang. The statement by Blanchon in her discussion of Sechuan legends, that she intends not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the material, but to present a selection of significant pieces, could serve to describe the collection as a whole. For those who are looking for new insights into methods and significance of Asian travel and trade in the pre-modern world, this collection will be a disappointment. Its main value lies in other directions. One is in its use of some less well known western travel accounts, and in bringing before the public some of the holdings of the Biblioth que des Langues Orientales. Another is in the evocation of details --we learn about the routes through the Himalayas, and the methods of transport associated with them, about the survival of Mongol postal terminology in Russian, Ottoman and Persian, about the construction of canals and bridges in China. Taken together these do not provide an overview of Asian trade and commerce, but they do remind us vividly of the importance of trade and travel in the pre-modern period, its breadth, its dangers, and its rewards.&lt;br /&gt;Beatrice Forbes ManzTufts University&lt;br /&gt;Leo de Hartog GENGHIS KHAN: CONQUEROR OF THE WORLD. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1989) ix, 230 pp.&lt;br /&gt;This volume, an English translation of the Dutch original published in 1979, is directed at a general readership. Judging by the bibliography, the present edition has been revised and updated in light of the scholarship of the last decade. De Hartog opens his study with a survey of the geography and ethnography of the eastern steppe and then turns to a chronological account of the life and times of the Mongolian ruler. He concludes with several chapters on Chinggis Khan's immediate successors, g dei and Guy g, at which point the book ends rather abruptly. There seems to be no clear rationale for the add-on chapters except perhaps that it allows the author to describe the Mongolian invasion of Central Europe, 1237-42, a subject of particular interest to the original edition's intended audience.&lt;br /&gt;Based on secondary scholarship in West European languages and sources available in translation, de Hartog's narrative is a clearly organized and generally accurate portrayal of the emergence and expansion of the Mongolian Empire. He takes care, as well, to provide sufficient background information on the Mongols' major opponents --the Chin and Sung, Khwarazmshahs, and the Russian principalities-- so that the uninitiated will be able to place the actions of the conquerors in a comprehensible and meaningful context.&lt;br /&gt;21 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;With regard to accuracy, the problem is not what is included but what is sometimes left unsaid. For instance, his discussion of the imperial ideology (p. 35) is incomplete and somewhat misleading. While the importance of a heavenly mandate is duly noted, the equally critical concept of dynastic good fortune or charisma is alluded to only in oblique fashion. Moreover, it would have been useful and appropriate to point out at this juncture that the political notions advanced by the Mongols have unmistakable antecedents in the ideological prescriptions of the Turk khaghanate and are in fact part of a long tradition among steppe peoples. As it stands, the text seems to imply that this ideological system was the creation of Chinggis Khan and associates. A similar criticism can be made of his treatment of Mongolian attitudes tlward religion. While his assertion that the Mongols were remarkably tolerant is of course true, the practical, political consequences of this policy deserve elucidation. The Mongols regularly honored alien gods and their earthly representatives not only for the spiritual power they might control but because religious elites possessed effective communications networks and wielded influence over public opinion. Once coopted with tax immunities and official recognition, these elites facilitated the Mongols' efforts to consolidate their hold on conquered territory. In this general interpretation of Mongolian society, de Hartog follows the view, first elaborated by Vladimirtsov, that feudal relationships were the central organizing principle. This is a long debated issue and in the final analysis always turns on one's definition of feudalism. In sustaining this thesis, however, I don't think it accurate to assert, in this case on Bartold's authority, that "all members of [Chinggis Khan's] guard had to be of aristocratic birth" (p. 44). In fact, individuals were recruited into the guard for a variety of reasons: Some as hostages, others because of particular talents, and some because of family connections. Their backgrounds were diverse and the criterion for acceptance was more a matter of loyalty and utility than of birth. While registering my disagreements with the author in the spirit of friendly debate and exchange, I do not want to leave the wrong impression. His handling of the data in many cases reveals insight and interpretive skill. He argues, quite correctly, that the imperial guard was not simply a security force but a training ground for military and governmental leaders. And his discussion of the political implications of the "official" version of Tolui's demise is most perceptive. According to the SECRET HISTORY OF THE MONGOLS, when g dei became ill in 1232 his younger brother Tolui, with the approval of Eternal Heaven willingly traded his own life for that of the ailing khaghan and so departed the earth. This episode, de Hartog observes, was certainly concocted by the toluids, once they gained the imperial throne in 1259, as a device to dramatize their founder's great service to the empire.&lt;br /&gt;22 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;Overall, this volume achieves what it set out to do - - provide a readable and informative introduction to early Mongolian history for the general public.&lt;br /&gt;Thomas T. AllsenTrenton State College&lt;br /&gt;Carney E. S. Gavin and the Harvard Semitic Museum, editors. IMPERIAL SELF PORTRAIT: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AS REVEALED IN THE SULTAN ABDUL HAMID II's PHOTOGRAPHIC ALBUMS. (Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 12, 1988). xi, 269 pp. Numerous illustrations, appendices, index. Softcover.&lt;br /&gt;The photographic albums presented by Sultan Abdul Hamid II to the governments of Great Britain and the United States are a critically important source for both the history of the Ottoman empire in the late nineteenth century and the history of photography in the same period. Now housed in the British library and the Library of Congress, these albums provide evidence of how the Ottoman government wished itself to be perceived by the foreign powers, as well as a visual record of what at least parts of the empire actually looked like. The albums in the Library of Congress have been studied since 1940's, although their contents have not been extensively published, but the British library albums have remained uncatalogued and virtually unknown until the last decade or so. This new publication concerning the albums, edited by Carney Gavin and his colleagues at the Harvard Semitic Museum, thus serves to bring these valuable photographs to the attention of a wide audience.&lt;br /&gt;The book begins with a brief foreword by Prof. Dr. Nurhan Atasoy which describes the project currently underway to catalogue and publish the 33,000 photographs in the Yildiz Albums, also from the period of Abdul Hamid II, and now in the collection of Istanbul University. The photographs in the Yildiz Albums, intended to provide information about the empire to Sultan Abdul Hamid, contain a different range of images than the gift albums in Washington and London and form an interesting comparison with them.&lt;br /&gt;The balance of the book is divided into four sections: an historical introduction, information about the album collections, the photographs, and appendices. Each section is further divided, and each separate article or appendix is identified by a Roman numeral, twelve in all. Although the organization of the book is confusing at first, with a great deal of information presented in short articles or lists, the book is actually easy to use, once the reader is familiar with it.&lt;br /&gt;The first section of the book, 'Historical Introduction: Abdul-Hamid's Gift Albums as an Imperial Self-Portrait,' was&lt;br /&gt;23 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;written by Carney Gavin. Divided into two separate essays,Gavin's text is the longest in the book (23 pp.). In the 'Overview,' Gavin describes the albums themselves, as well as their publication here. He also includes a chronological list of recent research and publications concerning the albums. His second essay, 'The Sultan's Gift in Perspective.' discusses the albums in the light of several anniversaries which Gavin considers important: the printing of the TABLEAU GENERAL DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN by I. M. d'Ohsson, beginning in 1787; the 150th anniversary of the invention of photography in 1839; the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Harvard Semitic Museum in 1889; and the 10th anniversary of the first international F.O.C.U.S. Conference, held in 1978. Structuring his essay around these four anniversaries allows Gavin to touch on a wide range of subjects, from pre-photographic representations of the Ottoman empire, to a summary of recent international efforts in the preservation of historical photographs.&lt;br /&gt;In the second section of the book, 'Collections,' the albums and their history are discussed in four short essays. George Hobart, Curator of Photography at the Library of Congress, and Muhammad Isa Waley, Curator of Turkish and Persian collections in the British Library, have each provided a brief (two page) summary of the history of the albums in their collections. The third piece in this section, 'Analysis of Abdul-Hamid's Gift Albums,' by William Allen, is a revised version of an article published in 1984 in the journal HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY. Until the publication of this book, Allen's article was the most comprehensive publication available about the albums, and it is still the only detailed analysis of the contents of the albums. Allen summarizes the subject matter of the photographs, as well as presenting information about the photographers responsible for the images in the albums. It is a very useful article; one only regrets that it is not longer. The final part of this section of the book is entitled 'Album Descriptions,' and contains brief descriptions of each of the 51 albums, arranged in numerical sequence according to their Library of Congress numbers. The short descriptions each include an identification of the photographer (and information as to how the identification was made), the number of photographs in the album, and a one or two sentence description of their subject matter.&lt;br /&gt;Part Three, 'A Pictorial Selection,' begins with a detailed title list (including the L.C. album number, photograph number within the album, and negative number) for the 166 images from the albums which are reproduced in the book. The photographs are divided into the four subject categories which researchers have established: Views, Buildings, Monuments, and antiquities; Military, Naval, Rescue...Industrial Establishments; Educational Institutions; and Horses, Imperial Stables and Yatchs. The quality of reproduction is high, the selection of images is representative of the contents of the albums, and the fact that the entire&lt;br /&gt;24 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;page, with the image, original mount and captions is included in the reproduction, makes this section of the book extremely useful.&lt;br /&gt;Also useful are the four appendices included in Part Four. The first appendix is a table of correspondence, which matches the Library of Congress, British Library, and microfiche numbers of the albums, as well as listing the discrepancies between the L.C and B.L. sets of albums. In the second appendix, every photograph in every album is listed individually, arranged by album according to L.C. numbers. Appendix Three, 'Thematic Classifications,' sorts the albums by subject matter, according to the subjects listed above. The fourth appendix is an index to the photographs which lists a variety of places, people, and institution which appear in the albums.&lt;br /&gt;As should be clear by now, this book contains a wealth of information about the Abdul Hamid albums. The editors have made a great contribution to scholarship in the various fields for which these photographs are important by bringing the albums to the attention of a diverse audience. Furthermore, the detailed information and extensive reproductions will allow much wider access to this unique archive of Ottoman photographic history than has ever been possible before.&lt;br /&gt;This issue of the JOURNAL OF TURKISH STUDIES concludes with a series of brief book reviews. The first review article, by Carney Gavin, discusses seven recent books of historical photographs from the Middle East, with much space devoted to Engin izgen's 1987 work, PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: 1839-1919. Secondly, Sinasi Tekin, the editor of the JOURNAL OF TURKISH STUDIES has reviewed, in Turkish, two recent German publications on Turkish manuscripts, published in the Verzeichnis der Orientalishchen Handschriften (VOHD) series.&lt;br /&gt;Nancy MicklewrightUniversity of Victoria&lt;br /&gt;THE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY. Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, Eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) vii + 331 pp.&lt;br /&gt;The emergence of the nationalities factor as a core element of the Soviet politics under Gorbachev will doubtless inspire many hastily assembled volumes. All of us in the field of Soviet studies should be grateful that the present work, probably the first of this new wave, is extraordinarily good. Precisely, however, because the book may set the standards for subsequent efforts its minor flaws as well as its great strengths should be scrutinized. Any treatment of Soviet nationalities should, of course, be factually reliable. It should be comprehensive in its coverage of influential nationality elements and sufficiently&lt;br /&gt;25 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;detailed to be a reliable guide for those --including, unfortunately, numerous Sovietologists-- still unfamiliar with many nationalities. The book should be reasonably uniform in approach, for omissions in discussions of specific nationalities or topics covered will perplex readers seeking a comparative perspective. The work itself should provide an analytic overview informed by relevant social science theory. On the whole, the Hajda-Beissinger volume meets these criteria admirably. Firm editorial decisions secured an able group of contributors. A few words on the background of each (many are not widely known even in Sovietological circles) might have assured reader confidence; but this reviewer is convinced that, since personal commitments no doubt precluded collaboration by some top specialists, it would have been practically impossible to assemble a better team.&lt;br /&gt;The editors' decision to avoid a routine assembly of chapters devoted to specific nationalities is commendable. Just five chapters on particular nationalities are preceded by seven theme chapters transcending individual nations or even groups of nationalities. This approach does omit a few interesting ethnic groups and occasionally over-emphasizes certain smaller Union Republics. On the whole, though, the combination of individual nationality coverage and theme analysis is so superior that one may hope it becomes the standard for future volumes of this type.&lt;br /&gt;There is one additional requirement for a nationalities survey intended to meet current needs: it must be up-to-date. Because the most exciting Soviet developments have occurred during the past two years, this requirement is onerous. Every book author knows how excruciatingly difficult it is to keep a manuscript up-to-date as it passes through the long publishing process; a collaborative volume is most difficult of all. Both the editors and Westview Press are to be commended, therefore, for producing a work, published very early in 1990, which so closely approaches the ideal of timeliness.&lt;br /&gt;One way, evidently, by which the editors sought contemporary relevance was to have each nationality chapter close with a survey of current opposition to the regime. Ronald Suny (on "Transcaucasia") and Romauld J. Misiunas, on the Baltic Republics, meet this requirement very well by providing cogent analyses in a comparative framework of events as late as October 1989. Save for one or two footnotes, Roman Solchanyk's treatment stops with 1988. This is hardly surprising, considering his awkward assignment --perhaps a lapse of editorial judgement-- to cover Moldavians and Belorussians as well as the immense topic of Ukrainian nationality. Fortunately, Bohdan Bociurkiw, in "Soviet Religious Policies" and Roman Szporluk in "The Imperial Legacy" provide depth coverage of many Ukrainian topics, often quite up-to-date.&lt;br /&gt;These two theme chapters also expand on Dina Spechler's brief treatment of "Russian Nationalism" by analyzing the substance of traditional Russian imperialism, which she contrasts to&lt;br /&gt;26 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;"anomic nationalism," regarded as a dangerous response to tensions of modernization.&lt;br /&gt;Many readers will find Martha Olcott's equally abbreviated discussion of "Central Asia" inadequate for exploring the reverbations of traditional forces. Her reference to the potential clash between "secularized intellectuals" and "Islamic fringe groups that are springing up in rural areas" seems to me obscure the possibility (advanced by H l ne Carr re d'Encausse and the late Alexandre Bennigsen, whom Olcott does not cite) that "fringe groups" are contemporary manifestations of 'sufi' networks with deep roots in the Soviet Moslem milieu. Szporluk and Bociurkiw do not supplement treatment of Moslem issues as they did the Slavic, Suny does cover some Moslem issues in his balanced treatment of Azerbaijan; but the editors might well have commissioned an additional chapter on RSFSR Moslems, notably Tatars, whose role is indispensable for understanding the Islamic tradition.&lt;br /&gt;Happily, statistical treatment of current trends vital for the future of the Moslem nations is admirable. Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver, noted for their numerous sophisticated analyses of Soviet statistics, not only provide a comprehensive analysis of demographic trends and linguistic identification, but also coordinated demographic discussions in individual nationality chapters. Gertrude Schroeder, in "The Soviet Economy," covers demographic topics like manpower as well as relative productivity, investment, and consumption. Stephen Burg's theme chapter on "Nationality Elites," although exceptionally well grounded theoretically, is surprisingly slight in statistical evidence. Paul A, Goble's discussion of literary politics does not, of course, lend itself to quantitative techniques, but is outstanding in its comparative examination of the unavowed --and perhaps unconscious-- influence of Soviet categories even on dissident writers in Central Asia. An unusual theme is Teresa Rakowska- Harmstone's "Nationalities and the Soviet Military." The author misses an opportunity to bring together highly relevant evidence on Wold War II experience, and exaggerates the significance of Turkic and Caucasian manpower: even after large initial losses, Soviet military manpower was not drawn "ethnically largely" from these groups, which comprised less than thirty per cent of the population remaining under Soviet rule. In this novel, exploratory chapter, such minor lapses are hardly available, though. The same qualification applies to general criticism of contributions to this volume. In a wide- ranging contemporary survey, omissions and infrequent errors are hardly avoidable. The wonder is that, at such an early stage, editors and contributors achieved the remarkable accuracy and balance which can serve as a model for subsequent analysis of Soviet nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;John A. ArmstrongSt. Augustine, Florida&lt;br /&gt;27 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin-Madison&lt;br /&gt;Cristopher Beckwith, THE TIBETAN EMPIRE IN CENTRAL ASIA: A HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR GREAT POWER AMONG TIBETANS, TURKS, ARABS, AND CHINESE DURING THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) xxii + 269 pp. Bibliography. Index.&lt;br /&gt;Interest in Tibet in the West has centered over the centuries on its topography and its religion. Little attention has been paid to the history of Tibet except as it occasionally pertained to the imperial history of China. The increasing body of scholarship on Tibetan Buddhism will typically mention the introduction of Buddhism to the Tibetan court via the marriage of King Srong-btsan-sgam-po to the Chinese princess Wen-ch'eng around 642, then skip to the founding of the first Buddhist monastery in Tibet at bSam-yas around 775, will mention the suppression of Buddhism under the evil king gLang-dar-ma (who was assassinated in 842), and then will begin anything approaching a sustained chronology only with the second introduction of Buddhism into Tibet in the eleventh century (marked commonly by the arrival of the Bengali monk Atisa in Western Tibet in 1042). Thus, long eras of Tibetan history go overlooked, most importantly the reigns of the Tibetan kings from circa 600-866. This period of the "Tibetan Empire" is the subject of Christopher Beckwith's important new study.&lt;br /&gt;The book is the first detailed narrative history of the Tibetan Empire in Central Asia written in any language. Beckwith brings a prodigious skill in languages to his task, employing original sources in Chinese, Old Tibetan, Arabic, and Old Turkic and secondary sources in French, Russian, German, and Japanese. The volume is a straightforward chronology of the political events of the period, detailing military campaigns, treaties, and diplomatic missions. A prologue that discusses the first historical references to the Tibetan people is followed by an account of Tibetan conquests in eastern Central Asia in the late seventh century. Subsequent Tibetan successes to the West, in the countries of the Tarim Basin, were short- lived due to political intrigues within Tibet. In the beginning of the eighth century, the Arabs joined the Chinese and Tibetans as the major players in the game for control of Central Asia, with treaties and alliances among the three being made and broken. Tibetan incursions into T'ang China reached a high-water mark in 763 with the capture of Ch'ang-an. But by the middle of the ninth century, what was once the vast Tibetan colonial empire had been lost to other powers, notably the Arabs and the Uyghurs.&lt;br /&gt;Beckwith presents this story in a fast-paced narrative accompanied by extensive annotation. The volume concludes with an epilogue that attempts a synchronic cultural comparison of the Franks and Tibetans (and sometimes the Arabs, Turks, and&lt;br /&gt;28 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. 3, NO. 2 FALL 1990&lt;br /&gt;Chinese) from the seventh through the ninth century. Although overly brief to be of any real use and somewhat out of place given the rest of the volume, Beckwith's motivation is correct: to show that Tibet was one of the great world powers of this age. The preceding chapters of the book had already made that point quite clear. The volume concludes with five appendices; a comparative table of Frankish, Byzantine, Arab, Tibetan, Eastern Turkic, and Chinese rulers; a glossary of Chinese terms; a bibliographical essay; and a useful bibliography and index.&lt;br /&gt;Donald S. Lopez, Jr.University of Michigan&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/20075286-113519659766882588?l=aacarbulletin.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/20075286/posts/default/113519659766882588'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/20075286/posts/default/113519659766882588'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://aacarbulletin.blogspot.com/2005/12/vol-iii-no2.html' title='Vol III No.2'/><author><name>AACAR Bulletin</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12319161662375419427</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20075286.post-113519641369189337</id><published>2005-12-21T12:19:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-12-21T12:20:13.750-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Vol III No 1</title><content type='html'>BULLETINOF THEASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN RESEARCHVOLUME 3, NUMBER 1&lt;br /&gt;ISSN: 0898-6827 AACARBULLETIN of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research, Inc. Editor: H. B. PAKSOY Vol. III No. 1 Spring 1990 EDITORIAL ADDRESS: Box 1011, Rocky Hill, CT 06067&lt;br /&gt;BOOKS FOR REVIEW, CONTRIBUTIONS, NEWS ITEMS AND COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD BE SENT TO THE EDITOR.&lt;br /&gt;INSTITUTIONAL MEMBERS: School of Arts and Sciences, CENTRAL CONNECTICUT STATE U.; Program on Nationality and Siberian Studies, W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, COLUMBIA U.; Mir Ali Shir Navai Seminar for Central Asian Languages and Cultures, UCLA; Program for Turkish Studies, UCLA; THE CENTRAL ASIAN FOUNDATION, WISCONSIN; Committee on Inner Asian and Altaic Studies, HARVARD U.; Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, INDIANA U.; Department of Russian and East European Studies, U. of MINNESOTA; The Middle East Center, U of PENNSYLVANIA.&lt;br /&gt;IN THIS ISSUE&lt;br /&gt;Robert Canfield "Briefing on Afghanistan" Audrey L. Altstadt "Azerbaijan Peoples Front" Paul B. Henze "Mongolia Faces Glasnost &amp; Perestroika" News of the Profession Book Reviews&lt;br /&gt;INDIVIDUAL MEMBERSHIP IN AACAR is available to individuals through the payment of tax-deductible, annual dues covering January 1 - December 31, includes subscription to AACAR BULLETIN (twice annually). Send your check or money order (no cash, please) for $25.00 (US funds only), made to AACAR, Prof. Audrey L. ALTSTADT, Treasurer, c/o History Department, CCSU, New Britain, CT 06050.&lt;br /&gt;All institutions are encouraged to provide related news, funding, support and employment announcements for inclusion in AACAR BULLETIN. ADVERTISEMENTS from publishing houses, booksellers, applicable service providers will be considered. Please contact the Editor for rates with proposed copy.&lt;br /&gt;All information reported is believed to be correct at the time of publication. AACAR BULLETIN suggests that readers verify the events and particulars of an announcement with the named organizers and contacts, and regrets that AACAR BULLETIN can assume no responsibility for cancellations, amendments, postponements or the like. AACAR BULLETIN reserves the right to edit any material submitted for space considerations, and generally list them in the order of arrival. As customary, inclusion of an event or item in an issue does not necessarily imply endorsement by AACAR BULLETIN, AACAR or its Officers. All opinions expressed are those of their authors.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR is a non-profit, non-political, scholarly association, incorporated in the State of Connecticut, Headquartered at Department of History, Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, CT 06050. AACAR BULLETIN gratefully acknowledges the subvention received from the CCSU toward the publication of this issue.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR is a tax-exempt, publicly supported organization, as defined under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, all membership dues, grants, contributions, gifts and donations made to AACAR are tax-deductible.&lt;br /&gt;AACAR AND AACAR BULLETIN ARE COPYRIGHTED 1990 BY THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN RESEARCH.&lt;br /&gt;When contacting the named organizations and persons, it will be greatly appreciated if the source, AACAR BULLETIN, is mentioned.&lt;br /&gt;2 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;We invite you to renew your membership in AACAR. Annual dues are $25. Please see the front cover for details.&lt;br /&gt;BRIEFING ON AFGHANISTAN by Robert L. CANFIELD&lt;br /&gt;[Professor R. L. CANFIELD is a member of the Department of Anthropology, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. He spent the first six months of 1989 in Pakistan as the recepient of a Fullbright Scholarship for research among the Afghans. The following has reached AACAR BULLETIN a few days after the publication of our previous issue.]&lt;br /&gt;The situation in Afghanistan is more serious than is generally recognized. Soviets retain advantages due to their close proximity to the scene, and through the modernization of material infrastructure. The access to the north is easy, by land or air, as evinced by continued artillery and air strikes from Soviet territories. Soviets enjoy advantages in social resources through the "Sovietization" of hundreds, perhaps thousands of people. Kabul's persistence suggests more strength than was supposed, though the general unpopularity of the PDPA has not improved. Lack of enthusiasm for and doubts about the the Interim Government is evident. Scepticism about the tanzims have grown since the last Shura, especially since Jalalabad and the people are unready to do battle sacrificially for a dubious government. The major danger is divisiveness. The historic pattern of subjugation by Kabul has been through confrontation of each district or locality separately. Another important danger is the unsavory reputation of some Afghan mujahedin. US, Pakistan and Saudi policy has favored the most unsavory, and certainly untypically narrow-minded kinds of mujahedin; it is good news that there is interest in reversing that policy. Can it be done soon enough to avoid serious damage to the Afghan people? Recommendations may be summarized as:&lt;br /&gt;1) In the leadership of the government, a broad base of involvement and protection of minority rights must be assured. Problem areas are: Pushtun vs. Persian speaking; Sunni vs. Imami (Athna'isharia); Shia vs. Ismaili sects; regional differences, which can be expressions of sect/ethnic biases; disputes among commanders which can reflect regional/ethnic/secterian biases, even the Communists/progressives (if possible), of whom there is not an insignificant minority in Kabul. I believe the American position should be to be especially careful towards the minorities. The attitude of most people who have had power in the past (who are mostly Sunni Pashtuns) is that it is a shame for such distinctions to be recognized; you can be sure it is not the view of the minorities themselves. This is not an argument to recognize quotas, however; simply protection of minority rights. Certain groups have had advantages that have skewed understanding of the Afghans. Special interest has been taken in&lt;br /&gt;3 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;the refugees in Pakistan vs. the Afghans who have stayed in that country. Afghans resisting from within the country need more recognition and better representation. Similarly, the Pushtuns of Eastern Afghanistan have had a privileged position. As most of the refugees are Pushtuns from Eastern Afghanistan, there is a tendency to favor them in reconstruction plans. There is a further problem in that, as a people, these Pushtuns appear to be more intrasigent than other Afghans on some crucial issues. They are, as a whole, more likely to be opposed to Zaher Shah, and more likely to oppose the involvement of non-Pushtuns in the future government. Their attitudes, because of their particular access to Western (and Pakistani) observers, can be over- represented to Western (and Pakistani) thinking.&lt;br /&gt;A clash that seems unavoidable is between the Hazaras and the Pushtuns, at least the Kuchi Pushtuns. The Kuchis who were granted grazing rights in the Hazarajat under Abdul Rahman before the turn of the century were denied them in 1979 by the Hazaras after they had mobilized under Behishti. When the war is over the Kuchis will certainly seek to recover those rights as well as the agricultural lands they had acquired from impoverished Hazaras in this century.&lt;br /&gt;2) Support must be removed from the extremists. The people in Kabul fear them and the hardening of their resolve is widely known. Within the resistance, the attitude of the people is fear and distrust notably of Hikmetyar, but also Sayyaf and Khales, and of the tanzims, coupled with growing resentment. As it is well known that these extremists are the clients of the US, public appreciation of the US support (which is considerable) could sour as resentment against the extremists escalates. More and more people are saying that the US interest in Afghanistan has been mainly in embarrassing the Soviets; the US didn't care what kind of Afghans they backed so long as they intimidated the Soviets. One Shiite man asked: "Why have Ayatollah Reagan and Ayatollah Bush become such good Muslims?"&lt;br /&gt;Indeed, the US support for the extremists has played into Najib's hands, as the extremists are precisely the mean spirited, intolerant, narrow minded people that Najib represents the resistance to be. The resistance is, however, much more broadly based, supported by the large mass of the Afghan people -- who are, if not educated, at least intelligent and civilized. To curb Hikmetyar, consider backing his rival, Qazi M. Amin Waqad. Waqad has a better tribal base and is from the more "tribal" part of Afghanistan (Hikmetyar is from the North where there is no tribal society; he has little experience working with his own people in the traditional way). Waqad's recent deal with Iran may complicate such a tactic, however. The same is true for Sayyaf and Khales. They have rivals who could be induced to do away with the extremist rhetoric and be more cooperative with a wider sector of the society.&lt;br /&gt;3) Due to their offensive behavior and drawbacks for the resistance, support must be removed from the Wahhabis. Among the most flagrant transgressions: their taking of captive Afghan&lt;br /&gt;4 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;girls to the Gulf area. Are they really training Muslims from other places in Sayyaf's camps? As it is known that the Saudis and Kuwaities are clients of the US, the US is implicated in these activities. The atrocities and training (in so far as there is any) of "terrorists" must be stopped. Indeed, it is possible that the Saudi government would welcome a strong position by the US, as it is not entirely free on its own (so I am told) to curb its Wahhabi elements within its society.&lt;br /&gt;4) The development of a viable alternative leadership to the Afghan Interim Government, that will appeal to a braod range of Afghan people, must be encouraged. It is well known that the Afghan Interim Government has captured little support among the common people and the PDPA has in more than ten years gained even less. The greatest tragedy of the situation is that after so much fighting there is as yet no institution of leadership that commands the respect of the Afghan people. Two steps seem necessary:&lt;br /&gt;A] Encourage Zaher Shah to be brought in as a symbol of Afghan unity and national identity. Many Afghans (as is well known) would be reassured to have Zaher Shah and some of the old cabinet back in power for a while, to stabilize the country. Try to persuade the Interim Government to invite Zaher Shah to come in on its behalf and provide legitimacy and to attract the involvement of other widely recognized former Afghan leaders, such as Dr. Yusuf, Gholam Ali Ayeen, Samad Hamid. This is an unusually good time to press for Zaher Shah to be brought in. Najib has said that he would welcome Zaher Shah; take him up on it. Zaher Shah's coming would give legitimacy to the mujahedin in the view of many people in Kabul, provide a basis for the cessation of fighting, and enable steps to be taken quickly toward the formation of a united government, including enough "progressives" to calm Soviet fears that Islamism could continue to fester on its borders. One could futher complicate Kabul's response by offering to remove the extremists (notably Hizb-i Islami) from the mujahedin leadership --this should be done anyway, for the good of the Afghan people-- in exchange for the disbarring of the PDPA from the coalition government. PDPA members and the mujahedin extremists should be assured of the right to stand for office when elections take place (which should be not too soon, only after a delay that will allow animosities to die down).&lt;br /&gt;B] Immediately start supplying weapons and other resources to the mujahedin through the government that is being formed under Zaher Shah. The support for the commanders now, which was intended to avoid the favoritism of the parties, has led to more partiality, more variance in the distribution of arms among the commanders, and thus more division among the mujahedin, and even to growing resentment against the US. The current trend away from the centralization of power is counterproductive. We should instead be working through some kind of centralized authority&lt;br /&gt;5 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;while exerting pressure on it to develop the broader base that is proposed above.&lt;br /&gt;5) An aggressive international policy must be pursued. Specifically, seek a non-aligned, independent Afghanistan by arranging a pact among all the neighboring states that would ensure that Afghanistan would remain an "open" economy and society, free to work out its own affairs, and to develop its own international policies. Because the US is implicated in the outcome and in fact has a stake in keeping the "Northern Tier" nations outside of Soviet control, it must be assertive in seeking to protect the autonomy of Afghanistan --as against not only the Soviets but also the Pakistanis and Iranians. Each of Afghanistan's neighbors has a different perspective on the composition and possibilities for Afghan society. Pakistan sees Afghanistan as an extention of its tribal territory, which is essentially Ghilzai Pushtun; hence its emphasis on Ghilzai Pushtuns. Iran sees Afghanistan as an extention of its Shiite society; hence its emphasis on Afghanistan as "Khorasan," its Eastern province. The Soviet Union sees Afghanistan as an extention of its Central Asian peoples, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, etc., with the Pushtuns as an intermediate South Asian people. Afghanistan can never be of indifferent interest to the Soviet Union. If the USSR remains a viable empire, it has a huge advantage over all other neighbors, as the infrastructure for close relations is already in place. And it has a huge stake in the future society of Afghanistan, because of the dangers of Islamic movements there that could influence its own Muslim populations. (Note how Rafsanjani has been used in the hope of quelling the Shiite resistance in Azerbaijan; there is, of course, no comparable leadership within Afghanistan, where there is no Iran-type stratified theocratic leadership).&lt;br /&gt;The only hope for Afghanistan is an autonomy that is guaranteed by all the nations involved. This requires a continued and aggressive interest in Afghanistan by the US. It is true that the US cannot itself be involved in defending Afghanistan with its own military forces; in fact, the US cannot defend the interests of any "Northern Tier" nation. However, the demonstrated willingness of the Afghans to fight for their own autonomy, is a valuable asset to US interests in South Asia and the Middle East. With help, the Afghans would, acting in their own interest, provide a degree of security on the Northern Tier so far not realized through other means. Indeed, the Afghan people's ability and willingness to defend their territory sharply contrasts with Pakistan's military capability, which has been notoriously unimpressive in actual conflict and cannot be trusted to be a significant means of protecting US interests in South Asia. The Afghan people's defensive capability and committment can serve US interest so long as Afghanistan remains autonomous. Its autonomy needs to be recognized by all its neighbors, which is not likely to happen without aggressive US support.&lt;br /&gt;6 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;The US will make a grave mistake by assuming that Afghanistan will again sink into its previous marginal place in international relations. The changing configuration of power in Greater Eurasia gives Afghanistan a particularly significant place, as it cannot in a modern world continue to serve as a barricade against the encroachments of a northern empire into South Asia unless aggressive political means are used to protect Afghanistan autonomy. Modern material improvements will make Afghanistan a corridor that must be watched and protected by all the powers interested in the affairs of South and Western Asia.&lt;br /&gt;THE AZERBAIJAN KHALG JEBHESI (AZERBAIJAN PEOPLE'S FRONT) by Audrey L. Altstadt&lt;br /&gt;[Prof. A. L. Altstadt is Assistant Professor of History at Central Connecticut State University. She has spent two terms in Baku on IREX Exchanges. She was a Fellow of the Harvard Russian Research Center, and a Short Term Scholar at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. Prof. Altstadt is currently finishing a monograph on the history of Azerbaijan.]&lt;br /&gt;The Azerbaijan Khalg Jebhesi (Azerbaijan People's Front, APF) was legalized only last summer. The APF, related groups and unaffiliated supporters of national reform in Azerbaijan have published grievances and needs in both Russian and Azerbaijani Turkish language publications. The demands are specific, and touch upon economic, political, ecological and cultural matters. They present a challenge to Russian hegemony and, for their fulfillment, would require a fundamental alteration in relations between Azerbaijan and Moscow and between Russians and Azerbaijani Turks within the republic itself.&lt;br /&gt;The APF evolved at least since 1988 on the basis of issues discussed by the scholarly and artistic elite in Azerbaijani Turkish-language publications throughout the 1980s. The APF therefore represents the culmination of a movement long in gestation. The APF program and BULLETIN place heavy emphasis on economic and political issues, calling for full exercise of sovereignty guaranteed in the constitution and control over natural resources and economic decision making. The program supports the guarantee of civil rights, equal treatment for all nationalities residing in the republic, and protection of the environment and cultural heritage (including expanded de facto use of Azerbaijani Turkish and reinstatement of original geographical and personal names). The program "condemns the use of force in political struggle..." and states that the "founding values of the APF are humanism, democracy, pluralism, internationalism, and human rights."1&lt;br /&gt;7 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;In short, despite Gorbachev's attempt to justify sending more than 20,000 troops to Baku by crying "Islamic fundamentalism," the evidence reflects no such influence.&lt;br /&gt;Economic grievances have, perhaps, been most widely discussed. Prof. Dr. Mahmud Ismailov, economic historian of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences, laid out the specifics of some inequities which had formerly been only whispered.2 "According to the calculations of the economists, our republic has a yearly trade deficit of 2.5 billion rubles. If one considers the fact that the republic is a supplier of such raw materials as cotton, oil, grapes, etc, then it is losing eight to ten billion rubles annually." Raw cotton, he stated is sold by Azerbaijan at 500-700 rubles/ton while cotton goods earn 12-13 thousand rubles per ton. "Azerbaijan annually exports 135 million rubles' worth of wool to Georgia and Armenia, while finished products would bring ten to fifteen times more to the national income."&lt;br /&gt;These accusations are seconded by Bahtiyar Vahabzade (People's Deputy; also Narodnyi ["People's"] Poet and corresponding members of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences) and Ismail Shykhly (prominent novelist, member of editorial board of the journal AZERBAIJAN).3 Both take up the matter of oil prices. Vahabzade quotes the price at 35 rubles per ton, compared, he says, to $140 per ton on the world market: "...we sell gold like ore, for peanuts, and then buy manufactures made from this raw material, for triple the price." Shykhly states that Azerbaijan sells oil (per ton) for only 3 rubles more than it costs to produce it: "It means we earn 3 rubles per ton. Does it make sense to sell a ton of oil for 3 rubles?!"&lt;br /&gt;Thus the real culprit is central planning, i.e. the Russian- dominated system, that establishes prices and mandates the flow of goods. It fails to build necessary enterprises in Azerbaijan so the republic can make finished goods from its own raw materials and employ its own people. Add to this the health and environmental crises created by excessive use of pesticides, and it is no wonder that these men are so bold as to call this colonialism.&lt;br /&gt;Even the NKAO matter, like all the others on the APF agenda, really concerns the Soviet system. It was that system that drew the current borders (Azerbaijan, too, feels cheated by them) and adjusted them periodically since 1921. This issue is often used as an example of Moscow's infringing on Azerbaijan's sovereignty. Such considerations furthermore reflect the need to bring the Russians into the formula when examining Azerbaijani-Armenian relations. APF leaders and others4 have argued that Russian instigation may have led to recent clashes in the capital which, in any event, the government used as a pretext to send troops into Baku, even though fighting there had ended. The real goal, they suggest, had been to crush the movement. There are numerous&lt;br /&gt;8 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;documented cases of such provocation during the clashes of 1905,5 and one Azerbaijani said "there is no absence of such provocateurs now."6&lt;br /&gt;Azerbaijan's national movement is political, economic, cultural,7 environmentalist, and national -- but it is not religious. The rhetoric is reformist, even socialist, but not Islamic. The leaders of the APF have denied religious foundation for their movement and all the published material and speeches confirm that. Recent demonstrations along the Iranian and Turkish borders, despite Tehran Radio's imputation of religious motivation, were aimed at securing free movement to visit relatives in Iranian Azerbaijan. Perhaps the case of Germany urged them to take action at this time.&lt;br /&gt;In the aftermath of the shooting in Baku, Soviet Defense Minister Yazov and subsequently Gorbachev himself, acknowledged that troops had been sent to Baku to prevent a seizure of power by the national movement. So why had Gorbachev claimed "Islamic fundamentalism" was the danger at the time he sent the troops? Is it possible that Gorbachev was misinformed? Was his staff was not familiar with the many publications and statements of APF leaders and the scholarly and artistic intelligentsia in Azerbaijan who gave birth to the movement and to the APF? Did they only begin reading when the soldiers began firing? Perhaps the impact of small groups who did use religious rhetoric had been exaggerated. Maybe Gorbachev decided to believe Radio Tehran. Or, as Azerbaijani Turks had said and as Gorbachev's words suggest, was the real target the Azerbaijan Popular Front?&lt;br /&gt;Apparently, Gorbachev was well aware of the popularity and program of the APF and, therefore, of the threat it presented to Soviet control over so politically and economically important an area as Azerbaijan. Soviet troops closed APF offices and telephone lines, and arrested more than 40 APF leaders, including historian Ehtibar Mamedov, when he was in Moscow, more than 1000 miles from occupied Baku. Ironically, Gorbachev may have repeated Nicholas II's error when the tsar closed the First State Duma in 1906 -- he succeeded only in removing the moderates from the political scene, and polarizing those who remained. The President of the Supreme Soviet told the Russians that "Azerbaijan would never forgive the murder of its sons and daughters." 8&lt;br /&gt;Rhetoric about an "Islamic" threat has not been abandoned, and national leaders are still called "extremists" or "fanatics." For the sake of his "image" in the West, it is to Gorbachev's advantage to portray the Azerbaijan national movement as fanaticism. What better way to preempt Western criticism of a bloodbath than by raising the specter of the West's preeminent bete noire -- "Islamic fundamentalism." The program of the Azerbaijan People's Front is too little known for even the scholarly community to realize that it has nothing in common with&lt;br /&gt;9 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;"Islamic fundamentalism." There is no "Azerbaijani lobby" in any Western country to clarify or argue.&lt;br /&gt;Within the context of the Gorbachev era, the bloody treatment meted out to Azerbaijan fits the pattern that has emerged in Central Asia. Kazakh sensibilities were trod upon and their protests harshly put down. Is the total number of Kazakh casualties even known? The Crimean Tatars got the same run around from Gorbachev they got from his predecessors. Promises of "consideration" of their case were followed by inaction. And, so many Uzbeks have been tried for "corruption," that all but the intentionally blind have begun to suspect that it is a ploy. Tajikistan is even now experiencing similar bloody upheavals and, again, though grievances were clearly articulated, "Islam" makes its way into the reports. Gorbachev, the politician, deals gently with those whom the West watches, those with large emigre communities in Europe and North America. He raises the Crusader spirit against Islam, even when the "Muslims" are secular, nation-minded men and women who demand only that perestroika be applied to them as well. NOTES&lt;br /&gt;1. Full English-language text was published in CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS CHRONICLE, Vol 8, No. 4 (August 1989). The first APF BULLETIN [BIULLETEN' INITSIATIVNOGO TSENTRA NARODNOGO FRONTA AZERBAIDZHANA, No. 1, 1989. In Russian, 10 pages.] was apparently issued summer 1989 by the APF Initiatory Center, but contained declarations by the Center dated November and May 1988. It restates the appeal to all citizens of the Azerbaijan SSR "regardless of party status, nationality or religion" to join with the People's Front to fulfill the promises of perestroika in the republic.&lt;br /&gt;2. Published in English translation in CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS CHRONICLE, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1989; and in Russian in a newly published newspaper called AZERBAIJAN, 5 November 1989, with the title "V roli pasynkov." The newspaper began publication in October 1989 and took the name AZERBAIJAN in memory of the 1918- 20 newspaper by the same name. The earlier newspaper was published during the period of independence.&lt;br /&gt;3. Both articles in the newspaper AZERBAIJAN, 1 October 1989.&lt;br /&gt;4. Telephone interviews, 21 January 1990&lt;br /&gt;5. Local press of that period as discussed in Altstadt, "Baku 1813-1913" in Michael F. Hamm, Editor THE CITY IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); Tadeusz Swietochowski, RUSSIAN AZERBAIJAN 1905-1920 (Cambridge U Press, 1985)&lt;br /&gt;10 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;6. Telephone interview, 20 January 1990.&lt;br /&gt;7. The cultural arena has been the area of greatest activity for the longest time. Recent expressions of the desire to write accurate history, change the names of places and institutions and use the traditional rather than russified forms of surnames appeared in AZERBAIJAN: "Yeni gazetimiz, yeni arzularimiz," (Our New newspaper, our new desires") by Ilyas Efendiev, 2 October 1989, and "Familiyamizi neje yazag?" ("How Should We Write our Surnames?") unsigned, in 6 November 1989.&lt;br /&gt;8. Eyewitnesses in Baku tell of unarmed on-lookers being shot in the streets or on their own balconies, and passing cars, with their occupants, being crushed by tanks. The Baku newspaper SEHER&lt;br /&gt;(3 February 1990) devoted an entire issue to a list of known victims -- 120 listed as dead (full names, birth dates and nationality -- almost all were Azerbaijani Turks, mostly in their 20s and 30s), and hundreds listed as wounded (also with names and ages). Official reports of the death toll are clearly too low. Sources in the republic report hundreds of corpses, some say thousands.&lt;br /&gt;MONGOLIA FACES GLASNOST &amp; PERESTROIKA by Paul B. HENZE&lt;br /&gt;[Paul B. HENZE is a Resident Consultant at the RAND Corporation, Washington D.C. office. Previously he has served on the National Security Council. Mr. Henze, who has studied, inter alia, classical Mongolian language and history at Harvard as a graduate student during 1949-1950, visited Mongolian Peoples Republic (MPR) during 15-24 June 1989 as a study leader to a group sponsored by the California Academy of Sciences. The following is excerpted from a draft he prepared for publication as a RAND Paper. A copy of the published paper may be purchased from the RAND Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90406]&lt;br /&gt;.... When Mongolia applied for UN membership in 1946 the objection was raised that it was not really an independent country. China still claimed sovereignity but equally serious was the widespread belief in the West that it was just as much a Soviet republic as Azerbaijan or Tajikistan. The country finally gained UN membership fifteen years later, in 1961. Up until then only communist countries had embassies in Ulan Bator, the Soviet embassy in the center of the city not surprisingly being the most impressive. Britain established an embassy in Ulan Bator in 1963 and began sending a few Mongols to study in England each year. Most of the Mongols who speak good English now tell you proudly that they studied in England, often at the university of Leeds. Japan maintains an embassy which is becoming increasingly active. The newest embassy is that of the United States which opened for&lt;br /&gt;11 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;business in the first week of June 1989. It was not easy to find, for its two resident officers are workinmg in a ground floor apartment in a residential district while they look for a permanent chancery. But they have been warmly welcomed by MPR officials and intellectuals, who are eager to expand trade and contacts, want English language books on many subjects and say they are eager to have Americans come to Mongolia as English teachers and technicians. Might Mongolia be the next communist country, after Hungary, to welcome the Peace Corps?&lt;br /&gt;.... Chinggis Khan anniversary stamps are on sale in souvenir shops. Gradually Mongol national feelings have reasserted themselves. Foreigners are unwise to make irreverent remarks about Chinggis Khan in Mongolia today. A section of the National Museum devoted to the origins and early history of the Mongol nation centers on the Great World Conqueror. His battle standards and weapons are on display. Guides point to them with pride and call visitors' attention to the enormous cast-iron hub of a wheel from his war chariot. Paintings by Mongol artists recreate his battles and giant portraits of his sons and grandsons dominate a succession of rooms which depict Mongol accomplishments in subsequent centuries. A proud curator lectures before a map of Mongol conquests: "You see that Mongol armies conquered China and Russia and ruled them for hundreds of years. The sons and grandsons of Chinggis Khan conquered Central Asia and Persia and extended their control into Asia Minor..."&lt;br /&gt;.... In the south Gobi, where we spent three days visiting sand dunes and a saxaul forest in the desert, climbing down a glacier in a gorge in the Gobi Altai, and viewing birds and wild animals and the site of Roy Chapman Andrews' dinasaur discoveries, I gave our cheerful driver a generous tip for his good service the evening before we were scheduled to leave. He came back half an hour later and pressed a commemorative coin with a portrait of Karl Marx into my hand, then took a gold- painted statue of Buddha out of his pocket and placed on top of the coin, and chuckled...&lt;br /&gt;NEWS OF THE PROFESSION&lt;br /&gt;AACAR extends warm collegial welcome to two new Institutional Members: School of Arts and Sciences, CENTRAL CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY; The Middle East Center, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.&lt;br /&gt;Board of Editors of the AACAR Monograph Series --Thomas ALLSEN (TRENTON STATE COLLEGE) (Secretary of the Board); Peter GOLDEN (RUTGERS); Omeljan PRITSAK (HARVARD); Thomas NOONAN (UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA)-- are interested in hearing from individuals with appropriate manuscripts. ALL COMMUNICATIONS should be sent to Prof. Thomas ALLSEN, Department of History, Trenton, NJ 08650.&lt;br /&gt;12 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;AACAR elections were held by postal ballot during Fall 1989. The Election Committee Chaired by Prof. John STREET (Linguistics, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON) and Member Prof. Iraj BASHIRI (Department of Russian and East European Studies, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA) have reported the results. The Founding Executive Committee having submitted itself for election, was duly elected for a term according to the Election Committee's report: Richard N. FRYE (Member-at-Large); Audrey L. ALTSTADT (Treasurer); Eden NABY (Secretary); H. B. PAKSOY (President). During the year, AACAR By-Laws will be adopted.&lt;br /&gt;NATIONALITIES PAPERS has a Special Issue (Vol XVII/Number I, Spring 1989) on The Soviet Nationalities and Gorbachev. Edited by Henry R. HUTTENBACH and Alexander J. MOTYL, it contains the Proceedings of a Conference (April 28, 1989) sponsored by the Program on Nationality and Siberian Studies, The W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. To order a copy, send $10 to the Nationality and Siberian Studies Program, 1319 International Affairs Building, Columbia University, NY, NY 10027.&lt;br /&gt;Newsletter of the Harvard Students for Inner Asia continues to be published by the students staff of the Harvard Committee on Inner Asian and Altaic Studies. Vol. 3, No. 1 contains the following items and communications: "The Central University of Nationalities" by Xiangyun Wang; "XINGJIANG Normal University" by Stuart DeLorme; Reports on Recent Conferences; "A Trip to Tashkent" by Kahar Barat; Requests for Information; "UNESCO Silk Roads Project Update" by Doug Hitch; "Recent Archeological Research in Soviet Turkmenistan" by Fred Hiebert; News of publications and Newsletters; Information on New Students; Reports of Public Lectures. For subscriptions, contact: Doug HITCH or Mariko WALTER, 2 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138.&lt;br /&gt;The Committee on Inner Asian and Altaic Studies HARVARD UNIVERSITY luncheon meetings are continuing to be held under the direction of Prof. Richard N. FRYE. For notices, contact Margaret LINDSEY, Administrator, 2 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138. CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS CHRONICLE is the new name for the Central Asian Newsletter issued since 1982. Edited by Marie BROXUP, Simon CRISP and Caroline GRAY, published by the Society for Central Asian Studies [92 Lots Road, Unit 8, London SW10 4BQ, UK], the new title was adopted to better reflect its contents. Subscriptions are available from the above address. The Society for Central Asian Studies also publishes the CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY.&lt;br /&gt;Middle Eastern Studies Center of the OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY shall host a conference on "Soviet and American Relations with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan: Advances and Setbacks" May 5-6 1990. In conjunction with the Mershon Center, the conference papers will&lt;br /&gt;13 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;be published in a volume. Contact: Prof. Alam PAYIND, Director; or Jeff ROBERTS, Assistant Director; 308 Dulles Hall, 230 W 17th Ave., Columbus OH 43210.&lt;br /&gt;The 33nd Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference (PIAC) will be held in Budapest-Hungary 24-29 June 1990, sponsored by the Altaistic Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the K r si Csoma Society. The 1990 President of PIAC is Alice SARK ZI. For further information, contact: PIAC Secretariat, Department of Uralic-Altaic, 101 Goodbody Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington IN 47405. The February 1990 issue (No. 19) of the PIAC Newsletter contains, inter alia, further information on the UNESCO Silk Roads Project.&lt;br /&gt;The vast UNESCO Silk Roads Project, which involves some forty-odd countries and four to five years of activities, is now underway. In line with its objective to promote international understanding through the study of the ancient routes of exchange, the project will recreate the expeditions that linked East and West, sponsor scholarly seminars, assist in the organization of public exhibitions on the art and archeology of the Roads, and help in the publication of popular and technical materials, encyclopedias, television documentaries. The expeditions will be composed of members of the Consultative Committee, scholars, representatives of various countries involved in the project, media representatives, and members of the UNESCO secretariat. Among those already accepted include "International Festival of Ethnographic and Documentary Films and Symposium" organized by Gary SEAMAN of the Center for Visual Anthropology, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. Educational materials will be produced on a number of levels. Scholarly projects include "A Historical Atlas of the Silk Roads" and a comprehensive bibliography of the source materials. The BULLETIN OF THE ASIA INSTITUTE, edited by Carol Altman BROMBERG, has been selected as one of the publishers of primary research. Further information may be obtained from Prof. BROMBERG, Department of Art and Art History, WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, Detroit, MI 48202.&lt;br /&gt;The Summer Research Laboratory of the Russian and East European Center of the UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS at URBANA-CHAMPAIGN will continue in 1990, with the continued support of the US Department of State, The US Department of Education, and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Associateships will be available for periods of one to eight weeks any time between June 10 and August 3. Associates will again be eligible to receive faculty privileges in the library, including access to the stacks, the use of a carrel, and the right to check out books and periodicals. Contact: Vicki MILLER, 1208 West California Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801.&lt;br /&gt;33rd International Congress of Asian and North African Studies will be held in Toronto, August 19-25. Those wishing to attend or&lt;br /&gt;14 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;participate should write: Dr. A. HARRAK, Secretary-General, Victoria College, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1K7, Canada. There is a discount for early registration.&lt;br /&gt;Center on East-West Trade, Investment and Communications of the DUKE UNIVERSITY is planning to publish the Journal of Soviet Nationalities. Under the direction of Prof Jerry HOUGH, the Center currently has two Visiting Scholar programs: The Carnegie Corporation is funding the "study of nationality policy;" while The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation supports the "domestic reform process" research. The awards are intended for scholars in all disciplines of the social sciences. For those Visiting Scholars Programs, contact the Center at: 2114 Campus Drive, Durham, NC 27706. 919/684-5551. The application deadline is 10 March 1990. Awards are to be announced by 1 April 1990.&lt;br /&gt;The TOYO BUNKO is a library specializing in Oriental Studies, established in 1917 by the late Hisaya Iwasaki (1865-1955), who purchased the library of George Ernest Morrison (1862-1920), advisor to the Office of the President of the Republic of China. Morrison was born in Australia and studied medicine. He became interested in the Far East and came to be stationed in China as a correspondent of the Times. In 1912, he became a political advisor to the Office of the President of the Republic of China. Because of his occupational need and his private interest, he began collecting Western books on China. These books were kept in a library within his house in Beiking and were made available for those wishing to consult them. The Morrison Library became widely known among China scholars of the world, and when its sale was announced, universities and research institutions in the Western world competed to buy it.&lt;br /&gt;The Morrison collection was nearly complete on China, but it was quite deficient on other countries of Asia. Hisaya Iwasaki, who purchased the library, broadened the scope of the collection to cover all of Asia and added Chinese books and other source materials written in various Asian languages. In 1924, he established the Toyo Bunko Foundation at the present location and created a research department in addition. This marked the beginning of the first library and research institution in Japan specifically devoted to Oriental Studies.&lt;br /&gt;It is known that Hisaya Iwasaki established various Mitsubishi enterprises and played a leading role in the growth of modern industry in Japan. He also made great contributions to the development of scholarship and the arts in Japan. In 1948, Toyo Bunko was incorporated as a branch of the National Diet Library. In 1961, upon the request of UNESCO, the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies was added to the Toyo Bunko. For further information on the collection itself, contact: 28-21, 2 Chome, Honkomagome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113, Japan.&lt;br /&gt;Modern Asia Research Centre (MARC) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies (GIIS), with the collaboration of the&lt;br /&gt;15 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;Institute of Development Studies (IUED) is continuing to sponsor publications, research and lecture series. MARC was founded in 1971 by the GIIS, and during 1987 IUED joined the effort and shares support of the enterprise. The Director of the Centre is Dr. J. L. MAURER, Associate Professor at IUED in Geneva. Dr. P. REIGNER is in charge of Research Coordination. One of the primary objectives of the Centre is to foster academic exchanges and cooperative projects with similar Research Centers in the US and Europe. Contact: P O Box 36, CH 1211, Geneva 21 Switzerland.&lt;br /&gt;The Ninth Symposium of the Comite International des Etudes Pre- Ottomanes et Ottomanes (CIEPO) will be held in Jerusalem July 23- 26 1990. The Organizing Committee (Amnon COHEN, David KUSHNER, Jacob LANDAU and Michael WINTER) suggested the theme "The Ottoman City; Foreign Relations of the Ottomans; and Local and Regional Sources for Ottoman History; other topics relating to Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Studies." Contact: CIEPO Organizing Committee, P. O. Box 8065, 91080, Jerusalem, Israel.&lt;br /&gt;The Fourth International Conference on Central Asia is announced to take place 27-30 September 1990 at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The theme is "Language, Nationality and Social Order in Central Asia 1100-1990." Contact: Ms. Deniz BALGAMIS, 4225 Humanities, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706.&lt;br /&gt;The Joint Committee on Soviet Studies (JCSS) of the ACLS and the SSRC, with the participation of IREX, is announcing a pilot program for a small number of graduate students and junior scholars to participate in research projects in the Soviet Union for a period of up to six months during 1990. The experimental program will be conducted under the auspices of the US-USSR Commission on the Humanities and the Social Sciences of the ACLS and the USSR Academy of Sciences, in conjunction with the Soviet Sociological Association. This Program is offered subject to availability of funds. Contact: Joint Committee on Soviet Studies Sociology Subcommittee, SSRC, 605 Third Avenue, NY, NY 10158. Application Deadline: 15 March 1990.&lt;br /&gt;Publications: James CRITCHLOW, "Corruption, Nationalism and the Native Elites in Soviet Central Asia" The Journal of Communist Studies Vol. 4, No. 2, 1988.&lt;br /&gt;Arthur T. HATTO, "Mongols in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Kirghiz Epic" in Gedanke und wirkung, Festschrift zum 90. Geburstag von Nikolaus Poppe, Walter HEISSIG and Klaus SAGASTER (Eds.), Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1989.&lt;br /&gt;Gunnar JARRING, The Thiefless City and the Contest between Food and Throat (Four Eastern Turki texts edited with translation, notes and glossary) Lund: Royal Society of Letters, 1989. Available through Almqvist &amp; Wiksell International, P O Box 638, 101 28 Stockholm-Sweden.&lt;br /&gt;agatay KO AR, "Examples From the Mother-Tongue Theme in Contemporary Turkistan Poetry" Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Turcology,&lt;br /&gt;16 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;Istanbul.&lt;br /&gt;Hisao KOMATSU "Bukhara in the Central Asian Perspective: Group Identity in 1911-1928" Monograph Series No. 2, Secretariat of the Research Project "Urbanism and Islam," Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, 1988.&lt;br /&gt;Kermit McKENZIE, "Chokan Valikhanov: Kazakh Princeling and Scholar," Central Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 3.&lt;br /&gt;H. B. PAKSOY, ALPAMYSH: Central Asian Identity under Russian Rule (Hartford, Connecticut: Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research Monograph Series, 1989)&lt;br /&gt;Masayuki YAMAUCHI "The Unromantic Exiles: Istanbul to Berlin, Enver Pasha 1919-1920." Monograph Series No. 11, Secretariat of the Research Project "Urbanism and Islam," Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, 1989.&lt;br /&gt;BULLETIN OF THE ASIA INSTITUTE Volume 4 (1990) (Festshrift Richard N. FRYE) is available. Other issues contain papers addressing Central Asian topics. Subscription orders should be sent to Prof. Carol Altman BROMBERG, Dept. of Art and Art History, WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, Detroit, MI 48202.&lt;br /&gt;The first issue (October 1989) of the BUG NK T RKISTAN/TURKISTAN TODAY is published. Contact: Dr. Timur KOCAOGLU, Editor, H rwarth Str. 37, 8 M nchen 40, W. Germany.&lt;br /&gt;CRIMEAN TATAR REVIEW Vol. IV., No. 2, 1989 has been issued. For subscriptions, contact: M. Batu ALTAN, Editor, P O Box 307, Essex Station, Boston, MA 02112.&lt;br /&gt;THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL has published a special issue on Central Asia. Subscription orders should be sent to Indiana University Journals Division, 10th &amp;amp; Morton Streets, Bloomington Indiana 47405. The special issue is $9 + $2 postage. Prepayment required.&lt;br /&gt;NEWSLETTER of the Nationality and Siberian Studies Program of the W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union (Winter 1990; Number 5) contains a listing of the most recent activities of the Program. Contact: Alexander J. MOTYL, Director; Charles F. FURTADO, Jr., Secretary, at 1319 International Affairs Bldg., COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.&lt;br /&gt;The Middle East Documentation Center of the UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO has issued a catalogue of microfiche of the Ottoman Microforms Project. Titles include a number of new entries. Contact: Laurie ABBOTT, 5828 S. University Ave., 201 Pick Hall, Chicago, IL 60637.&lt;br /&gt;ISIS Books Ltd. has moved to new quarters: Semsibey Sokak 10/2, Beylerbeyi-Istanbul 81210, Turkey. Telephones (90-1) 321 38 51 &amp; 321 38 47. ISIS also issued a new catalogue, available form the same address.&lt;br /&gt;OXUS BOOKS Oriental Booksellers, specializing in Rare and Out-of-print books [121 Astonville Street, London SW18 5AQ; Telephone 01-870 3854; Fax: 01-877 1173] has issued three new catalogues: Catalogue Eleven-Central Asia/China/Japan/S. E. Asia; Catalogue Six-Arab World/ Turkey/Iran/Cyprus; Catalogue Nine-Russia. J. M. S. SLATER Esq., the proprietor, announces that orders may now be charged to Visa and Master Card.&lt;br /&gt;BEYOGLU KITAP ILIK LTD. [Galip Dede Caddesi 141/5, T nel-Istanbul 80020, Turkey. Telephones: (90-1)&lt;br /&gt;17 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;145 49 98 &amp; 149 06 72] issued a new catalogue, "Pax Ottomanica," which includes titles of Central Asian nature.&lt;br /&gt;IDC/Inter Documentation Company-Microform Publishers, specializing in microfilm publications of archival materials on a large number of topics, have announced their move from Switzerland to Leiden, Netherlands. Their catalogues may be obtained from: P O Box 11205, 2301 EE Leiden, The Netherlands. Telephone: 31-71-14 27 00; Fax: 31-71-13 17 21.&lt;br /&gt;ORIENTAL RESEARCH PARTNERS [Box 158, Newtonville, MA 02160-0158. Telephone: (617) 964-2818; Fax: (617) 720-3909] has issued its Frequent List number 38.&lt;br /&gt;UPA Microform Collections [44 North Market Street, Frederick, MD 21701-5420. Telephones: (301) 694-0100 &amp; (800) 692-6300] has a number of new issues pertinent to Central Asia. Stephen BLANK is now teaching at the US Army War College, Pennsylvania.&lt;br /&gt;Stephen L. BURG has been appointed Dean of the College at BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY. Richard N. FRYE was an official guest of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences during the commemoration ceremonies held in honor of the late Academician B. GAFUROV during December 1989.&lt;br /&gt;Vincent FOURNIAU has accepted a post in the Department of History, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON.&lt;br /&gt;Paul GOBLE has moved to Radio Liberty Research-Munich.&lt;br /&gt;Reshat JEMILEV, a prominent Crimean Tatar leader living in the USSR, has addressed a group at the HARVARD UNIVERSITY Russian Research Center during October 1989.&lt;br /&gt;Cemal KAFADAR has accepted an post at the Department of History, HARVARD UNIVERSITY.&lt;br /&gt;Kemal H. KARPAT has announced that the Fourth International Central Asian Conference will be held at the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, 27-30 September 1990.&lt;br /&gt;Diane KOENKER has been appointed to the Directorship of the Russian and East European Center, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS URBANA- CHAMPAIGN.&lt;br /&gt;Eden NABY has been appointed to teach Turkic Literature at the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures of HARVARD UNIVERSITY during Spring 1990. During Fall 1989, she taught at the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations.&lt;br /&gt;Teresa RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE has been appointed as a Secretary of the Navy Fellow, US NAVAL ACADEMY, Annapolis, for 1989-90.&lt;br /&gt;Uli SCHAMILOGLU has accepted a post in the Department of Slavic Studies, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON.&lt;br /&gt;Nazif SHAHRANI has accepted a post at the Deaprtment of Uralic-Altaic, INDIANA UNIVERSITY.&lt;br /&gt;Thomas VENCLOVA (YALE UNIVERSITY) will be offering a course in the non- Russian literatures of the Soviet Union during spring 1990, within the Program on Nationality and Siberian Studies, The W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.&lt;br /&gt;BOOK REVIEWS&lt;br /&gt;18 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;Yasushi Inoue, WIND AND WAVES [Translated from the Original Japanese by James T. Araki]. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989). xi + 200.&lt;br /&gt;This historical novel by one of Japan's most popular writers is a useful and interesting book, whether one is interested in it as history or as literature. It is a curious mix of straight history, psycho-history and story-telling, and relates the events surrounding Khubilai Khan's two disastrous attempts at conquering Japan. As such, it involves the fates of at least four peoples, namely, the Mongols, the Japanese, the Koreans and the Chinese. While these attempts at conquest were at best peripheral events in the histories of Japan and the Mongol Empire, the same can hardly be said for Korea, which served as the base of operations and source of labor and provisions, and actually suffered the most from the campaigns.&lt;br /&gt;Thus, the most significant thing about this book is that it takes the view of the occupied and beleaguered Koryo Dynasty: events throughout are seen through the eyes of the main Korean figures, i.e. King Wonjong, who succeeded his father Kojong in 1259, his son King Ch'ungnyol, enthroned in 1274, Yi Chang-yong, Wojong's chief minister, Kim Pang-gyong, chief military commander and later chief minister, etc. The book's point of view is all the more significant when one considers that the author is Japanese, and perhaps this is another reason the book has been favorably received in Korea. Indeed, WIND AND WAVES has been translated at least twice into Korean.&lt;br /&gt;When this book first appeared in Japan in 1963 (Japanese title: "Fuutoo"), Japanese critics noted that it was in many ways a logical continuation of Inoue's other Inner Asian/"Silk Road" - related historical novels, in particular his AOKI OOKAMI ("The Blue Wolf"), which told the story of Chingis Khan. Critics also noted that this novel was the first in which Inoue used a strictly documentary, chronogical style and stuck closely to the historical record. Whereas in AOKI OOKAMI Inoue was apt to "fill in gaps in the historical facts with literary imagination" (Fukuda 1979, 218), in FUUTOO Inoue relies heavily on the Korean sources, namely the KORYOSA (History of Koryo). Fukuda even makes much of the fact that Inoue spent a week in Korea on a fact- finding mission for this book, although I would not.&lt;br /&gt;Inoue's choice of this matter-of-fact, chronological style inevitably led some critics (e.g. Kawamori 1963) to complain that "...the impressions of the characters are superficial: all are depicted with identical depth." On the other hand, Inoue's book succeeds in its realistic description of the abject suffering of the Korean land and people and of the agonizing of the highest Koryo officials as they tried every possible means to avert each of the campaigns and the awful consequences they knew they would have for Korea. Araki's translation also faithfully renders the mixture of ship's log-type narration and descriptions of the psychology and thoughts of the Korean King.&lt;br /&gt;19 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;Especially interesting, but ultimately impossible to verify, is Inoue's characterization of Khubilai Khan's personality and of his relationship with the Korean king. It is appropriate that this book should appear at the same time as Rossabi's new book on Khubilai Khan.&lt;br /&gt;One interesting side-effect or side benefit of this book is that it portrays for the Japanese a situation of colonial and military exploitation of Korea that is not very different from the experience Korea had with Japan earlier in our century. Thus, Hirano (1963) writes that "...FUUTOO opened my eyes to the bitterness of a tiny country in the process of being colonized, and to problems like occupation policy, agricultural levies for the troops, and failed military resistance. On this point, even though FUUTOO is a tale of the distant 13th century, it can be said to be a topical work."&lt;br /&gt;On the more mundane level, this book helps correct the view propagated in Japanese history textbooks that Koryo was somehow an accomplice to the attempted invasions and shared the blame for the damages suffered by Japan at the time. For us as English readers, though, it provides a useful starting point for more fundamental research into the events and personalities surrounding the attempted invasions, and is of some use for students of Korean and Mongolian history. For those who wish to delve deeper into the history here, I include additional references below.&lt;br /&gt;N.B. Korean here is transliterated according to the Yale System. Aoyama 1921. "Nichi-Gen-kan no Koorai [Koryo between Japan and Yuan]." Shigaku Zasshi 2-8, 9.&lt;br /&gt;Aoyama 1955. Nichi-Rai Kooshoo-shi no Kenkyuu [Research on the History of Japanese-Koryo Negotiations]. Maiji Daigaku Bungakubu.&lt;br /&gt;Fukuda H. 1979. Inoue Yashushi Hoodenkaku [Critical Biography of Inoue Yashushi]. Tokyo: Shuueisha. Hirano K. 1963. Review of FUUTOO in July 30 issue of Mainichi Shinbun.&lt;br /&gt;I Unkyu. 1972. "Wen uy Ilpon Cengpel Kochal - Kolye wa Wen uy Kwukcey Kwankyey lul Cwungsim ulo [An Examination of the Yuan Campaigns against Japan - From the point of view of Koryo-Yuan International Relations]." Honam Sahak 1.&lt;br /&gt;I Wenhyep (tr.). 1968. Phungta ("Hyentay Seykyey Munhak Cencip 6") Seoul: Sinkwu Munhwasa.&lt;br /&gt;Kawamori Y. 1963. Review of FUUTOO in the September issue of Gunzoo.&lt;br /&gt;Kim Chelmin. 1973. "Wen uy Ilpon Wenceng kwa Ko-Wen Kwankyey [Yuan's Japan Expeditions and Koryo-Mongol Relations]." Kentay Sahak 3.&lt;br /&gt;Koh Byong-ik [Ko Pyengik]. 1960. "An Aspect of the Korean- Mongol relations in the 14th century." Proceedings of the First International Conference of Historians of Asia (Manila), 332-338.&lt;br /&gt;20 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;Murai Shoosuke. 1982. "Koorai-Sambetsushoo no Hanran to Mookoo Shurai no Nihon [The Koryo Sambyolch'o Rebellion, the Mongol Campaigns and Japan]. Rekishi Hyooron 382, 384.&lt;br /&gt;Nakamura EIKOO. 1963. "Juusan-yon Seiki no Tooa Joosei to Mooko no Shuurai {The Far Eastern Situation in the 13th and 14th Centuries and the Mongol invasion of Japan]." Iwanami Kooza Nihon Rekishi 6.&lt;br /&gt;Nedachin, S. V. 1911. "Poxod Imperatora Xublilaia na Iaponiiu (Po Kitaiskim, Koreiskim i Iaponskim Istochnikam). Vyderzhki iz doklada [Emperor Khubilai's Campaign against Japan (according to the Chinese, Korean and Japanese sources). Excerpts from a Report]." In: Otchet o Deiatel'nosti Obshchestva Russkix Orientalistov v. St. Peterburge za 1910 god Prilozhenie II, pp. 31-65. St. Peterburg.&lt;br /&gt;Pak Hyengyun. 1969. "Ko-Mong Yenhapkwun uy Tongceng kwa ku Cenmal [The Circumstances surrounding the Eastern Campaigns of the Koryo-Mongol Allied Army]." Sahak Yenkwu 21.&lt;br /&gt;Pak Sangkyun (tr.). 1975. Phungta ("Ilpon Munhak Tay-Cencip 4") Seoul: Tongse Munhwawen.&lt;br /&gt;Reck, Karl-Heinz. 1968. "Korea und die Mongolen." Verhaeltnis 135-144.&lt;br /&gt;Rockstein, Edward. 1972. "The Mongol Invasion of Korea: 1231." Mongolia Society Bulletin 1:2, 41-54.&lt;br /&gt;Rossabi, Morris. 1988. Khubilai Khan, His Life and Times. Berkeley: University of California Press. {See AACAR BULLETIN Vol II, No. 1 for a Review by Buell.}&lt;br /&gt;J. R. P. King Harvard University &amp;amp; SOAS-London&lt;br /&gt;Leslie Dienes, SOVIET ASIA: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL POLICY CHOICES. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987). 289 pp. Softcover, 29.95.&lt;br /&gt;In a country of the enormous size of the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that imbalances in regional economic development have always been among the most challenging of the economic problems. Regional factors are becoming even more important under perestroika, because in this time of capital shortages and "self- financing" the outlying regions can expect less inflow of capital from the center to help equalize regional disparities in development. In this study, Leslie Dienes expands upon his extensive previous work with Soviet regional economic development and energy resources, including his collaboration with Theodore Shabad (to whom the book is dedicated), to analyze the role of national policy on economic development in the largest of the regions outside of the European heartland, that of Soviet Asia. Following an initial chapter on the problem of regional integration in the Soviet Union and the setting of the various parts of Soviet Asia, the book presents chapters on the role of energy in Siberian development, the Soviet Far East, Central&lt;br /&gt;21 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;Asia, population and labor in Siberia and Kazakhstan, and regional planning in Soviet Asia's development. Although Dienes covers economic development in an area "exceeding the size of Brazil and Australia combined," he manages to pack an impressive array of sources into this volume to provide considerable detail to support his analysis.&lt;br /&gt;As a result of the subordination of regional interests to those of the center, he writes, economic development in these regions has been primarily to serve the interest of the European core area (which he refers to as the "metropolis") and not the balanced economic development of the regions. In Siberia, the bulk of the investment capital has gone to the westernmost part (West Siberia and North Kazakhstan), especially for development of the oil and gas fields in Tyumen oblast. This part of Soviet Asia is close enough to the core that its raw materials can be transported to the European region for processing or consumption. Further east, the remoteness of Central and Eastern Siberia makes their resources --especially their energy resources such as coal and hydropower-- less useful to the center, and lack of capital has prevented development of a balanced industrial base to process their raw materials.&lt;br /&gt;These problems apply even more strongly to the economy of the Far East, which, in spite of the great distance from the European core area, remains dependent upon the center and is only weakly connected to other parts of Siberia. Lavish efforts -- including the building of the BAM railroad-- at developing its natural resources for export to pacific countries have not been particularly successful. Dienes concludes that "the outward foreign trade orientation of Siberia's eastern half remains essentially a potential, and a potential that is increasingly remote," (p. 87) but that the strategic situation will continue to cause the military to play a crucial role in the region's economy.&lt;br /&gt;Dienes blames much of the labor shortage in Siberia, which is so great that a major share of labor in the West Siberian oil and gas fields and in the Far East is supplied by temporary workers, on the poor living conditions, especially housing. Improvement in living conditions is partially blocked by rampant "departmentalism," uncoordinated development fostered by each ministry having its own agenda and providing its own facilities and services. Even efforts at creating Territorial Production Complexes, which supposedly should make possible cooperation among all economic organs, have been largely unsuccessful in reducing this "organizational anarchy."&lt;br /&gt;Unlike Siberia and North Kazakhstan, Central Asia and South Kazakhstan represent a zone of largely indigenous Central Asian population concentrations where internal factors, as opposed to the national policy decisions that dominate Siberia, are of increasing importance. Rapid population growth, over-supply of labor in contrast to Siberia's labor shortages, the process of "korenizatsiya" or nativization of the local economy and institutions, and increasing constraints on the availability of&lt;br /&gt;22 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;subsidies from the center are producing stresses which threaten economic development.&lt;br /&gt;The author concludes that, under Gorbachev's economic plans, the subordination of regional interests in Soviet Asia to those of the developed European part of the USSR will become even more pronounced. Investment will be concentrated mainly in natural resource development --especially energy resources such as West Siberian oil, gas and coal-- to serve the needs of the metropolis, while eastern Siberia will be essentially "mothballed" for lack of investment capital. This strategy may be possible with sparsely settled parts of Siberia, but is more problematic in the case of Central Asia, where the rapidly growing and increasingly restive native Central Asian population may not accept economic decline under its continuing plantation economy.&lt;br /&gt;In spite of the author's excellent coverage of Soviet Asia, the concept of Soviet Asia as a region of analysis remains somewhat difficult to accept. The author himself discusses at length the considerable differences between the two main parts of this Asian periphery: Siberia, a sparsely-settled and largely Slavic hinterland of the Slavic core; and Central Asia, populated by indigenous Central Asians, a "quasi-colonial dependency" of that Slavic center. Since these regions are so different in their relationship to the center, and, aside from a single chapter on Central Asia, the book is devoted almost exclusively to the various parts of Siberia, it might have been more appropriate to have limited the analysis to that vast region alone.&lt;br /&gt;Aside from this regional issue, over which geographers doubtless can legitimately disagree, and the paucity of maps (only three maps in a work devoted to detailed regional analysis), there is little to criticize in this excellent book. Dienes' exceptional knowledge of the literature, his first-hand visits to many of the areas discussed, and his thorough background on and long experience with issues of Soviet energy and regional development, have enabled him to produce what is surely one of the best works available on the problems and prospects of Soviet regional economic development.&lt;br /&gt;Peter R. Craumer Florida International University&lt;br /&gt;Helene Carrere d'Encausse, ISLAM AND THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE: REFORM AND REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL ASIA, [translated by Quintin Hoare, with a preface by Maxime Rodinson] (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) 267 pages.&lt;br /&gt;A number of the works of H. C. d'Encausse have been available in English for some years, especially her contribution to E. Allworth's CENTRAL ASIA: A CENTURY OF RUSSIAN RULE (1966) where she provided the main historical sections. It is therefore quite useful to have d'Encausse's history of reform in Bukhara&lt;br /&gt;23 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;available for use in English alongside her surveys of similar periods in Central Asia as a whole. This book is a translation of a work originally published in 1966 and reprinted in 1981 by a scholar of the Soviet Union who has since gone on to become one of the incisive students of 20th century Soviet politics in the West. The present volume includes a number of helpful additions to the French versions, including a Supplementary Select Bibliography and a Glossary of Arabic, Persian and Turkish Terms. The town name index of the French version has been replaced by two indices: one subjects and the other of names.&lt;br /&gt;The main body of the work is divided into three parts and nine chapters: the parts are titled, The Origins of Reformism in Bukhara; In Search of an Ideology, 1900-1917; and National Reconquest, 1917-1924. In addition it includes four appendices: 1) a list of the rulers of the Bukharan Khanate 2) the statutes of the Istanbul-based 1909 "Benevolent Society of Bukhara for the Dissemination of Knowledge among the Masses," 3) the Manifesto of the Emir of Bukhara in 1917, 4) the reform program of the Young Bukharan Party. All three documents are translated from Russian sources. The author demonstrates her ability to tap the sources from the Jadidist period as well.&lt;br /&gt;Understanding both the colonial and reform period in Bukharan history helps in better realizing the processes that were taking place throughout Central Asia, including in Chinese regions. While much of the terminology for hierarchy differs in Kashgar for example, nevertheless the pattern of relationships within the three basic parts of society --the tribal, religious and emirate rulers-- reflects similarities. In the same way, the road to reform follows roughly similar turns in neighboring Muslim areas. The author points to crosscurrents when her sources allow, thus providing, with her detailed study of Bukhara, the possibilities for creating a model for comparison elsewhere. The author's remarks on the doomed Bukharan attempts at rebellion against Tsarist colonial rule, in particular the climate in the late 19th century when the Andijan revolt and its antecedents take place, provide leads for exploration of similar movements in and around Bukhara.&lt;br /&gt;This English edition has appeared unrevised from the earlier French original. For this reason perhaps, it retains some peripheral factual errors. The exile periodical "Qanun" is attributed to Sayyid Jamaluddin al-Afghani (p. 66) when it is the work of another important Iranian reformer of the 19th century Mirza Malkom Khan. While it is known from other sources that al- Afghani excited considerable interest among Tsarist Muslims, one wonders whether "Qanun" also penetrated into Bukhara. The author makes the same erroneous association in the volume edited by Allworth referenced above. Likewise the Khwajagan are identified as "a branch of the Yassawiya specific to Bukhara," (P. 34 fn. 132; p. 212) when, subsequent analysis of 14th-17th century histories has revealed the Khwajagan as a variety of a powerful Central Asian mystical order of independent families and/or&lt;br /&gt;24 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;silsileh frequently associated with the Naqshbandiyya. In addition to these problems, one would have wished for a more careful and complete glossary explaining terms such as "jeti- khan" (seven khans) (p. 66), where neither the language of the term (Uzbek? Chaghatay?) is clear nor the function and organization of the group. Perhaps parallels may be found if the term was referenced in some way. Despite these problems, this work will be indispensible in the classroom English-medium English.&lt;br /&gt;Eden Naby Harvard University&lt;br /&gt;Edward Allworth, (ed.) CENTRAL ASIA -- 120 YEARS OF RUSSIAN RULE. (Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1989).&lt;br /&gt;Duke University Press has added to its Central Asia Book Series an attractive large-format paperback reprint, complete with maps and illustrations, of the original 1967 Columbia University Press edition of this book. The original included the work of six specialists. Seven of its sixteen chapters were written by Helen Carrere d'Encausse. The book was and remains a compendium of information and analysis otherwise unavailable in a single volume. The original edition extended to 550 pages. Another book would have been necessary to take advantage of the new material that has become available --and continues to emerge- - bearing on the pre-1967 Soviet period, let alone deal with the past 20 years of Central Asian history. The compromise was to add Chapter 17, an additional 45 pages by editor Edward Allworth. The result is invariably unsatisfactory, for the new chapter is both deficient in information and inadequate in many of its tentative judgements.&lt;br /&gt;The era of glasnost' and perestroika is not only opening up archives, reviving memories and leading to rehabilitation of previously condemned political and cultural figures, it is giving Central Asians the opportunity and the impetus to think anew about their history, their culture and, above all, the condition of their economy and society. A process of reevaluation of the entire Soviet period is under way in Central Asia, as in the rest of the Soviet Union. It is probably irreversible. The reevaluation, we can already sense, is not going to be confined to the Soviet period. Central Asians are reevaluating the entire Russian colonial experience. The process is perhaps most advanced in Kazakhstan, which receives comparatively little attention in the new concluding chapter, but it is in motion everywhere in Central Asia. It is not confined to Soviet Central Asia, in fact, but to an increasing extent Soviet Central Asians are beginning to communicate across the borders that have cut them off from kin living under Chinese rule to the East and in Afghanistan and Iran to the South. All Central Asians are showing a marked tendency to look Westward too, and there the Turkish Republic attracts their attention. Last year a Kazakh scholar in Alma Ata begged me to send him publications from the Turkish Republic. "Everything that&lt;br /&gt;25 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;is published there is interesting for us," he said, "for Turkey is the only independent Turkic nation in the world and we know they have been successful in managing their economy and a democratic political system. We need to know more about their experience to liberate ourselves."&lt;br /&gt;Given the speed with which developments have unfolded in the Soviet Union during the past three years, many of Allworth's judgements, though usually qualified, seem too conservative. There is a good discussion of literary developments in the 1970s and 1980s when ideas and aspirations that are now discussed daily in public and in the press could only be expressed indirectly in novels and plays or alluded to in poetry. Allworth notes that "schoolbooks have insistently emphasized an ideology that thinking people of the region often repudiate," and adds: "The ethnic question remains the crucial one for Russian authorities and for the Central Asians as well." (p. 539) True. But is bilingualism really making so much headway? (p. 538) And will "Central Asian children begin to accept Russian literature as part of their own heritage"? Doubtful, I should think, in light of the cultural resurgence that has now been reinforced politically with the formation of vocal national front organizations that appear to be gaining support steadily. Recent developments lead one to wonder, in fact --if Central Asia were to attain a level of autonomy or independence comparable to that which India enjoys-- whether the Russian language and Russian culture would survive at all, as the English language and culture in India?&lt;br /&gt;How firmly is use of the Cyrillic alphabet for the indigenous languages established? Is the renewed interest in the Arabic script which has manifested itself during the past two years a passing phenomenon? Nothing but speculation is possible, given the fact that all these issues are in a process of accelerating evolution. My guess would be that rather than shifting back to Arabic, Central Asians would eventually gravitate toward the Latin alphabet [in use between ca. 1928- 1939] as used in the Turkish Republic. There is a keen interest in it in Azerbaijan. The cataclysmic developments in Azerbaijan during the first weeks of 1990 may have profound resonance in Central Asia. In late January 1990 Olzhas Suleymenov rushed to Baku to demonstrate solidarity with the Azerbaijanis. Another of Allworth's speculative comments prompts debate: "Divergence between regional sublanguages, more than the intrusion of Russian as a second tongue, may represent a most divisive factor within the culture of Central Asia, under certain circumstances." (p. 543)&lt;br /&gt;He was wise to qualify this judgement, for no clear answer to this question is possible now. A strong sense of Turkic/Islamic solidarity is developing throughout the Soviet Union. All the Turkic peoples, not only the Central Asians, are showing a heightened interest in each other. This tendency may overwhelm the particularist tendencies the Soviets tried for so long to foster. The very dialectic process that Marx was so fond&lt;br /&gt;26 AACAR BULLETIN VOL. III, NO. 1, SPRING 1990&lt;br /&gt;of may be at work here: changes the Soviets tried to engineer are rejected, even though they may have some logic, for the very reason that they were imposed from Moscow by Russians and communists who can now be openly scorned.&lt;br /&gt;Nothing in Allworth's judgements strikes me as already more dated than his comments on Islam: "A tendency by some outsiders, including Soviet Russians, to see threats to the state from what they term a resurgent Islam...probably have exaggerated the potential of religious revival as a disruptive social or political thrust in the region. The region has undergone greater change through modern education and development than most other neighboring countries. The fashion in the West of generally categor
